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ATOMIC WEAPONS AND AMERICAN POLICY

By J. Robert Oppenheimer

IT IS possible that in the large light of history, if indeed there is to be history, the atomic bomb will appear not very different than in the bright light of the first atomic explosion. Partly because of the mood of the time, partly because of a very clear prevision of what the technical developments would be, we had the impression that this might mark, not merely the end of a great and terrible war, but the end of such wars for mankind.

Two years later Colonel Stimson was to write in *Foreign Affairs,* "The riven atom, uncontrolled, can be only a growing menace to us all. . . ." In the same paragraph he wrote, "Lasting peace and freedom cannot be achieved until the world finds a way toward the necessary government of the whole."[1] Earlier, shortly after the war's end, the Government of the United States had put forward some modest suggestions, responsive to these views, for dealing with the atom in a friendly, open, coöperative way. We need not argue as to whether these proposals were stillborn. They have been very dead a long, long time, to the surprise of only a few. Openness, friendliness and coöperation did not seem to be what the Soviet Government most prized on this earth.

It should not be beyond human ingenuity for us to devise less friendly proposals. We need not here detail the many reasons why they have not been put forward, why it has appeared irrelevant and grotesque to do so. These reasons range from the special difficulties of all negotiation with the Soviet Union, through the peculiar obstacles presented by the programmatic hostility and the institutionalized secretiveness of Communist countries, to what may be regarded as the more normal and familiar difficulties of devising instruments for the regulation of armaments in a world without prospect of political settlement.

[1] "The Challenge to Americans," by Henry L. Stimson. *Foreign Affairs,* October 1947.

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Instead we came to grips, or began to come to grips, with the massive evidences of Soviet hostility and the growing evidences of Soviet power, and with the many almost inevitable, yet often tragic, elements of weakness, disharmony and disunity in what we have learned to call the Free World. In these preoccupations —one wholly negative, and one largely positive though very difficult—the atom, too, was given a simple rôle, and the policy followed was a fairly simple one. The rôle was to be one ingredient of a shield: a shield composed also in part of the great industrial power of America, and in part of the military and, even more, the political weaknesses of the Soviet Union. The rule for the atom was: "Let us keep ahead. Let us be sure that we are ahead of the enemy."

Today it would seem that, however necessary these considerations and these policies may be, they are no longer nearly sufficient. The reason for that one can see when one looks at the character of the arms race. The reason for that one can see when one compares the time-scale of atomic developments here and abroad with the probable time-scale of deep political changes in the world.

It is easy to say "let us look at the arms race." I must tell about it without communicating anything. I must reveal its nature without revealing anything; and this I propose to do.

There are three countries embarked on this race: The United Kingdom—and of that we need to note only that it is unfortunate that so talented and hard-pressed a country, so close to us in history and tradition, should be doing all this separately from us—ourselves, and the U.S.S.R.

As for the U.S.S.R., it has recently been said officially, and thus may be repeated with official sanction, that it has produced three atomic explosions, and is producing fissionable material in substantial quantities. I should like to present the evidence for this; I cannot. We do need one word of warning: this is evidence which could well be evidence of what the Government of the U.S.S.R. wants us to think rather than evidence of what is true. I may, however, record my own casual, perhaps too rough guess as to how the U.S.S.R. stands in relation to us in the field of atomic munitions. This does not refer at all to other elements of armament. I think that the U.S.S.R. is about four years behind us. And I think that the scale of its operations is not as big as ours was four years ago. It may be something like half as big as ours

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then was. This is consistent with the facts known to us. It has not been proven by them, by any means.

This sounds comfortably reassuring. It sounds as though the job of keeping ahead were being satisfactorily accomplished. But in order to assay what it means, we have to know something of what it is that they are four years behind, how fast the situation is likely to change, and what it means to be half as big as we are.

When Hiroshima was bombed there was a single plane. There was no air opposition. We flew straight in at medium height, at rather low speed, over the city of Hiroshima; we dropped one bomb with an energy release the equivalent of about fifteen thousand tons of TNT. It killed more than seventy thousand people and produced a comparable number of casualties; it largely destroyed a medium-sized city. That we had in mind. But we also had in mind, and we said, that it was not a question of one bomb. It would become a question of ten, and then one hundred, and then a thousand, and then ten thousand, and then maybe one hundred thousand. We knew—or, rather, we did not know, but we had very good reason to think—that it was not a question of ten thousand tons but of one hundred thousand and then a million tons, and then ten million tons and then maybe one hundred million tons.

We knew that these munitions could be adapted, not merely to a slow medium bomber operating where we had almost complete air supremacy, but to methods of delivery more modern, more flexible, harder to intercept, and more suitable for combat as it might be encountered today.

Today all of this is in train. It is my opinion that we should all know—not precisely, but quantitatively and, above all, authoritatively—where we stand in these matters; that we should all have a good idea of how rapidly the situation has changed, and of where we may stand, let us say, three, four, or five years ahead, which is about as far as one can see. I shall revert to the reasons why I think it important that we all know of these matters. I cannot write of them.

What I can say is this: I have never discussed these prospects candidly with any responsible group, whether scientists or statesmen, whether citizens or officers of the Government, with any group that could steadily look at the facts, that did not come away with a great sense of anxiety and somberness at what they saw. The very least we can say is that, looking ten years ahead, it

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is likely to be small comfort that the Soviet Union is four years behind us, and small comfort that they are only about half as big as we are. The very least we can conclude is that our twenty-thousandth bomb, useful as it may be in filling the vast munitions pipelines of a great war, will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two-thousandth. The very least we can say is that, as Mr. Gordon Dean has emphasized, there will come a time when, even from the narrowest technical point of view, the art of delivery and the art of defense will have a much higher military relevance than supremacy in the atomic munitions field itself.

There are other aspects of the arms race; though they may be well-known, they are worth mentioning. We developed the atomic bomb under the stimulus of the fear that the Germans might be at it. We deliberated at length on the use of the bomb against Japan; indeed it was Colonel Stimson who initiated and presided over these thorough deliberations. We decided that it should be used. We have greatly developed and greatly increased our atomic activities. This growth, though natural technically, is not inevitable. If the Congress had appropriated no money, it would not have occurred. We have made our decision to push our stockpiles and the power of our weapons. We have from the first maintained that we should be free to use these weapons; and it is generally known we plan to use them. It is also generally known that one ingredient of this plan is a rather rigid commitment to their use in a very massive, initial, unremitting strategic assault on the enemy.

This arms race has other characteristics. There has been relatively little done to secure our defense against the atom; and in the far more tragic and difficult problem of defending our Allies in Europe still less has been done. This does not promise to be an easy problem.

Atomic weapons are not just one element of an arsenal that we hope may deter the Soviet Government, or just one of the means we think of for putting an end to a war, once started. It is, perhaps, almost the only military measure that anyone has in mind to prevent, let us say, a great battle in Europe from being a continuing, agonizing, large-scale Korea. It is the only military instrument which brings the Soviet Union and the United States into contact—a most uncomfortable and dangerous contact—with one another.

Atomic weapons, as everyone knows, have been incorporated

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in the plans for the defense of Europe. They have been developed for many tactical military uses, as in the anti-submarine campaign, the air campaign, and the ground campaign in the European theater; and these potential applications continue to ramify and multiply. Yet the Europeans are rather in ignorance what these weapons are, how many there may be, how they will be used and what they will do. It thus needs to be remarked, as we shall need to remark again, that for Europe the atomic weapon is both a much needed hope of effective defense and a terrible immediate peril, greater even than for this country.

These are some of the peculiarities of this arms race, marked for us by a very great rigidity of policy, and a terrifyingly rapid accumulation, probably on both sides, of a deadly munition. When we think of the terms in which we in this country tend to talk of the future, the somberness with which thoughtful men leave a discussion of the subject is not wholly ununderstandable. There are two things that everyone would like to see happen; but few people, if any, confidently believe that they will happen soon. One is a prompt, a happily prompt reform or collapse of the enemy. One is a regulation of armaments as part of a general political settlement—an acceptable, hopeful, honorable and humane settlement to which we could be a party.

There is nothing repugnant in these prospects; but they may not appear to be very likely in the near future. Most of us, and almost all Europeans, appear to regard the outbreak of war in this near future as a disaster. Thus the prevailing view is that we are probably faced with a long period of cold war in which conflict, tension and armaments are to be with us. The trouble then is just this: during this period the atomic clock ticks faster and faster. We may anticipate a state of affairs in which two Great Powers will each be in a position to put an end to the civilization and life of the other, though not without risking its own. We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life.

This prospect does not tend to make for serenity; and the basic fact that needs to be communicated is that the time in which this will happen is short, compared to the time in which reasonable men may have some confidence in a reasonable amelioration or even alteration of the great political troubles of our time.

In this prospect, surely, we shall need all the help and wisdom and resourcefulness we can muster. This, in all probability, is a

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very tough fix. There are three things we need to remember, three things that are very sharp. It is perilous to forget any one of them. One is the hostility and the power of the Soviet. Another is the touch of weakness—the need for unity, the need for some stability, the need for armed strength on the part of our friends in the Free World. And the third is the increasing peril of the atom. The problem is straightforward, if not easy, if we forget the last. It is easy if we forget the first. It is hard if we remember all three. But they are all there.

We need the greatest attainable freedom of action. We need strength to be able to ask whether our plans for the use of the atom are, all things considered, right or wrong. We need the freedom of action necessary—and we do not have it today—to be able to negotiate, should an opportunity for that at some future time appear.

Much will be needed to bring us this freedom of action. Some of it we cannot write about, because it has not occurred to us. Some we cannot write about because it would not be proper for anything but official discussion. An example may be the question of whether, under what circumstances, in what manner, and with what purpose to communicate with the Soviet Government on this and related problems.

But there are three reforms which seem so obvious, so important, so sure to be salutary that I should like to discuss them briefly. One has to do with making available to ourselves, in this tough time, the inherent resources of a country like ours and a government like ours. These resources are not available today. The second has to do with making available the resources of a coalition of governments, bound together in an alliance, yet at the moment foreclosed from discussing one of the principal factors that affects the destiny of the alliance and of all its members. The third has to do with taking measures to put off, to moderate, to reduce the dangers of which we have spoken. I shall deal with each of these.

The first is candor—candor on the part of the officials of the United States Government to the officials, the representatives, the people of their country. We do not operate well when the important facts, the essential conditions, which limit and determine our choices are unknown. We do not operate well when they are known, in secrecy and in fear, only to a few men.

The general account of the atomic arms race that has been out-

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lined here can, of course, be found in the public press, together with a great deal of detailed information, some true, and much largely false. This mass of published rumor, fact, press release and speculation could yield, upon analysis, a fairly solid core of truth; but as it stands, it is not the truth. The consequences of such ignorance may seem obvious; but we may recall two examples that illustrate well what they are.

It must be disturbing that an ex-President of the United States, who has been briefed on what we know about the Soviet atomic capability, can publicly call in doubt all the conclusions from the evidence. Perhaps this was primarily because it was all so secret that it could not be talked about, or thought about, or understood. It must be shocking when this doubt, so recently expressed, is compounded by two men, one of them a most distinguished scientist, who headed one of the great projects of the Manhattan District during the war, and one of them a brilliant officer, who was in over-all charge of the Manhattan District. These two men are not now employed by any agency of the Government concerned with these questions; therefore they did not have access to the evidence. Thus their advice is unavailing, their public counsel wrong.

A second example may illustrate further. A high officer of the Air Defense Command said—and this only a few months ago, in a most serious discussion of measures for the continental defense of the United States—that it was our policy to attempt to protect our striking force, but that it was not really our policy to attempt to protect this country, for that is so big a job that it would interfere with our retaliatory capabilities. Such follies can occur only when even the men who know the facts can find no one to talk to about them, when the facts are too secret for discussion, and thus for thought.

The political vitality of our country largely derives from two sources. One is the interplay, the conflict of opinion and debate, in many diverse and complex agencies, legislative and executive, which contribute to the making of policy. The other is a public opinion which is based on confidence that it knows the truth.

Today public opinion cannot exist in this field. No responsible person will hazard an opinion in a field where he believes that there is somebody else who knows the truth, and where he believes that he does not know it. It is true that there are and always will be, as long as we live in danger of war, secrets that it is

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important to keep secret, at least for an appropriate period, if not for all time; some of these, and important ones, are in the field of atomic energy. But knowledge of the characteristics and probable effects of our atomic weapons, of—in rough terms—the numbers available, and of the changes that are likely to occur within the next years, this is not among the things to be kept secret. Nor is our general estimate of where the enemy stands.

Many arguments have been advanced against making public this basic information. Some of these arguments had merit in times past. One is that we might be giving vital information to the enemy. My own view is that the enemy has this information. It is available to anyone who will trouble to make an intelligence analysis of what has been published. Private citizens do not do this; but we must expect that the enemy does. It is largely available by other means as well. It is also my view that it is good for the peace of the world if the enemy knows these basic facts—very good indeed, and very dangerous if he does not.

There is another source of worry—that public knowledge of the situation might induce in this country a mood of despair, or a too ready acceptance of what is lightheartedly called preventive war. I believe that until we have looked this tiger in the eye, we shall be in the worst of all possible dangers, which is that we may back into him. More generally, I do not think a country like ours can in any real sense survive if we are afraid of our people.

As a first step, but a great one, we need the courage and the wisdom to make public at least what, in all reason, the enemy must now know: to describe in rough but authoritative and quantitative terms what the atomic armaments race is. It is not enough to say, as our government so often has, that we have made "substantial progress." When the American people are responsibly informed, we may not have solved, but we shall have a new freedom to face, some of the tough problems that are before us.

There is also need for candor in our dealings with at least our major allies. The Japanese are exposed to atomic bombardment; and it may be very hard to develop adequate counter-measures. Space, that happy asset of the United States, is not an asset for Japan. It is not an asset for France. It is not an asset for England. There are in existence methods of delivery of atomic weapons which present an intractable problem of interception, and which are relevant for the small distances that characterize Europe. It

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will be some time at least before they are relevant for intercontinental delivery. These countries will one day feel a terrible pinch, when the U.S.S.R. chooses to remind them of what it can do, and do very easily—not without suffering, but in a way that the Europeans themselves can little deter or deflect.

There have been arguments for technical collaboration with the United Kingdom and Canada; these have often appeared persuasive. There have been arguments for military collaboration with the NATO governments, and with the responsible commanders involved. General Bradley and General Collins both have spoken of this need, partly in order to explain to our allies that an atomic bomb will not do all things—that it has certain capabilities but it is not the whole answer. This is surely a precondition for effective planning, and for the successful defense of Europe.

Yet there are much more general reasons. We and our allies are in this long struggle together. What we do will affect the destiny of Europe; what is done there will affect ours; and we cannot operate wisely if a large half of the problem we have in common is not discussed in common. This does not mean that we should tie our hands. It means that we should inform and consult. This could make a healthy and perhaps very great change in our relations with Europe.

It is not clear that the situation even in the Far East would be wholly unaffected. It is troublesome to read that a principal reason that we should not use atomic weapons in Korea is that our allies would not like it. We need not argue here either that it is right or that it is wrong to use them there. In either case, our decisions should rest on far firmer ground than that other governments, who know less than we about the matter, should hold a different view than ours. It would be proper that the Japanese and the British and the many other governments immediately involved have a notion of what the issues really are.

Once, clearly, the problem of proper candor at home is faced—the problem of a more reasonable behavior toward our own people and our representatives and officials with regard to the atom—then the problem of dealing with our allies will be less troublesome. For it is pretty much the same information, the same rough set of facts, that both our people and our allies need to have and to understand.

The third point may seem even more obvious. I do not believe

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—though of course we cannot today be certain—that we can take measures for the defense of our people, our lives, our institutions, our cities, which will in any real sense be a permanent solution to the problem of the atom. But that is no reason for not doing a little better than we are now doing.

The current view, as is well known, is not very optimistic. Not long ago General Vandenberg estimated that we might, with luck, intercept 20 or 30 percent of an enemy attack. That is not very reassuring, when one looks at numbers and casualties and at what it takes to destroy the heart and life of our country. For some months now, a highly-qualified panel, under the chairmanship of Dr. Mervin Kelly, appointed by Secretary Lovett and reporting now to Secretary Wilson, has studied the complex technical problems of continental defense. There are many technical developments that have not yet been applied in this field, and that could well be helpful. They are natural but substantial developments in munitions, in aircraft and in missiles, and in procedures for obtaining and analyzing information. Above all, there is the challenging problem of the effective use of space; there is space between the Soviet Union and the United States. This panel, it would appear, has been oppressed and troubled by the same over-all oppression which any group always finds when it touches seriously any part of the problem of the atom. Yet there is no doubt that it will recommend sensible ways in which we can proceed to try to defend our lives and our country.

Such measures will inevitably have many diverse meanings. They will mean, first of all, some delay in the imminence of the threat. They will mean a disincentive—a defensive deterrent—to the Soviet Union. They will mean that the time when the Soviet Union can be confident of destroying the productive power of America will be somewhat further off—very much further off than if we did nothing. They will mean, even to our allies, who are much more exposed and probably cannot be well defended, that the continued existence of a real and strong America will be a solid certainty which should discourage the outbreak of war.

A more effective defense could even be of great relevance should the time come for serious discussion of the regulation of armaments. There will have been by then a vast accumulation of materials for atomic weapons, and a troublesome margin of uncertainty with regard to its accounting—very troublesome indeed if we still live with vestiges of the suspicion, hostility and

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secretiveness of the world of today. This will call for a very broad and robust regulation of armaments, in which existing forces and weapons are of a wholly different order than those required for the destruction of one great nation by another, in which steps of evasion will be either far too vast to conceal or far too small to have, in view of then existing measures of defense, a decisive strategic effect. Defense and regulation may thus be necessary complements. And here, too, all that we do effectively to contribute to our own immunity will be helpful in giving us some measure of an increased freedom of action.

These are three paths that we may take. None of them is a wholly new suggestion. They have, over the long years, been discussed; but they have not been acted on. In my opinion they have not, in any deep sense, been generally understood. We need to be clear that there will not be many great atomic wars for us, nor for our institutions. It is important that there not be one. We need to liberate our own great resources, to shape our destiny.

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WILL BRITAIN AND AMERICA SPLIT IN ASIA?

By G. F. Hudson

THE difference between British and American approaches to the problems of the Far East is not the creation of fanatics or scoundrels but of geography and history. Though it offers the most recent menace to the solidarity of the free world, it is not new. It is still in essentials the difference between Vasco da Gama and Columbus. After all, the shape of the continents and oceans has not changed in 500 years, and even now that travel by air has traversed the limits between sea and land, it remains decisively important whether one goes east or west to reach the Indies. The Englishman traveling to Tokyo goes by "ports"—Suez, Colombo and Singapore—or by an air route via Cairo and Karachi; the American goes by sea or air directly across the Pacific from San Francisco or Seattle. This is no mere matter of convenience in getting from one place to another; it corresponds to a permanent difference of national location and to divergent habits of mind developed over centuries.

The very term "Far East" indicates the European approach to East Asia. For the ancient Greeks and Romans the lands of silk and spice, the Seres and the Sinae, the Golden Chersonese and Cattigara, belonged to the furthest east; the theoretical geographers said that one could reach them by sailing west, but nobody had ever gone that way. With the revival of geographical science and the urge for exploration in the fifteenth century, it was the lure of the Orient that drew on the caravels to new discovery; Prince Henry the Navigator looked south towards the tropic seas from his observatory on Cape Sagres and hoped to outflank the Moslem possessors of Egypt by finding a way round Africa to India. When Columbus set out to cross the Ocean Sea, the Portuguese had already established themselves in Guinea and had passed the Cape of Good Hope. But Columbus was less interested in India than in the riches of Cathay described by Marco Polo and in the fabled gold of Cipango concerning which he had reported on the unreliable authority of Kublai Khan's intelligence service. Cipango was to be reached not by going round Africa, but by sailing west from the Canaries. Had it not been for certain miscalculations of distance and the obstructive

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interposition of the American continents, Columbus might well have drunk tea as the guest of the Japanese Shogun in the Golden Pavilion of Kyoto.

It was Magellan, however, who accomplished what Columbus had intended; ships of Spain under his command passed South America and crossed the Pacific, arriving in those Asian waters which the Portuguese had already reached by way of the Indian Ocean. Spain alone among the maritime Powers of Europe regarded her Asian possessions as a *Western* extension of her empire. With the settlement of Oregon and California the United States became the heir to Spain in the Pacific and successor to the tradition of the Acapulco galleons. Americans took the initiative in opening Japan to foreign intercourse because for them it was not a terminus beyond China, as it was for the European traders, but a country on the way between San Francisco and Shanghai.

In the eighteenth century, trade with China was carried on by the East India Companies of European nations. The British, who became predominant in the trade at Canton, regarded it as an extension of their commerce with India, and in so far as the East India Company did not itself directly do business in China, the market was left to the so-called "country" ships sailing under license from India. Politically, India with her sea approaches became the pivot of Britain's policy as an oceanic and imperial Power. In so far as Britain looked beyond Europe in diplomacy and strategy, India and the Indian Ocean occupied the foreground of the picture; China, Japan and the Pacific belonged to the remote background.

True, by the beginning of the twentieth century Britain had acquired a very substantial economic stake in the Far East and for a few years Far Eastern affairs became of cardinal importance for British foreign policy. The Russian penetration of Manchuria after 1895 aroused fears in London that China was about to fall under Russian domination, and Britain made her first definite departure from "splendid isolation" in world politics by concluding an alliance with Japan to check Russia's Far Eastern expansion. But it has to be remembered that Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far East at this time was only an extension of a conflict of policies which already involved Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, and the alarm about China was primarily due to the British sense of weakness in that region of the world. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was intended to redress the regional balance of power,

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otherwise strongly in favor of Russia, by giving support to a nation able and willing to act locally against Russia. In the event, Russia was curbed by the war of 1904; but thereafter Japan in turn began to show aggressive tendencies, and Britain, increasingly preoccupied with the new tensions arising in Europe, was compelled more and more to turn a blind eye to Japanese actions damaging to British interests in China. In 1914 the Japanese alliance still paid dividends to Britain, for Japan entered the war against Germany and cleared German commerce-raiders from the western Pacific. But in 1915, locked in mortal combat with her European enemy, Britain had to tolerate without protest the "Twenty-one Demands" which came near to imposing a Japanese protectorate on China.

The pattern of British Far Eastern policy between 1905 and 1918 has since been twice repeated, first in relation to Japan between 1931 and 1941, and again in relation to Communist China since 1949. Its basic principle is to avoid, even at the cost of great sacrifices of interest and prestige, any involvement in a Far Eastern conflict which would require diversion of British power from regions of more vital importance.

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British foreign policy and strategy are ultimately based on a scale of priorities which sets Europe and the Mediterranean first, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean second, and the Far East by a long way third. If in a time of crisis certain interests have to be thrown overboard to lighten the load, those which are located beyond Singapore must be the first for sacrifice, and those from Suez eastward must be next; but the needs of security in Europe can never be sacrificed because the very existence of Britain as a nation depends on it. The fall of Singapore in the last war did not finish Britain; even Rommel's entry into Cairo would not have been a mortal blow; but had Hitler's army been able to cross the Channel in 1940, that would have been the end of everything for the British people.

The American scale of priorities is necessarily different. Situated between two broad oceans, the United States has never had to face the same kind of problem of strategic security as that which has been a condition of British foreign policy, and until very recently most Americans thought that isolation was a safe and profitable course for America to follow in world affairs. But

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in so far as America has emerged from isolation and become involved in the course of history beyond the oceans, the involvement has been as much trans-Pacific as trans-Atlantic. Indeed, it has been even more, for, although the Pacific is wider than the Atlantic, the American acquisitions of Hawaii and Alaska and four decades of sovereignty in the Philippines have brought America closer to Asia than to Europe. If there was one part of the world in which Americans, generally speaking, took little or no interest, it was that region comprising the Middle East, India and the Indian Ocean, which to the British was, and is, so much more important than the countries bordering the Pacific.

The experience of the last war simply confirmed and accentuated the divergence between the two angles of vision. For the British, the war against Japan was a sideshow as compared with the struggle in Europe. For the Americans, the two wars were approximately equal in scale and significance; if the Chiefs of Staff always maintained the strategic priority of the European fronts, American popular emotions were more deeply committed in Guadalcanal and Okinawa than in Sicily or Normandy. For the British, victory in Europe was the real end of the war, especially as rockets were still falling on London in the last days of the fighting; but for Americans the surrender of Germany taken jointly by the four Allied Powers could never be such a triumph as the capitulation of Japan received on board an American battleship by an American Supreme Commander. Indeed, the circumstances of the conclusion of World War II, which left the United States participating with Britain, France and Russia in the control of Germany and Austria, but with virtually sole responsibility in Japan, meant that America was more profoundly involved as a nation in East Asia than in Europe.

Another difference separating British and American policies in Asia and closely connected with the basic difference of geographical approach was the focus of view on India and on China respectively. Neither the characteristic British concern about India nor the equally characteristic American concern about China can be explained simply in terms of material interest or power politics; there is additionally in each case an emotional fixation, a sense of responsibility and a sentimental attachment which craves for reciprocal affection. The historical relations are indeed at first sight strikingly different in the two cases, for whereas the British governed India as an imperial Power, the

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Americans are not merely innocent of any former ruling authority in China but are the only nation among the Great Powers of the West which has never annexed or leased territory from China. Nevertheless, the concentration of American idealism on China, represented by intensive missionary and philanthropic activity over a long period, produced in America an attitude not unlike that formed in Britain by generations of imperial tutelage in India.

The respective predilections appeared in the difference of opinion during the war about the desirability of according China Great Power status as one of the Big Five in the United Nations and the anticipated peace conferences. The American Government was very anxious to give China this status (and eventually got its way), but the British did not consider that any useful purpose would be served by laying an exceptional international responsibility on a nation which had not really succeeded in creating a unified modern state before 1937 and had since then suffered shattering disorganization through the Japanese invasion. If, on the other hand, population were to be taken as the criterion of Great Power rank, the British were inclined to urge the claims of India which (at that time including what is now Pakistan) had a population almost equal to China's and a more developed industry and administration. The Americans, for their part, regarded the Indians as a colonial people who had not yet won their Yorktown, not in any way to be compared to the glorious, unconquered Chinese.

An observer of the international scene in 1945 would quite reasonably have judged the future prospects of American-Chinese relations to be far brighter than those of British-Indian relations. In India there was extreme tension, the Congress Party was in non-violent insurrection against a British Raj apparently unwilling to abandon the residue of its power, and in the opinion of many the situation was drifting towards a great catastrophe. In China, on the contrary, the National Government was about to return to its capital after complete victory over the Japanese invader—a victory gained with the decisive aid of the United States—and an era of the closest and most friendly coöperation between Washington and Nanking seemed about to begin. Yet the next five years reversed both prospects. In India, Britain finally ceded sovereignty without bloodshed to two independent successor states, very friendly relations were established with

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both of them, and both of them chose voluntarily to remain within the free association of the Commonwealth. In China, a civil war meanwhile brought to power a party which as a cardinal principle of its political faith was bitterly hostile to the United States.

It might have been supposed that, as British capital investment in China was still greater than American, and as the new "anti-imperialist," Russia-linked régime threatened not only these investments, but also Hong Kong and less directly Malaya, Britain would have been more shocked and alarmed than America by the Communist victory in China. The fact was just the opposite, and the reasons for it are not far to seek. For a decade Britain had been becoming more and more disengaged from the affairs of China, and America more and more involved in them. The Americans were conscious of having been involved in a great war primarily because of their refusal to abandon the cause of China's independence. If the United States had been willing to allow Japan to dictate terms of peace to a China which had already lost all her principal cities to the invader, there would probably not have been any Japanese-American war at all. When war broke out, its strategy, as far as America was concerned, corresponded to the basic war aim of liberating China. Whereas for Britain the war against Japan meant primarily the defense of India and the recovery of the conquered British territories of Burma and Malaya, the island-hopping advance of the American forces across the Pacific was directed towards the East China Sea. When the Americans captured Okinawa, they were nearer to Shanghai than to Tokyo. Meanwhile, the only relief to blockaded China came from American supplies transported in American aircraft (even though flying from British territory), and the Chinese Generalissimo was provided with an American Chief of Staff. In the event, of course, no American campaign on Chinese soil ever took place, and the capitulation of the unbeaten Japanese army in China, except for Manchuria, was brought about by the blows struck by American air power at Japan herself. But the United States undoubtedly played the decisive part in the liberation of China, and on the day of Japan's surrender it would have been incredible to any American that within half a decade Chinese schoolchildren would be taught that the overthrow of Japan had been accomplished by Chu Teh's guerrillas in conjunction with the invincible army of the Soviet Union.

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III

The conclusion of the Pacific war did not end American involvement in China, but increased it. The United States had undertaken to give war-ravaged China economic and military aid in the postwar period, and in particular to transport Chinese Government troops by sea and air to take over Japanese-occupied areas; on the other hand, the American Government was anxious not to be mixed up in the civil war which was breaking out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. The desire to stop the civil war, however, led America to plunge far more deeply into Chinese internal affairs than if she had merely supplied the recognized Government of China with arms and allowed it to get on with the job of suppressing internal revolt. It is irrelevant in this context to inquire whether the Marshall mediation, together with the imposed truce and the subsequent arms embargo, were entirely due to a humane aspiration to bring about peace in China or whether they reflected in part a surreptitious Communist influence on American foreign policy at that time. For the historian the essential fact is that America did assume responsibility for settling the affairs of China, and the disastrous sequel to these efforts could not but leave the American people with a strong sense of frustration and humiliation.

Even though American action at the end of 1945 had had the effect of depriving the National Government of its only chance of victory, the final outcome of the civil war appeared to both Chinese and Americans as a Communist triumph not only over the Kuomintang but also over the United States, and the cup of defeat has been all the more bitter for Americans to swallow because of the traditional special friendship between the two countries. The fact that for the last two and a half years a Chinese army has been killing American soldiers has hurt the American nation as a whole less than the outrageous misrepresentation of the American record in the Far East and the denunciation of past generosity in medicine and education to a backward China as "cultural aggression." The Chinese Communists are not merely a Marxist-Leninist party which has gained power in yet another country; they are, above all, an anti-American faction which has alienated the affections of the Chinese people from China's best friend. For this reason, America is basically unwilling to accept what happened in China as an irreversible decision or to admit that the "People's Republic" represents China as a nation. The

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British, on the other hand, do not share this attitude, and on account of their different relation to China in recent years have great difficulty even in understanding it. The British have viewed China since 1945 with the matter-of-fact detachment of a spectator who feels himself quite outside the game. They have no sense of failure because they have not tried to achieve anything; they are not greatly disappointed because they never expected postwar China to be stable; they do not like the new régime, but they think it has come to stay and hold that it must be accepted as an accomplished fact.

This difference of attitudes is primarily a matter of feeling, but it corresponds to a contrast of strategic preoccupations more definable in terms of national interest. As a result of the Pacific war, America has acquired a strategic "frontier" in the western Pacific, running down from Alaska through the Aleutians, Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines, over against the Russo-Chinese power bloc on the mainland of Asia. This defensive system is the Pacific counterpart of the Atlantic-European system, with its frontier from Norway to Turkey, in which America participates as a member of NATO. In the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the NATO Powers there would inevitably be from the outset a fighting front in the northern Pacific as well as in Europe and the Atlantic. The situation now is quite different from what it was in World War II. There was then ultimately a Pacific as well as a European war, but they were geographically separate spheres of conflict; Germany had no territorial base in the Far East; and Japan, though engaged in hostilities in China, remained neutral in relation to the European war for more than two years after its outbreak. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, straddles Europe and Asia, so that any crisis which involved the United States in an armed conflict in Europe would mean also a Russo-American war on the other side of the world.

More specifically, there are three dangers against which American strategic planning has to provide. In the first place, Siberia is less than a hundred miles from Alaska at the nearest point, and this is the only area in which it would be practicable for Russia to attempt an incursion into the North American continent; such a move might have but little real military importance, but the psychological effect of "carrying the war into America" would be so great that it would be essential to meet the attack successfully. Secondly, even though Russia lacks sea power comparable to

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that of Japan in 1941, the Pacific would probably be infested with Russian submarines from Siberian bases, and long-range missile-bearing aircraft might strike from Kamchatka at Hawaii and Seattle. Thirdly, Russia would probably attempt an invasion of Japan in order to gain control of her industrial capacity and skilled labor for war purposes. The entire burden of defense against all these possible strategic threats (which are implied in a hypothetical war with Russia, whether China is a belligerent or not) must be borne by the United States and Canada, with local assistance from the Japanese National Safety Corps in defending Japan. On the Atlantic side, in contrast, Britain and France are in the first line for any conflict with Russia, and there is no Russian territorial base close to North America.

Thus, even though it may be argued among the NATO Powers that Europe would be the main and decisive theater of war, America is much more directly exposed to hostile operations on the Pacific than on the Atlantic side and has to provide for a Pacific front without any of the European nations, but only Canada, as an ally. This fact cannot fail to influence American thinking about the Far East, the more so as America's European allies are not merely absent in the northern Pacific but seem to be quite unaware that a strategic problem exists there. For Britain and France the Far Eastern danger in a general war would be the hostile belligerency of China involving attacks on Hong Kong, Hanoi, Saigon and Singapore; the Soviet Far East does not come into the picture at all, nor does anything east or north of Hong Kong, which has become an absolute terminus of strategic interest. For America, on the other hand, the hostile belligerency of China would signify in the first place a southward extension of the Siberia-Alaska-Japan war theater, and China would be dangerous, not only as a springboard for invasions of Southeast Asia, but also as a base for air raids and airborne landings against Kyushu, Okinawa and Luzon. It is in this context that Formosa is strategically important; it covers the approaches from the mainland of China to Okinawa and Luzon. It does not, however, in any way cover Hong Kong, Indo-China or Malaya, and its fate is therefore a matter of indifference in the limited Anglo-French view of Far Eastern defense.

In the world as seen from London or Paris the Far East is above all "far." It is further away than is to be measured by mere distance in miles on the surface of the globe, for there are many

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countries intervening, and a space occupied by crowded lands is psychologically much greater than an expanse of empty sea such as lies between Seattle and Tokyo. But the Soviet army on the Elbe is terribly near. Britain and France have endured a European war at close quarters twice within 40 years, and all their political and strategic thinking is conditioned by their experience. France has been twice invaded and partially or completely occupied by hostile forces; to all Frenchmen who are not Communists the prospect of a Russian conquest (which would also be in part an East German one) is indescribably horrible. Britain, though not actually invaded, has been endangered in both wars by submarine blockade and in the last war was heavily bombarded from the Continent by bomber aircraft, flying bombs and rockets. With the addition of atomic weapons to offensive armaments and the further development of rockets and guided missiles, Britain faces a prospect of appalling devastation in any future war in Europe, and the supreme aim of her strategy in hostilities against Russia must be to hold the front as near to the Elbe as possible, so as to prevent a break-through into Holland, Belgium and northern France. So vital is this purpose both for Britain and France that almost everything else in the world seems to them of quite minor importance. Their governments desire to achieve the maximum concentration of the defense forces available to NATO (including the American) against a possible Russian drive into Western Europe and are desperately anxious lest any conflict in some other part of the world should seriously divert these forces away from the European front. This has been the basic motive of the European, and particularly British, pressure on the United States to refrain from any extension of the Korean war by direct action against Communist China.

Unfortunately, by one of those political developments which bring together people of the most diverse aims and views in support of a single line of policy, the British determination to reduce the risk of strategic diversion in the Far East has got so mixed up with the sympathies for the new China prevailing in certain left-wing circles, wishful expectations that Mao Tse-tung will become a Tito, and hopes for a revival of trade with China, that many Americans cannot see anything in the current British attitude to Far Eastern affairs but pro-Communism and commercial greed. The record of Sir Winston Churchill should indeed be a sufficient guarantee for any open-minded American citizen that

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British official policy is neither made in the Kremlin nor dictated by the merchants of Hong Kong. But it is beyond question that the issue of relations with China has been the most serious cause of friction between Britain and the United States since the end of World War II. Fundamentally, in spite of the tendency (which is not new) for London and Washington to adopt different views on the international law of *de jure* recognition, there is no real conflict of principle; the essence of the matter is that the British instinctively feel that war with China is something which must be avoided or kept within limits, whatever the provocation, while Americans, convinced of the justice of their cause, have had no comparable sense of risk in seeking a victorious outcome to the struggle in Korea. When the Englishman thinks of the Yalu, he never forgets the Elbe; it is only too easy, in spite of NATO, for the American to forget it.

In so far as Britain is willing to make any substantial diversion of strength from Europe, it would be not to the Far East and the Pacific, but to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. In 1940, while Britain was still in danger of invasion, Churchill took the risk of sending reinforcements to Egypt. Five of the independent members of the Commonwealth and several of the remaining territories of the British Empire are grouped round the Indian Ocean—Australia to the east, Malaya, Ceylon, India, Pakistan and the British Arabian protectorates to the north, Kenya and South Africa to the west. There are also the Middle East oil interests, complete loss of which would be a crippling disaster for Britain as a Great Power. This sphere of British policy is secondary to Europe, but has a priority far exceeding anything beyond Singapore. There is also as a diplomatic consequence of the British focus on the Indian Ocean a strong pull on British policy by India, which has been an additional factor of disturbance in British-American relations. Ever since India became independent there has been an effort on the side of Britain to adjust British policies in Asia to Indian views whenever possible and to avoid giving Delhi any ground for suspicion that India was not being regarded as a fully sovereign entity in the field of foreign affairs. In the United States, on the other hand, where there was formerly such widespread sympathy for Indian nationalism in its struggle to get rid of British rule, the policy actually pursued by an independent India has come as a very disagreeable shock and has been a cause of considerable annoyance. Mr. Nehru's

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ostentatious neutralism in the "cold war," the sympathetic attitude of India towards Communist China, and the Indian leadership of the so-called bloc of Asian and Arab states in the United Nations, all tend to produce tensions between India and the United States and these react on British-American relations because of the constant British desire to conciliate India and give full consideration to the Indian point of view. There is certainly a good case for arguing that this is, in any event, worthwhile in the general interest of the free world; thus, for example, the fact that the United Nations Assembly adopted the resolution on prisoners of war in Korea which was sponsored by India had the effect of morally isolating the Communist bloc on that issue. Nevertheless, the special association of Britain with the nation which of all non-Communist countries shows the greatest partiality for Communist China has obvious dangers for British-American harmony.

The history of the last five years shows that increases of Communist pressure in Europe tend to bring Britain and America closer together, while increases in the Far East tend to drive them apart. From the point of view of the Kremlin, the lesson to be drawn must, therefore, be to go slow in Europe but to keep the pot boiling in the Far East. There are some indications, even though it is still too early for any definite judgment, that the "new" Russian policy adopted since the death of Stalin has as its principal aim the separation of Britain and America, and that in so far as a real *détente* is intended it will be confined to Europe. If in the present political moods of Britain and America, Russian diplomacy concentrates on the explosive issue of the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, it will have a chance to wreck the whole structure of alliances laboriously built up for the security of the free world since 1947.

The most recent exchange of recriminations across the Atlantic must have made Stalin turn in his tomb in envy of his successor. It is certainly not going to be easy to achieve an adjustment of British and American policies over Far Eastern problems. But the more understanding there is in each country of the fundamental geographical and historical factors which determine the differing national approaches to these problems, the better will be the prospect of reaching agreement and of avoiding emotional reactions which take no account of the distinction between going east and going west to get to Cathay.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOVIET SUCCESSION

By Bertram D. Wolfe

JOSEPH STALIN was dead six hours and ten minutes before the Kremlin flag was lowered and the radio announced that the Dictator was no more. In an age of split-second announcements of death, there is something strange in this delay. No less strange were the official communiqués on his last illness. "The best medical personnel has been called in to treat Comrade Stalin. . . . The treatment is under the direction of the Minister of Health. . . . The treatment is under the continuous supervision of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government. . . ." Nine doctors watching each other; the Minister of Health watching the Doctors; the Central Committee and the Government watching the Minister. And all of this, by an inner compulsion, announced to the world. Who can fail to sense that the laws of life and death are somehow different behind the Kremlin walls?

Early on the morning of March 6, with all the morning papers missing from the streets, the radio announced that the *Vozhd* had died at 9:50 the night before. The communiqué included a call to maintain "the steel-like unity and monolithic unity of the ranks of the Party . . . to guard the unity of the Party as the apple of the eye . . . to educate all Communists and working people in high political vigilance, intolerance and firmness in the struggle against internal and external enemies." This call was repeated hourly all through the day.

Shortly before midnight the Party chiefs, in continuous session since their leader's death, announced that a joint session of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had come to the conclusion that "the most important task of the Party and the Government is to ensure uninterrupted and correct leadership of the entire life of the country which demands the greatest unity of leadership and the prevention of any kind of disorder and panic."[1] "In view of the above," the Communiqué continued, it was necessary to make at once a sweeping series of changes in the personnel and organiza-

[1] The words were *"razbrod i panika."* *Razbrod* means disarray or disorder. It is stronger and has a wider sweep than our word, confusion. Panic has the same meaning in both languages.

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tional structure of the leading Party and Government bodies. The changes completely undid all the personnel and structural arrangements made less than five months earlier by the Nineteenth Congress under the personal direction of the man who was not yet dead 24 hours.

The "call to steel-like unity and monolithic unity" and to increased "vigilance and intolerance in the struggle with internal and external enemies" continued to reappear in editorials and articles. It was repeated textually in Malenkov's funeral oration three days later. The warning against "disorder and panic" was paraphrased by Beria in his funeral oration and repeated verbatim in the leading *Pravda* editorial of March 11.

Disorder and panic! When Franklin Roosevelt died during his fourth term in office, could it occur to the Vice President who automatically succeeded him, or to the leaders of either political party, or to "the Government," to warn against disorder and panic? When George VI of England or Gustav V of Sweden died while still in royal office, could such words creep into the communiqués or the funeral addresses of those who knew and loved them?

Not even in young states just being born in turmoil and conflict, not in Israel when its first president, Chaim Weizmann, died, not in Turkey when Kemal Pasha died, not in Pakistan when Liaquat Ali Khan died, not in India when her unique political-religious leader Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated, not in China when Sun Yat-sen breathed his last, could anyone think of pronouncing the ominous words "disorder and panic." Those strange words bring us close to the heart of the mystery of the nature of the total state, of the nature of the men who rule over it, of their relationship with each other, with the people they rule, and with the rest of the world.

II

One searches history in vain for a case of a peaceful and bloodless succession to a dictator who has climbed to power by force and based his rule upon force without troubling to restore the ruptured fabric of legitimacy. When Caesar was assassinated, the triumvirate that followed tore the Roman Empire apart. The Directory that succeeded the terror of Robespierre was dislodged by Napoleon, who wrestled all his days with the problem of restoring legitimacy, only to end them on St. Helena. Hitler's *Tau-*

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sendjähriges Reich perished in a flaming bunker in Berlin and Mussolini's Imperium Romanum did not outlast his hanging. There had been "disorder and panic" when Hitler and Mussolini died, for the lack of a procedure for the succession to a dictator was reinforced by the invading armies closing in on the rubble of their cities. But the "disorder and panic" which Stalin's comrades speak of springs not from such external events but from their hearts and the essence of their system. A system that is based upon an unending war "on all existing conditions and institutions," an unending war upon their own people and upon all other peoples, cannot develop a legitimacy. The word "panic" escaping the lips of the rulers of the world's most powerful government betrays a fear that is ineradicably in their hearts: they fear the prostrate people over whom they rule, they fear the outside world which they plan to conquer, and they fear each other.

The Soviet Government is not a government by Soviets. The people have long ceased to elect or recall "Deputies." The Soviets have long ceased to elect their leaders or decide anything. Nor is the Soviet Government a party government either. Parties need each other as the sexes need each other, and party life ceases as soon as there is only one party and no opposition, just as sex life would cease if there were only one sex, *i.e.* no sex.

As the Soviets have long ceased to decide anything or select their leaders and officials, so the Party has long ceased to decide anything or select its leaders. What was once a party has become a "transmission belt" (the words are Stalin's) to convey and enforce the will of the leaders upon the masses. Both decision and personnel selection are from the top downward; a military-ideological-organizational apparatus, a pyramidal power structure culminating in what Max Weber has called a charismatic leader.

On the surface everything seems designed to last forever and to insure a simple, quiet, peaceful succession. Was ever such monopoly of power wielded by so perfectly organized a mechanism? Thirty-six years of continuity in government (is it not still called "Soviet?"). Thirty years of continuity of personal leadership in the person of the all-wise, all-powerful *Vozhd.* Over a third of a century of uninterrupted happiness of the people, of nonexistence of opposition. More than two decades of unanimous decisions on everything. Not the unity of human beings, but the unity of a monolith. Where is there a crevice in which might sprout the seedcorn of doubt, much less of disorder and panic?

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The Leader controlled the Politburo so long that at the Nineteenth Congress (October 1952) he could abolish it altogether in favor of a diffuse body so large and scattered that it could not be called upon to make day-to-day decisions.[2] The Central Committee had long before been made into such a body.

The chain of command was so clear: the Leader controlling the Politburo, the Politburo controlling the Central Committee, the Central Committee controlling the Party. And the Party, in turn, controls an imposing apparatus of police, army, bureaucracy, press, radio, meeting halls, streets, schools, buildings, churches, factories, farms, unions, arts, sciences, everything. All the power levers seem to function so smoothly. What it had cost Lenin and his associates so much travail and struggle to build, and Stalin so much struggle and bloodshed to perfect into the all-embracing power apparatus of the total state, seems now so perfected, so smoothly functioning. A ready-made machine, the greatest power machine in all history. Yet the first words of the orphaned heirs on the death of the Dictator are not human words of sorrow but ominous words about "disorder and panic" and "vigilance and uncompromising struggle against the inner and outer foe."

In all this mighty machine there is oppressive quiet, but no peace to insure a peaceful succession. There is a multitude of laws, but no legality to provide a legal and legitimate succession. The democratic revolution of March 1917 ruptured the legitimacy of Tsarism, but it set to work at once to develop a new, democratic legitimacy, out of the State Duma or Parliament, out of the City Dumas, the rural Zemstvos and the Soviets. It looked forward to convening a Constituent Assembly which would adopt a new democratic constitution and provide a fresh fabric of consensus, consent, acceptance, collective and democratic determination of policy, a multi-party system, a parliament, to secure the habits of willing consent which are the tissues of all normal governments and which make the death of a particular head of state a cause for grief but not an occasion of fear of disorder or panic. To use the terminology of the historian Ferrero, the Provisional Government set up by the first revolution of 1917 was a "pre-legitimate government," moving as quickly as the troubled times permitted from the ruptured legitimacy of the

[2] He doubtless set up a smaller, extra-legal body of men on the spot to consult with, not unlike the old Politburo.

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monarchy to democratic legitimacy. That is what it meant when it called itself "provisional."

But the Bolshevik Party, in November 1917, overthrew this "pre-legitimate" Provisional Government by a violent coup d'état, and then dispersed the Constituent Assembly which alone could have laid a foundation of democratic legitimacy. When they outlawed all other parties, including the working-class and peasant parties, they thereby drained the Soviets of all power as a "workers' parliament" or "workers' and peasants' parliament," and the Party began to rule in the name of the Soviets. Next Lenin outlawed all factions within the Party, thereby draining it, too, of all political life. Always excessively centralist and hierarchical, it now became a transmission belt for the will of the Central Committee. When the "servant" of the Central Committee, its General Secretary, executed the majority of the members of the Central Committee which he was supposed to serve, that, too, ceased to be a decisive organ.

Even as Stalin purged all dissenters and all he had reason to suspect because they were injured or aggrieved or because they found it hard to sing the praise of his perfections, the whole machine of power and force and propaganda got into high gear to make of this unpopular, colorless and unloved man a synthetic charismatic leader. The Leader who possesses *charisma* ("divine" grace) acquires one by one the attributes of divinity: omniscience, omnicompetence, omnipotence. In him all power is concentrated. Whom he touches with his spirit partakes of his grace. Whom he denounces shrivels into nothingness. He decides everything: linguistics, genetics, the transformation of nature, the disposition of artillery on every front, the quota and technique of every factory. Others get power only by emanation and delegation, and even then must be prepared to give him the credit for all successes and take upon themselves the blame and punishment for all failures.

So at the death of the Dictator, there are no parties to establish a legal succession by electoral contest. There is no Soviet constitutional provision for a successor to the post of self-appointed genius. There is no party which any longer decides anything, debates anything, selects anybody. There is not even a provision for a dictator, much less for a successor, in the Constitution or in a Party statute.

There is no moral code, either, to restrain the aspirants to the

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succession from framing each other up and killing each other off. In so far as they follow the precedents bequeathed to them, and in so far as they follow the real inner laws of the total state, that is precisely what they will have to do. It is to themselves that they are speaking when they call to an awed populace for "steel-like unity and monolithic unity of party and of leadership." It is from their own hearts that the words escaped concerning "disorder and panic."

III

Why not, asks the reasonable man trying to project himself into the irrational atmosphere of totalitarian dynamics, why not then a collective leadership? A triumvirate? A heptarchy? A decemvirate? The Presidium, maybe? The Central Committee? The Council of Ministers? The Secretariat?

Even in Lenin's day, before the Central Committee and Politburo had been drained of all political life and power, it proved impossible to arrange a succession by purely peaceful means, or by means which, at least within the party purview, might be regarded as lawful and legitimate. Lenin got three solemn warnings from the Angel of Death in the form of three partial cerebral hemorrhages. Only after the second did this man, bursting with vitality and a will to power over the entire world, begin to believe in his heart that death was approaching. Then at last he tried to prepare a "legal" and "peaceful" succession. Recognizing that he had acquired enormous personal authority, that perhaps without willing it consciously, he had dwarfed the Party and its leading bodies and become a personal dictator, Lenin began to fear that his lieutenants would tear each other to pieces if any one of them tried to become a Vladimir Ilyich the Second. With no clear understanding of the dynamics of the totalitarian process he had set in motion, he sought to reëstablish the moribund authority of at least one "collegial" body, the Politburo. His Testament proposed a collective leadership in which all his close lieutenants, working together, would replace him and together rule. For this purpose the Testament was carefully constructed, with a warning of the "danger of a split in the Party," with an adverse judgment on each of his associates to keep him from thinking that he was big enough to rule alone, and a word of praise for each of them, to indicate that none should be eliminated.

Collective leadership is difficult at best, but without democ-

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racy it is impossible. Where there are no constitutional rules for collective procedure, where in all fields there is dictatorship, where force settles all things, where opposition is not part of the game of politics but something to be eliminated and crushed, the whole momentum of the state and the system drives relentlessly towards personal dictatorship. So it was with Lenin; so it was with Mussolini; so it was with Hitler; and so it was with Stalin.

Even before Lenin was dead, Stalin began "disloyally" to gather into his hands the reins of power. The dying Dictator, speechless now from his third stroke, yet managed to add a codicil to his will: "Stalin is too rude, and this fault becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position. . . ." But Lenin's Will could not prevail against Stalin's will, and the innate dynamics of the machine which Lenin himself had set in motion. Stalin did not even permit it to be published in the Soviet Union.

Precisely because Stalin did not possess Lenin's moral authority over his associates, he found it necessary to use more physical power. The cult of Lenin's person among his disciples was spontaneous, and personally distasteful to him. Lenin had frequently used his authority and prestige to get his own way in disputed matters, but he opposed the development of a cult of his person. The cult grew up only around his embalmed corpse, fostered above all by the very man who was undoing his Last Will. For Stalin could claim infallibility only by first developing the cult of infallibility around Lenin and then making himself into the "best disciple" and apostolic successor. Thus the last repositories of some kind of legality and legitimacy, the Party Congress, the Central Committee and the Politburo, were deprived of their right to say *yea* or *nay* to anything. Unanimity, monolithic conformity and synthetic infallibility prevailed.

Lenin had defeated his opponents inside the Party by debate, sometimes tempered with a touch of organizational manœuvre and frame-up; but once they were worsted, he was careful to salvage the person and the dignity of the defeated opponent. But Stalin could not win by debate. His method was to enlarge the organizational manœuvres and frame-ups which were already a part of Lenin's techniques, to compel his opponents to besmirch themselves and to liquidate themselves morally by repeated "confessions." Then he killed them.

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There is a fearful dynamic to totalitarianism that drives it to rupture the entire fabric of consent and consensus. From thence springs its fear that men will not believe and not obey. But once fear is present, it drives to the use of further terror. And terror exercised against one's people or associates begets greater fear.

The free political process needs opposition as the lungs need air. Once opposition is outlawed, there are no limits to terror and fear. The thermometer measuring opposition having been broken, the quicksilver of opposition is instinctively felt to be everywhere. Everywhere there is fear, therefore everywhere there must be terror. Terror cannot be used against other parties and public bodies without invading one's own party and its leading bodies; until even one's cronies, one's palace guards, and one's doctors are suspect. The more inert the body politic, the more suspect it is and the more cause to fear it.

Stalin exacted a cult of his person that was the more extravagant because all who knew him knew his personal limitations. He was keenly sensitive to his inferiority as a theoretician and a popular leader. He knew that the men around him were his equals, in some way his superiors. This drove him to kill off all of Lenin's associates, to kill off all his "successors," and to surround himself by only lesser men, courtiers, sycophants, faction lieutenants, executants of his will. He exacted a cult of his person even from those he was about to destroy, and from the entire nation even as he tormented it. If Lenin's prestige was unable to bind his closest associates, who loved and revered him, to carry out his Will after he was dead, how much less likely is the enforced, repugnant, humiliating Stalin cult to bring his associates or his party to execute his Will?

Besides, this time there seems to be no Will. "In his unconscious," Freud has written, "no man believes in his own death." It is this which enables the soldier to hold on the shell-swept field, where a third or two-thirds must die, yet cling to the conviction that "my number isn't up." In the case of a dictator who aspires to absolute rule over all things and all men there is an exceptionally strong will to disbelieve in ordinary mortal limitations, so far as he is concerned. Lenin got three warnings from the Angel of Death, but Stalin, though aging, was rugged, and interviews with foreigners held only a few weeks before his stroke testified to his apparent good health. The stroke came suddenly; he immediately lost consciousness; within three days was dead.

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Moreover, Joseph Jugashvili Stalin, as all who knew him can testify, was jealous, resentful, envious, capricious and suspicious by nature. No one dared bid him prepare for death; none dared to try on the crown in his presence. As American presidents realize, it is unwise even in a democracy to announce too early in your term of office that you do not intend to run again. The very men of your own party begin to abandon you for the bandwagon of your anticipated successor, and power and leadership slip from your hands. But in a dictatorship, which tolerates only a single power center, it would be fatal to let anyone else openly try on the crown. A rival power center would begin to polarize, and the whole totalitarian régime would be called in question. His very benefactor and heir would become a danger to the Dictator if he began this unnatural abdication or renunciation of part of his total power.

As soon as anyone around him began to shine, however faintly, by the light of his own deeds, Stalin was swift to remove him from the stage. Sometimes the removal by the law of fear-and-terror led to purge. At other times, it led to mere rustication, a shift to a minor provincial post, as in the cases of Marshals Timoshenko and Zhukov. Sometimes, rumors grew that some one man was the "heir apparent;" then, mysteriously, an assassin's bullet or a sudden illness, or if we are to believe Stalin's last frame-up, "poison-doctors" brought the heir to his end. When shall we really know how Kirov died, and how Zhdanov died?

Thus the nature of the total state and the personal psychology of the particular Leader combined in Stalin's case to make it ever harder for anyone to grow big enough or acquire the prestige to fill his shoes, or don the mantle of the apostolic succession. The cult of his person grew until it filled the horizon and overarched the sky. Those around him, many of them very capable in their own right, were systematically reduced to dwarfs around a giant. Each fresh extravagance exacted from them in this cult of the master-of-everything, each blasphemous phrase in the litany of worship of a living god, diminished further the stature of the men around him, and made harder the process of building up a new charismatic leader after his death.

The only men who have a chance to try for the leadership are those who are in possession of the power levers which constitute the actual organs of government of the Soviet state. Molotov and Voroshilov, and to a lesser degree Kaganovich and Mikoyan,

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represent "Old Bolshevism." In so far as any new *Vozhd* may want to preserve an air of continuity with Lenin and the "Men of October," such "Old Bolsheviks" are useful as symbols. But they do not represent a real power lever. Stalin killed off virtually all the "Men of October" during the blood purges of 1934 to 1938. In 1947, on the thirtieth anniversary of the coup d'état of November 7, 1917, only 438 Old Bolsheviks who had joined the Party prior to the seizure of power were still alive and in good standing to sign a letter of thanks to Comrade Stalin for what he had done to the Party. The most important of these is now Molotov. Lenin pronounced him an "incurable dumbbell" and "the best file-clerk in all Russia." He is obstinate as a mule. *Kamennii zad,* Stone Behind, his own associates call him, and every diplomat who has tried to negotiate with him will agree. Unless he backs the wrong horse, he will undoubtedly be included in any entourage as a symbol of continuity, and someone like him or Voroshilov is likely to be vested with the title of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or some other such honorary badge. But Stalin was boss before he had any state titles, and Molotov and Voroshilov could not be boss if a score of titles were showered upon them. For the "Men of October," of which they are the enfeebled, diminishing shadow, are no more.

The new men, from whom the new *Vozhd* will emerge if the process is not interrupted before its completion, are the epigoni, the "sons," or perhaps the "grandsons." Lenin's Marxism was so different from that of Marx that one of his own admirers called it *marxisme à la tartare.* Stalin, killing off the Men of October, became the spokesman of the "sons," his Leninism became different from Lenin's as Lenin's Marxism was from Marx. The Malenkovs and Berias, and men still younger, who aspire to power, are men who never knew the great dreams and humane ideals of the nineteenth century Russian intelligentsia, never knew the excitement, the fervor and the misery of the Tsarist underground and exile, scarcely know except by hearsay the "heroic days" of the storming of the Winter Palace and the Kremlin. The world will watch with interest what these men, wholly formed and brought up not as underground revolutionaries but under the new régime of bureaucratic and totalitarian absolutism, will make of the heritage of Marxism and Leninism and Stalinism in the course of their struggle with each other.

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IV

The real power levers in this struggle are three: the party machine; the secret police; the armed forces. Potentially, other power groupings may be in process of formation: an *esprit de corps* among the state bureaucracy, for example, or among the industrialists and technicians. But these are only embryonic forces and not real power levers at present.

Who is in control of the party machine? While Stalin was alive, he controlled it. Whether he was General Secretary, or Premier, or simply *Vozhd,* all power and all decision emanated downwards from him and in his name. Because he had designated Malenkov in recent years as Secretary of the Party, or as first of a battery of three or five or ten secretaries (the number has fluctuated) it was assumed by the outside world, and by some in the Soviet Union, perhaps even by Malenkov himself, that he had his hand on the lever that moves that mighty machine. But often there is some central mechanism that is the key to the functioning of a machine, and, when that is removed, the levers no longer work. Stalin was such a central mechanism. All power concentrated in him, all cohesion. When he died, it soon became clear that no one was any longer in complete possession of the party machine.

For a few days, Malenkov acted as if he were, and the Party seemed to act as if he were. On the day of Stalin's death, *Pravda* quoted some lifeless utterance of his in bold type in the lead editorial, as formerly it had quoted Stalin. It did the same on March 7, 8 and 9. On the 9th *Izvestia* printed a photo of Stalin with Malenkov and a little girl. On the 10th *Pravda* published a photograph, retouched by montage, showing Stalin, Mao Tse-tung and Malenkov as a "big three," standing alone at the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Examination of the original photograph shows that Beria and Molotov were cut off in the "retouching," as well as Vyshinsky, who was actually signing the treaty, and many others. Sovfoto released a photograph of Malenkov with two of his three chins missing. Operation retouch had begun.

Greetings began to come from provincial congresses and gatherings to "the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., G. M. Malenkov." The press began to use the phrase "headed by Comrade Malenkov." Then suddenly, the number of quotes diminished. The "fat type" gave way to ordinary print.

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Quotes from Molotov and Beria began to appear along with quotes from Malenkov.[3] On March 13–15, *Pravda* ceased to use a dual title for Malenkov. From then on, in place of stress on his person, there was stress on "the Central Committee, consisting of people taught by Comrade Stalin, into whose hands Stalin gave the great Lenin banner."

The Supreme Soviet which was called to meet on March 14 to "ratify" the changes made on the day of Stalin's death, was postponed for a day without explanation. When it met, the list of cabinet ministers presented to it differed from the list that had been broadcast on March 6. Again no explanation. Secretly, the "Central Committee of the Party" had met on March 14, and come to significant decisions which were kept secret for a full week. The Soviet met only for one hour, one of the shortest sessions on record. It applauded the reports of the changes made on the day of Stalin's death, as mysteriously changed again by the secret meeting of March 14, but it did not go through the formality of voting its approval on anything. Malenkov told the Deputies: "The strength of the government will consist in its collective nature." Only on March 21, a full week later, was it announced that on March 14, Malenkov, "at his own request," had been removed as Secretary of the Party, and thereby deprived of the dual leading post which seemed to mark him for the succession.

Neither the editors of the regional and provincial press nor the Supreme Soviet had been informed of the decisions of the secret top party meeting of March 14. It is inconceivable that it was a full Central Committee meeting as stated, for that is so large (216 persons) that the news would have reached the editors and secretaries of the Constituent Republics. As late as March 21 and

[3] The satellite and foreign Communist press also took it for granted that Malenkov was being made into a new Stalin. Typical is the American Communist journal, *Political Affairs*, carrying material prepared in early March for its April issue. Of the three funeral orations, *Political Affairs* found room only for Malenkov's. And William Z. Foster wrote the lead article under the title: "Malenkov at the Helm." In it eight separate passages indicated that Malenkov was regarded as the successor. A few quotes will show the spirit of the article: "The prompt election of Georgi Malenkov to Stalin's post. . . . This (Marxist-Leninist) training constitutes the best possible preparation for the heavy tasks of leadership that have now come to Malenkov. . . . His superb Marxist-Leninist training and his high natural ability will make him a giant. . . . Today as Malenkov becomes the outstanding leader of the Party and the Government . . . Malenkov at the head of the Government . . ."

By the May issue, prepared in early April, Mr. Foster had repented of his rashness to the extent that in an article on "Stalin and the Co-existence of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.," he does not even bring in the appropriate quotation from Malenkov's statement on Stalin's policy of "coexistence" in the funeral oration.

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22, provincial papers continued to carry greetings to Malenkov in place of the column headed "News of the Day," and references to his dual titles and his position as "head of the Party" or "the Government" or both. Then suddenly this ceased. Most papers skipped one full day without publication—in many cases not the usual off day—and a surprising number of them reappeared next day with the name of a new editor at the masthead. At this writing (with provincial papers available in the United States only through the first week in April), a few provinces are holding out for bold-type quotes and greetings to Malenkov, while in Georgia Beria's name has been advanced at Malenkov's expense and he is being given sweeping credit for things previously associated with the name of that other Georgian, Joseph Stalin. Thus the situation remains tense and unsettled, but the great "operation build-up" has clearly broken down, or been visibly reversed.

When Malenkov first reported to the Supreme Soviet on the changes being made in the "Stalinist" Party and Government, he presented them as having been "contemplated and approved" by Stalin. Actually, they reversed in significant ways things that Stalin had done at the Nineteenth Congress. The Congress had abolished the Politburo in favor of a large and formless Presidium of 25. Now the Presidium was reduced to ten, in most cases the old Politburo members. Never before has a deliberative body in the Soviet Union thus contained an even number of persons, because of the danger of a tie vote. This suggests a state of deadlock and of bargaining over a precarious equilibrium.

The Secretariat, raised by the Nineteenth Congress to ten Secretaries, was now reduced to five, with Malenkov as First Secretary. On March 14, when Malenkov lost his secretarial post, he was replaced by Khrushchov. A few weeks later, Ignatiev, who had been elevated to the place of a Party Secretary only on the death of Stalin, was peremptorily dismissed in connection with the "doctors' frame-up." Thus the Secretariat would now appear to be reduced from ten to four.

No less startling were the changes in Stalin's governmental arrangements. The inner cabinet of 14 Deputy Premiers was reduced to five or six. Malenkov was made Premier, but he was surrounded by, and put under the obvious control of, members of the "Old Guard." To emphasize their importance, the Party performed the miracle of appointing four "First Deputy Premiers" to work with him. Though all four are called "Firsts" their

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names had to be mentioned in some order, therefore Beria was named as first "First," Molotov second, Bulganin third, and Kaganovich fourth First Deputy Premier. In addition, one more member of Stalin's old guard, Mikoyan, was named a Deputy Premier, the only one with no "First" before his title.

The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Security were combined into one single body, and Lavrenti Beria, whom Stalin had "kicked upstairs," was restored to his old post as head of the combined secret police forces. The Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy were combined into one, and Bulganin was made Minister, with two "First" deputies, Generals Zhukov and Vasilevsky. Thus the Army was brought back into the structure of carefully counterbalanced forces, and General Zhukov, whom Stalin had jealously exiled to a remote secondary post, reappeared as a kind of "representative" of the General Staff. Voroshilov, now aged 72, was made Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This might seem to be merely an honorary office, but in the delicate balance of forces, it too proved to have power implications, for on March 28, when Malenkov's recession had begun, it was Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium, rather than Malenkov, Premier and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, whose name was signed to the popularity-seeking decree on amnesty. If Stalin had chosen to issue an amnesty, he would never have let the chairman of a purely honorary body sign in place of him.

V

Lavrenti Beria seemed to be on his way out at the moment of Stalin's death. For more than a decade a favorite of Stalin's, he had first run Georgia as head of the Georgian police, and then risen to All-Union Security Chief. In 1946, after the post had been divided into two, a Minister of State Security and a Minister of the Interior, Beria was relieved of direct responsibility for either, and elevated to Deputy Premier "to devote full time to his main work." People assumed that the main work was either atomic energy and atomic espionage, or over-all supervision of both security forces. Beria's men were put in charge of both, as earlier his men had been put in charge of Georgia when he left for Moscow.

The first visible sign of Beria's decline was a large scale purge of his appointees in his native Georgia during 1952. Mgeladze, an

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anti-Beria man, became First Secretary of the Georgian Party, and with the assistance of police chief Rukhadze "crushed in a Stalinist manner" many lesser leaders. Stalin, as was his fashion, forced Beria to discredit himself with his own followers by sanctioning these purges. At the Nineteenth Congress in October 1952, Stalin eliminated Beria's man, Abakumov, Minister of State Security of the U.S.S.R., from his party and government posts. And on January 13, 1953, the lightning struck again. After patient preparation by Stalin and Malenkov, it was announced that the top Kremlin doctors were "poisoners," and that the deaths of Shcherbakov and Zhdanov, which had occurred while Beria was still a power in the Secret Police, were brought on by the doctor-poisoners. All this had happened because the Security Forces were guilty of "lack of vigilance." Things began to look ominous for Beria.

As a cerebral hemorrhage saved Stalin when Lenin was about to remove him as General Secretary in 1923, so death intervened to save Beria on March 5, 1953. The very next day, the Ministries of State Security and the Interior were recombined into one, and Lavrenti Beria's hand closed firmly on the mighty power lever. Beria was one of the three speakers at Stalin's funeral. It was he who made the nomination of Malenkov as Premier. On March 21, Malenkov resigned the post of Secretary through which Stalin had paved his way to power. But Beria had two serious handicaps to overcome. First of these was the unpopularity that has always clung to the head of the Secret Police. Beria's speeches began to include vows to protect the civil rights of the Soviet citizen and uphold the Constitution. On March 28, a sweeping amnesty of petty offenders was proclaimed, and the Penal Code was ordered revised "within 60 days."

On April 3, the "doctors' plot" was declared a frame-up, the anti-Beria police leaders held responsible, and placed under arrest. In the name of undoing an injustice, a counter purge thus got under way. On April 6, Semyon D. Ignatiev, whom Stalin and Malenkov had put into the post of Minister of State Security when Beria was losing his grip, and whom Malenkov had just made a Party Secretary, was accused of "political blindness and gullibility." On April 7, his ousting was announced.

Exactly one week later, on April 14, Beria struck back in Georgia. Secretary Mgeladze, Security Minister Rukhadze and "their accomplices" were charged with having framed up inno-

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cent Georgian leaders, "trampled down the rights of Soviet citizens," extracted "false confessions by impermissible means" (torture), "cooked up charges of nonexistent nationalism," and shown themselves to be "enemies of the people." The accused were rehabilitated and restored to their posts. That same day, new police chiefs were appointed in virtually all the Republics of the Soviet Union. All published names seemed to be Russian, regardless of the nationality involved, and many of them were known Beria men.

The other obstacle to Beria's rise to absolute power is a more insurmountable because more intangible one. Like Stalin, he is a Georgian. The once internationalistic Communist Party has long been playing with the fire of Great Russian nationalism and chauvinism. Now, if a second Georgian from an obscure conquered province succeeds the first, the Great Russians will ask: "Are there no Russians left to rule over the Russian land?" It is impossible for a man laboring under the double handicap of Police Chief and Georgian immediately to lay open claim to the apostolic succession. More than any other of the aspirants, Beria needs for a time the protective shield of "collective leadership" and anonymous "collegial bodies"—to rule, in so far as he can, in the name of the Party, the Central Committee, the Presidium, the cause of Lenin and Stalin. Thus his personal predicaments and the precarious equilibrium that marks the first phase of what will doubtless be a prolonged struggle combine to make an emphasis upon anonymity and collective leadership necessary for the present in a total state which cannot, in the long run, tolerate either collectivity or anonymity in its Leader.

VI

The Secret Police has its tentacles everywhere, in every factory, in every kolkhoz, in every Party organization. But the Party, too, has its cells everywhere, even in the Secret Police. The Army is riddled with Party agents and Secret Police agents and has been the most jealously watched power instrument of all. It was built by Trotsky who died in exile with a pickaxe blow in the back of his head. It was mechanized by Tukhachevsky who fell in the blood purges along with virtually the entire General Staff. Thereafter it bore a deep grudge against the Secret Police, which Stalin was apparently trying to mollify with his talk of "lack of vigilance of the Security organs" in the "doctors' plot

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against leading military figures." Generals Zhukov, Timoshenko, Vasilevsky, Konev, Sokolovsky, have been moved about by Stalin and Malenkov like musical chairs to prevent their popularity from growing too great, and watched over by a political "General, Marshal, and War Minister," Bulganin. Yet it has a strong *esprit de corps,* and if it can unite on a candidate it may well in a long struggle become the most powerful contender.

Moreover, in this totalitarian land, the Army is the only potentially democratic power instrument. The Russian and Soviet peoples cannot possibly identify themselves with the Party Machine that has enslaved and driven them and waged upon them an unending war of nerves. Still less with the Secret Police that has tortured, enslaved, purged. But the Army did serve them in defending their frontiers and homes against the invader. And the Army is a part of them and they of it, since all able-bodied males serve in it, and in it are better fed, clothed and housed than at any other time in their lives. Finally, the Army is thought of as for defense rather than for a deeply-feared aggressive war. The people trust the Army more than they do the Party or the Police, and around it they could most readily be rallied.

All three power levers, moreover, are not mechanical things, but living organisms with hundreds of thousands, even millions, of members. Such power levers can be used symbolically in manœuvring for position in a muted struggle. But they cannot be brought into actual play surreptitiously and behind the scenes. If the contenders do not manage to finish each other off, by some combination of subordination and purge, behind the scenes, then three great power machines, each embracing their millions of members and their families, may be brought into action in one or another combination.

Then whoever appeals to the Party must appeal to some traditions, some program, something in the past and present and something proposed for the future. Whoever appeals to the Army likewise. And to the Secret Police the same. If the struggle is prolonged and enlarged, there are other reserves of power to be tapped: the moribund trade unions, the regions and nationalities, the local party members, the nascent *esprit de corps* of officials and technicians, the kolkhozes, the factories. In any case the struggle to replace the charismatic leader with another of the same type is inseparable from the total state. And, overt or covert, the struggle is bound to smolder for a long time.

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If ever these power levers are to be used not merely as make-weights but brought into play as actual levers of power, then anything might happen. Then the Empire, which cannot take orders from an upstart as easily as it could from Stalin, may regain its independent life. The Soviet peoples, so long in chains, may then recover their freedom, while the outside world, safe only when Russia is democratic once more, may regain its lost hope of a genuine, just and enduring peace.

But the current "peace talk" must not be confused with such genuine peace. The men in the Kremlin are moving from weakness and the uncertainties of their internal struggle. As during the famine of the early twenties, they made their strategic retreats of the NEP and offered "concessions" to foreigners; as during the Anti-Comintern Axis they talked "Stalinist Constitution" plus "Popular Front;" as during the first onslaught of Hitler's invasion they "abolished" the Comintern; so once more they are moving from weakness and talking "peace." But during the NEP Lenin completed the political foundations of the total state. The Stalinist Constitution was translated into life by the blood purges. The abolition of the Comintern was accompanied by the dispatch of its agents into the "liberated" countries to turn them into "People's Democracies." And once more, the very decrees of amnesty, and of justice to the doctors, contain menacing phrases about renewed "vigilance" and are accompanied by a fresh wave of purges, while the "peace talk" on Korea is given its real meaning in a fresh "limited global war" in Laos, and the setting up of a "Thai Autonomous Government" in Yunan, China, with *irredenta* claims in Laos, Burma and Thailand. The very *Pravda* of April 25 which printed President Eisenhower's appeal for peace declared that the Kremlin will not "halt the liberating movement of Asia's colonial and semi-colonial peoples" and that the forces driving into Laos are "the People's Liberating Army of Patet-Lao."

Still totalitarianism's difficulty, whether writ large or small, is freedom's opportunity. The world, in this writer's judgment, except for the dangers which may spring from its own failures to understand what it is watching, is safer for the moment while a régime based on total force and total dictatorship goes through its convulsive struggles to solve the insoluble problem of a "legal" and "peaceful" succession in a system that knows neither law nor peace.

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THE SOVIET ECONOMY OUTPACES THE WEST

By Peter Wiles

ONE mistake of the Western Powers during the recent war was the refusal to exercise imagination as to what Europe would look like with the Red Army occupying the Eastern half. Today the West finds difficulty in conceding the possibility that the rate of economic growth—especially in strategic articles, not luxuries—is higher in Communist than in non-Communist countries, or to imagine the long-term consequences of this fact. But it is vitally necessary that we should have a view of the likely state of economic affairs after, say, two more decades of cold war. Here only a few tentative, initial materials can be offered for the education of our imaginations. Whether tension diminishes or not, whether Malenkov is or is not an improvement over Stalin, makes little difference in the trend which these materials indicate.

Part of the difficulty in appraising the relative rates of economic growth is due to the mendacity of Soviet statistics. But almost all experts agree that though some figures have to be rejected, some are usable; and from the most skeptical studies the fact of a superior rate of growth does emerge. Moreover, there is prejudice to conquer—prejudice far greater than that which obstructed the recognition that Nazi Germany was rearming faster than the West. For the Nazi economic system was essentially capitalist, and no one denied that it might be efficient. But the Soviet economy is not capitalist, and the whole theory of Communism is based upon its superiority. Some people are shallow enough to suppose that if this superiority is admitted the whole case of the free world is lost; and many are dogmatic enough to assert that there can be no such superiority. I shall argue here that by whatever other criteria economies may be judged, Communism is at any rate beating "capitalism," whether in the form of laissez-faire or of the welfare state, in its rate of growth. And in a long cold war the rate of growth is the most important thing, for in the end the country that grows most becomes biggest, and every economic advantage belongs to it, be it military power, dominance in world markets or even a high standard of living. This Communist superiority in rate of growth

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is not, of course, inexorable or permanent; it is traceable to specific features which "capitalism" could well imitate or improve on.

I shall not attempt to enter into the innumerable doubts and qualifications that beset the following estimates, but shall baldly quote some of the most approved. Before the war industrial production in the Soviet Union grew at, very roughly, a rate of between 10.5 percent and 13 percent per annum, and the labor force in industry at roughly an annual rate of between 8 percent and 8.3 percent (compound interest, 1928–40). In agriculture the very approximate figures show an increase in output of 1.4 percent and a fall in rural population of .9 percent. Productivity, therefore, rose by between 2 and 5 percent in industry, and about 2.3 percent in agriculture.[1]

How may we project this series into the future? Where the initial figure is small, growth is likely to be much quicker at first than later on. In other words, the law of diminishing returns tells us that further investments in the exploitation of any particular natural resource, such as, say, iron ore, are likely to yield less than the initial investment. It is thus obvious that any country can attain high rates of growth when it begins its industrial revolution, for the most accessible natural resources are the first to be exploited, but thereafter rates of growth are likely to be smaller. Moreover, the accumulated technical knowledge of other countries can be applied all at once, and there is a very sharp, once-for-all increase in skill. But it is too often forgotten that the law of diminishing returns applies with real severity only if there is no technical progress, that is, if no new technique is invented or no new natural resources discovered, whether of old

[1] For industrial production *cf.* N. Jasny, "The Soviet Economy During the Plan Era." Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, p. 22; gross industrial output in 1926–27 rubles, severely corrected, includes mining, excludes building. Also D. Hodgman, privately communicated; based on Soviet physical production data only, with 1934 weights. (The full, revised index appears in "Soviet Economic Growth," Abram Bergson, Editor. Evanston: Row-Peterson, 1953.)

For industrial labor *cf.* "Workers and Employees in the National Economy," 1934–41, from the official Soviet employment data and the 1941 captured plan: includes mining, excludes building. It is known that in 1928–32 the increase in this figure is largely a matter of definition, also that it is never fully comprehensive. But there is no reason why its growth after 1932 should not accurately reflect the growth of the total industrial labor force. *Cf.* Bergson, *Review of Economic Statistics,* November 1947. Also see census data, as adjusted by F. Lorimer, "Population of the Soviet Union." New York: Columbia University Press, p. 100: includes handicrafts, trade, credit, transport, mining.

For agriculture: *cf.* N. Jasny, "The Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.," p. 676 (net output, including farmers' consumption); F. Lorimer, *op. cit.,* p. 138, 153, 158 and 159.

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materials or new. The inventions and the discoveries pull in the opposite direction to the law, and since in industry a substitute can always be found in the long run for any particular material that runs short, the law can only slow down, never stop, industrial growth. With the normal yearly supply of discoveries and inventions, any community that can maintain full employment and set aside sufficient savings to finance all the necessary investment can maintain indefinitely a high rate of industrial growth. And the U.S.S.R. notoriously can and does do both these things. In general terms, therefore, though the rate of industrial growth will tend to decline in the future—since the most obvious possibilities of the industrial revolution have been exploited and the initial surplus of farm labor used up—it seems wise to expect large further expansion.

This does not apply to agriculture, however, even allowing for a high rate of investment and for new inventions. For first the land itself is a natural resource of overwhelming importance to agriculture, occupying a position in that branch of the economy that no natural resource occupies with regard to manufactures, and secondly, new discoveries of useful land are nearly impossible and the reclamation of old land is exceedingly expensive. This certainly applies to the great Stalin projects for the remaking of nature: they are very expensive, their technical validity is doubtful, and they take up land and labor initially which might be used for ordinary agriculture.[2] Thirdly, Communists are enthusiastic opponents of Malthus; they believe that a planned economy can support indefinitely many human beings on a given area of land. They take no steps whatsoever to restrict the supply of human beings, and this must, in the long run, be serious for them.

Agriculture is often described as the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy. But while this is true, it is less often remembered that Achilles could after all walk upon his heel. Not only did production per head of rural populations increase between 1928 and 1939, but so also—very slightly—did production per head of total population. The often-quoted decrease in yield per acre in these years may easily be explained by the spread of cultivation to less fertile acres. Moreover, the period includes the appalling years of collectivization itself, with its famine, its livestock slaughter and its approach to civil war. The peasants continue

[2] See the symposium in *Land Economics* (Wisconsin), November 1949.

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to detest the collective farm, but they no longer offer violent resistance. We may, then, perhaps predict the same low rate of growth as the figures above show for the past.

These guesses as to agriculture and industry are fortified by other considerations. The fifth Five Year Plan (1950–5) foresees a rate of growth of about 12 percent per annum compound in industrial production (measured by the published physical targets set); not different, then, from that obtained in the past. It should be remembered that achievement nowadays in Russia seldom falls very far short of plan, so that this rate may well be achieved. Thus, in the fourth Five Year Plan about half the physical targets set in industry, construction and mining were over-fulfilled and the remainder under-fulfilled.[3] We may therefore assume that a rate of growth equal to 6 percent per annum, or one-half of that foreseen, is a safe minimum. The agricultural targets of the fourth Five Year Plan, on the other hand, fared much worse, and they were lower. The new Plan's targets imply an 8.5 percent rate of growth in this sector: we may safely assume gross under-fulfillment, and suggest 3 percent. Since the population rises by about 1.5 percent per annum[4] this would be a very healthy state of affairs for the Soviets.

II

How do these rates of growth compare with ours? The search for an answer must keep two objects in view: one academic—to see which system grows more rapidly in roughly comparable circumstances; and the other practical—to see what the future has in store, starting from the existing circumstances. Let us begin with the academic comparison. At the outset of the plan era in 1928, the Soviet economy had two enormous advantages: a huge labor reserve on the spot, and a variety of natural resources awaiting exploitation. There was also a nucleus of industry in the older-established regions. Canada and the United States have both been in a similar or more favorable position—indeed, Canada still is—with two slight differences: the labor reserve was not on the spot but was quite easily available across the Atlantic and was better educated; and a great deal of foreign capital was borrowed. Output of U.S. industry (compound rates

[3] *Cf.* N. Jasny, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1952, p. 64–67.

[4] Population rose by 9,500,000 in the four years ending 1951: Malenkov, *Pravda*, October 6, 1952.

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of growth per annum, 1860–1914) grew by 5.3 percent and the labor force by 3.5 percent. In agriculture (1870–1910) net output rose by 2.5 percent and the labor force by 1.5 percent. Thus productivity grew by 1.9 percent in industry and 1 percent in agriculture.

The inter-war period showed much lower rates of growth except in productivity. As we are giving what is still called in general terms "capitalism" the benefit of the doubt and assuming full or fuller employment henceforth, we shall omit these years. Of other sizable countries only Japan and Canada are or have been better advertisements for capitalism than the United States. Both can show, at any rate for long periods, a growth of manufacturing output in peacetime not exceeding 6 or 7 percent per annum compound. Smaller countries, of course, can beat these figures occasionally, just as could a county of a large country: but this is clearly no fair test. The growth of industrial productivity, as opposed to output, is also higher in the United States than the capitalist average. We are then much more than fair to capitalism in concentrating on the United States.

It is thus clear that by this academic comparison Soviet economic development betters all recorded data for the West. Only in wartime do capitalist systems show comparable rates of growth: that is, when they cease to be capitalist and borrow many of the vices and virtues of centralized Communist planning. Non-Communist countries, then, can do as well as Communist, but only at a cost in regimentation and effort which they are quite unlikely to accept. It may be objected that the quality of Soviet goods is much inferior. This is very true, but quality has improved in the plan era, so that the rate of growth is not understated by measurements that neglect that factor. Only in comparisons of the absolute level of output need quality be taken into account.

The practical aspect of the comparison is best shown by taking the last few years after wartime reconstruction and reconversion, for though such a comparison is no measure of the relative efficiency of capitalism, it is decisive for future Western economic and diplomatic policy. We have seen reason to assume that the Soviet rate of growth will fall slightly in coming years. But this is merely because the U.S.S.R. has only just emerged from the honeymoon of easy natural resources and large labor reserves. The United States and Western Europe emerged long ago, and,

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as far as these two considerations go, we may follow the Paley Commission in assuming the same rate of growth as in the immediate past. But will there be a slump? Or permanent slight unemployment? It is now known that inflation can cure capitalism of unemployment, and it seems safest to assume that this cure, unpopular as it is, will continue to be applied in future as it has been during the past seven years, over most of the world. This again is justification for prolonging the most recent rates of Western growth in our calculations. If not, of course, the case of what we call "capitalism" is more parlous.

What are the most recent rates of growth? Let us omit the immediate postwar years of hyper-inflation and easy reconstruction. In 1947–52 the United States performed as follows: Industrial output rose by 4.3 percent yearly and employment by .7 percent. Agricultural output rose by .5 percent and employment fell by 3.5 percent. Canada presents an exceptionally favorable case for "capitalism," since industrial output rose by 7 percent and employment by 3 percent. In making a comparison with the U.S.S.R., we may fairly say that the period of easy reconstruction lasted until 1948. Then, in the period 1948–51, industrial output rose by about 17 percent[5] yearly and employment by about 5 percent.[6]

There is no direct information about the size of the labor force in Soviet agriculture, but the following figures throw some light:[7]

These figures are healthier than those of many free countries.

	1940	*1952*
Population (millions)	196	204
Grain harvest (million metric tons)	119	125.5
Sugar refined (" " ")	2.15	3.06
Cattle (million head)	54.5	60
Hogs (" ")	27.5	32
Sheep and goats (" ")	91.6	111

[5] Hodgman, *ibid.*

[6] "Workers and Employees in the National Economy," taking 35,000,000 as the number at the end of 1948.

[7] Population estimates from Lorimer (*op. cit.*) and Malenkov; crop evaluations are "biological," not "barn:" about 20 percent should be deducted to ensure comparability with other countries; figure for Soviet grain harvest for 1952 is average 1950–52 (*Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, 2/1951 and 1/1952). Figures for Soviet cattle, hogs, sheep and goats 1940 from Schwartz (*op. cit.*); for 1950 from Posev (Frankfurt), February 8, 1953, quoting official figures. References are to the expanded territory of 1940. See also "U.N. Economic Survey of Europe Since the War." New York: United Nations, 1953.

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True, the improvement is due to two non-recurrent factors: new territory was annexed and the growth of population was retarded during the war. Of genuine agricultural progress there is scarcely any sign, but at least the Malthusian wolf is at present far from the door, and agricultural collapse cannot be counted on at all.

It is correct that the Soviet citizen is still a very poor man, owing to the setbacks of the past: collectivization, purge and war. Real consumption in Moscow is less than one-half of what it is in Great Britain for equal work; though since nearly all housewives go out to work it is doubtless more than one-half per head of population.[8] Moreover, Moscow is presumably the richest place in the country; forced labor camps and the grain-growing collective farms must pull the general average far down. The North Atlantic Treaty Powers and Australasia clearly have an immense head start in the standard of living. But outside the countries concerned this is a matter of little propaganda importance. Thus Japan, Argentina and Uruguay are on a rough par with Moscow, and the rest of the free world is a good deal poorer.[9] Moreover, in the basic products that give strategic power the gap is narrower: Soviet Russia is not so very much "poorer" than France per capita, and of course much "richer" absolutely; and she easily surpasses Italy.

ANNUAL PRODUCTION PER HEAD OF POPULATION, 1951

	France	*Italy*	*U.S.A.*	*U.K.*	*U.S.S.R. (approx.)*
Coal (kg.)	1250	25	3903	4430	1400
Oil (")	7		2470		232
Electricity (thousand kwh.)	850	631	2413	1175	510
Pig Iron (kg.)	206	23	416	193	110
Steel (")	232	78	620	312	155
Cement (")	198	120	267	202	61
Grain[10]	322	225	866	143	500[11]
Raw Sugar (")[10] (processed from beet)	27	13	16	12	15[12]
Population (millions)	(42)	(47)	(154)	(51)	(202)

This table must, of course, be read as a whole, any individual

[8] Schulz and Wiles, *Oxford Institute of Statistics Bulletin*, September 1952.

[9] This is but a rough and impressionistic survey. *Cf.* United Nations, "National and Per Capita Incomes in 70 Countries—1949" (Statistical Papers, series E, no. 1).

[10] Crop years 1949–50 and 1951–52 averaged.

[11] I have put the average barn crop, 1950–52, at 100,000,000 metric tons.

[12] Calendar year 1951 only: the figure shows a pronounced upward trend due presumably to larger plantings each year.

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row being misleading. Thus the United Kingdom's strength in coal and steel, which it exports, is offset by its weakness in wheat, which it imports, and so on.

In Europe the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe makes possible a more advanced sort of comparison, although its accuracy is probably very low. In 1948, 14.5 percent of Europe's[13] industrial production took place in the satellite countries: East Germany, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. In the third quarter of 1951 the percentage was 21.5. The indices of production in that quarter (taking 1948 as 100) stood as follows: free countries 124.2, Jugoslavia 127, satellites 154.3. Depressing as these figures are, they become very much more so when we reflect that the satellites had no Marshall Plan to help them, but onerous trade treaties with U.S.S.R. to hinder them. Moreover, the absolute production volume of free Europe has actually declined since the fourth quarter of 1951, so that a rate of growth based upon more recent figures would be much lower. However, taking the figures as they stand the volume of satellite industrial production will equal that which will obtain in free Europe in about 1976. The law of diminishing returns will doubtless retard growth in both camps, and thus retard the rate at which free Europe is overhauled, though it will of course still leave a margin in favor of the satellites. Perhaps, then, we may give ourselves eight years' grace and postpone the year in which the satellites draw abreast of free Europe until 1984.

It may be asked if Czechoslovakia, the only advanced and industrialized country yet overrun by Communism, shows a lower rate of growth than other satellites. The answer is no. Her index of production reads thus:

1948 = 100 1949 = 115 1950 = 135 1951 = 156

Or exactly the average progress for a satellite. There is thus no consolation here, and no confirmation of the doctrine that Communism is unable to take over and work an advanced country. It is true that the standard of living is being steadily reduced to the Soviet level in this and other satellites. But this is no proof of inefficiency: it is an act of policy. In the long run, and if progress continues at this rate, it will certainly be reversed.

[13] United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, II/1952, p. 81 (1948 weights). "Europe" includes Turkey, U.K. and Eire, but excludes Switzerland which publishes no index of industrial production. "Free" countries include West Berlin, Finland and Spain.

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Caution must, however, be exercised. Years of expert study tell us with some precision which Soviet statistics are false and why, though we cannot reliably express that falsity in exact quantities. But the satellites have been neglected: we know only that the figures have an upward trend. We have here an extremely urgent field of study.

III

It is thus likely that even assuming full employment in most capitalist countries most of the time, the Soviet economy in particular, and Communist economies in general, will grow more quickly. Why is this, and what advantages have they?

The first is unquestionably that they save more of their national income. The pitfalls here are of course innumerable, and I quote, as usual, the best estimates without discussion. Of net national product at "factor cost"[14] the U.S.S.R. saved about 33 percent in 1937, 38 percent in 1940, and about the same in 1948. These figures much exceed those of Great Britain: 18 percent in 1948, and 21 percent in 1951. Nor does the United States make a better showing, with, for instance, 20 percent in 1950. In all three countries armaments are counted among the objects upon which savings are spent—indeed, it is not possible to draw the line statistically between armaments and other investments. All figures, again, are swelled to an unknown extent by the inclusion of a few items that are really current replacement of worn-out capital already existing. In the two free countries, moreover, the total is largely so-called "ice-cream" investment: investment, that is, in plants making consumption goods and, above all, in houses. In the U.S.S.R. the investment is largely in plants making basic materials or investment goods. For our purposes, then, the comparison should perhaps be still more unfavorable to the free countries.

[14] I have used this concept because the excess of retail over wholesale prices in the Soviet Union is vastly greater than in free countries owing to the huge turnover tax levied. Consequently, a ruble spent on armaments or investment goes much further than one spent on consumption goods; for guns and bricks bear very little turnover tax. Even a ruble given to a secret police officer probably buys more consumption goods than one given to an industrial worker, as he has his privileged shop. The distorting effect of turnover taxes must, therefore, be removed by taking all items at "factor cost." Sources for Soviet figures are: Baran, *Review of Economic Statistics*, November 1947, p. 230–1. (I have assumed the average rate of turnover tax on investment, rearmament and police expenditures to be 5 percent.) Bergson, *Quarterley Journal of Economics*, 1950, p. 218, 220. (I have made the same assumption about turnover tax as for Baran.) The evidence for 1948 is in N. Jasny, "The Soviet Economy during the Plan Era," p. 85.

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It is difficult to overemphasize the advantage to Communism of its high rate of saving. We all know it well enough, yet somehow the knowledge is not consistently incorporated into a general view. In one issue, for instance, of the *Economist* (December 20, 1952) it is possible to pick out separate passages like these:

> A democratic government is a poor saver. . . . An authoritarian government on the Eastern model, willing to exact large forced savings and itself taking responsibilty for most of the objects of investment, can save what it chooses. But in a liberal society, saving depends on self-help. It is the British people as individuals and as shareholders in enterprises, who must save. . . .
>
> China's transformation will take place under the star of Communism and total rule. If the Soviet analogy holds good, the people will be battered into economic growth. India, in choosing the way of liberal democracy, has renounced the weapons by which spectacular progress can be achieved. Left to its own poverty, it cannot win the race to economic strength in which, in the eyes of all Asia, it is now engaged against China.

Truisms, of course. But do we draw their consequences? Sophisticated people have long been accustomed to say that freedom is more efficient than tyranny, because being subject to free criticism it makes fewer mistakes in the long run and extracts more coöperation from the citizenry. In the days before telephones and typewriters, when no state could control the economy, this was probably true. But one wonders whether these developments, which have added effective economic controls and forced saving to the armory of tyranny, may not have tipped the balance.

Another Soviet advantage is that in the U.S.S.R. there is no consumers' sovereignty; and none of that extreme preoccupation with the correct allocation of scarce resources between competing purposes. These two influences are a brake upon the volume of production. For why do we suspend and distort the price mechanism in time of war if it is not because we are in a hurry? The Soviet economy is always in a hurry and it is enabled to be so by its neglect of the consumer and the more delicate problems of rational choice. Obviously this detracts from the standard of living. Not merely its high rate of saving but its very organization prevents the Soviet economy from satisfying the consumer out of any given quantity of resources. But if this quantity expands more quickly there must one day be a higher standard of living too, however ill-distributed the resources are. There is, again, no investment risk for the Soviet manager to bear, and he would not hesitate to invest even if he were allowed to. He simply car-

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ries out the planner's orders to invest, and hereby yet another brake upon production is removed.

Then there are few restrictive labor practices and no strikes, and enterprises scarcely have trade secrets from each other, for all these things are criminal sabotage. There is hardly any respect for vested interests, whether it be of localities in their special products, or of producers in their methods of organization and work, or of any group or individual in its status and income. The tax structure encourages work at every point: income tax is low and does not fall more heavily on extra work than on basic earnings, while indirect taxes are almost as heavy on necessities as on luxuries. The single Soviet goal is over-fulfilment of the plan, never mind at what cost in distortion of the economy or general inconvenience; let alone the cost in lives and freedom.

Thus the Soviet economy is not a kind one, nor are its social services indifferently offered to all. The high pensions and the sanatoria are for the strong, the hardworking and the loyal. Underneath there are no everlasting arms to catch the inefficient, the idle, the apolitical, the unfortunate, or even those who happen to be displaced from good positions by shifts of economic policy. There are three types of economy in the modern world: laissez-faire, welfare and unfair. In the first, progress is gradual, as the profit motive and the free supply of savings dictate. In the second, progress is usually inhibited lest someone get hurt in the short run. In the third, progress is a Moloch to which all present values are sacrificed. The Unfair State is a formidable competitor.

In comparing the Western economy with the U.S.S.R. we have too often been lulled by past Soviet failures. The first Five Year Plan was ruined by its crass neglect and political persecution of technicians, and by the colossal catastrophe of collectivization. The third Five Year Plan was stopped by the war; the fourth Five Year Plan has naturally been very successful, for it was a mere reconstruction plan and reconstruction is always easy. It is probable, again, that the Russian standard of living today is no higher than in 1928 when Soviet planning began, and certainly there are fewer head of livestock. The prewar period saw an almost uncontrolled inflation of the ruble, and Soviet statistics were not only mendacious but mislead the Soviet planners themselves.

But all these things are due to special historical circumstances; we cannot count on the continued gross inefficiency of Soviet sta-

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tistics and planning. We certainly cannot count on such catastrophic mistakes as collectivization and the great purges of 1936–8. Take, for instance, the suggestion of the Politburo member Khrushchov that small collective farms be forcibly amalgamated into very much bigger ones—the so-called agro-towns. The proposal involved the gratuitous removal of the houses in small villages to one central village—a movement to be carried out by the peasants themselves, without pay, in the winter months. In the projected agro-town there would be fewer or no private plots to cultivate on the side: an essential source of income and self-respect for the Soviet peasant. These measures would have met with as much resistance and would have damaged the agricultural economy as greatly as did the original collectivization itself. But the scheme was defeated; farms were amalgamated within reason, but no houses were moved or private plots diminished. All such follies are likely to be defeated in the future. The very falsity of the statistics, too, has lulled us. Thus Mr. D. McCord Wright says in his "Capitalism" (p. 99) that "the available Russian statistics do not, I believe, furnish a reliable basis of comparison" of rates of growth, and probably most Western economists have left it at that. This is as if we had refused to study the communiqués of the German High Command during the late war.

True, there are other Soviet follies. The régime is evidently willing to sacrifice scientific truth to Marxist dogma. Mendelian biology assigns man but little power over heredity and must yield to the more Marxian version of Lysenko, which has no discoverable basis of fact. In the long run this must do some damage to agriculture, and it will probably be quietly dropped. Soviet economic planners may not use the mathematics of probability, for of course in a planned society there are no such uncertainties. Physicists and physical chemists must eschew the quantum theory. In such an atmosphere free inquiry can hardly flourish; the researcher's initiative is cramped if at any moment he must account to a policeman for his activities. It is of extraordinary significance that Russian research, once so full of inventive genius, has contributed so little to pure or applied science since 1928. It is the Fuchses, not the Lysenkos, who will make the greatest contribution to Soviet science, and this must impose a technical lag upon Soviet development. Moreover, so long as techniques in Russia were grossly behind the tried and accessible techniques

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of the West, Russian progress could hardly help being quick. Even were her scientists free, she would progress more slowly now she has caught up.

But these are small consolations. Quantity makes up for quality, and ruthlessness for sophistication. The weakness of Soviet science can be exaggerated; bad theory does not render good practice impossible, even when a scientist believes in it, like Lysenko himself. Still less will that vast majority of Soviet scientists, who pay mere lip service to the dogma, be prevented from all useful practical achievement. There appears to be no reason why the satellites could not out-produce Western Europe, and the U.S.S.R. will almost certainly do so. But it is probable, happily for the West, that the U.S.S.R. will not out-produce the United States in the foreseeable future. Mr. Harry Schwartz estimates that it would be very difficult for Russia to achieve by 1980 the American output per person of 1948; still more to catch up with the United States if American progress continues even at its present slow rate. However, the absolute level of American production, even allowing for its further growth, may well be attained by the Soviet Union before 50 years have passed. We must also bear China in mind; by analogy with other Communist countries she is quite likely to overtake the whole of the rest of Asia in 50 or 100 years.

We shall then certainly have to deal with a rich totalitarian society, its faults more moral and political than economic. Economically not more strong than the rest of the world, the Communist bloc will nevertheless be almost as strong. The standard of living will not, of course, be so high, since tertiary industries (entertainment, passenger transport, etc.) will continue to be neglected, and consumers' capital (*e.g.* houses and furniture) will not be built up for a very long time, even though the current rate of output be high. But economic power is not the same thing as the standard of living. It may perhaps be defined as the ability to save and invest, plus the absolute quantity of primary and secondary output (*i.e.* extractive and manufacturing industry), plus the ratio of this output to the population. In economic power at least, Communism will grow faster than we do.

IV

There is no evidence at all for the theory that Communism will sober down or become more moral as it becomes richer. In a

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democratic society the free electorate may become more moral, or at any rate more sober, as it is enriched; indeed, the Communists have a phrase for this—the bourgeosification of the proletariat. But the Communist bloc is run by the men in the Kremlin and not by the electorate, so in this case the question is what will those men do with the new wealth? Hitherto (1929–52) the Kremlin has become steadily more aggressive and unpleasant as its economic power has increased; and we have no reason for not prolonging this trend too. If Malenkov is more peaceful than Stalin it is not because he represents a richer country but because he has changed the tactics. It is the purest wishful thinking to suppose that, like liberalism or Socialism, Communism will kill itself by its own success, by achieving its professed aims. For the aims of Communism are quite boundless: a new man on a new earth—the whole earth. *Hic ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono: imperium sine fine dedi.*

We may prophesy at least a few purposes to which the Kremlin will put its wealth. It will make truthful propaganda among the free but backward nations about the rate of its economic progress. It may also make a serious bid to capture the world markets by dumping, for if the Soviet Union can save it can also have an export surplus. This will make no small impression upon Asians, Africans and Latin Americans. It can even run a genuine Marshall Plan of its own, and infiltrate the poor free countries with technicians and managers. The non-American world has cause to know what influence that brings. It is all very well for the North Atlantic Treaty Powers to say that they are not materialists, that freedom matters more than economic progress. This is certainly true for those who have bread in their stomachs, but it does not convince the brash young materialism of starving Asia. Her reaction to Communist progress will be quite different from that of the more mature and sophisticated, even more idealistic, civilization in Western Europe.

The position is thus roughly as follows. A man is running against us but we are not running against him. We are merely out for our usual constitutional. We have a large but uncertain handicap. His trainer has put out a stream of mendacious publicity, from the exaggerations of which one certain fact emerges: the man is going faster than we are. If the race is an infinite marathon it is thus logically inevitable that we shall lose, no matter how great our handicap. This is not, incidentally, an arms race

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alone, though arms are certainly included, nor, on the other hand, is the prize a certain standard of living. It is a race in saving and productivity—a very boring event for which the welfare states and laissez-faire states of the West enter their names unwillingly. But the Soviet state is incapable of boredom. This is not the place to say exactly what ought to be done, even if the writer presumed to know. Preventive war is immoral, a revolution or appeasement next to impossible. Too great hopes should not be set on trouble in the Kremlin over the successorship. The solution for the problem raised here lies without doubt in the economic field. We must raise our own production, and keep the gap between us and them as great as it now is. Otherwise time is on their side.

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CANADA'S NORTHERN HORIZON

By L. B. Pearson

IN May of this year the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. St. Laurent, visited his friend, the President of the United States. As Canadian Prime Ministers and American Presidents have done over the years, they talked together with the frankness, mutual respect and community of aim which distinguishes the relations between our two peoples. They talked of many things—and among them of our common security. As they looked round the globe across the Atlantic and Pacific, they did not ignore the problems of continental defense, and of our northern borderlands in which we share a joint concern. In the far-off but not forgotten days of 1940, their predecessors, Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt, had also talked of these things.

In a world at war, Canada and the United States, locked in a single continent, and sharing Arctic frontiers, had been impelled by the vulnerability of North America to recognize the permanency of their joint interest in the defense of North America from the Rio Grande to the Pole. Wartime coöperation was close, and valuable lessons were learned. Both countries were determined that it should continue in time of peace. It has; and the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, since 1940, has become both the chief symbol and principal architect of such coöperation.

Continental defense is, of course, more than continental. North America cannot be made secure solely by mighty sea and air armadas above and off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts; or by air bases, radar networks and Maginot lines on the Arctic ice. It involves, we now know, the sending of forces from both countries to Korea and across the Atlantic for protection through prevention. The lines of defense today go far beyond any geographical limitation. They run, indeed, through the minds and hearts of men.

While all this is true, it is also true that our northern continental frontier, the Canadian Arctic, is now a vital area of both defense and development. Canadians have abandoned the indifference which they once displayed towards their Arctic regions. The reason is partly economic, but, more significantly, strategic. The advance of the air age has taught them that across their

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northern frontier, only a few hours away, is a new neighbor, the U.S.S.R. They realize, with something of a shock, that they stand between that neighbor, who has not been a friendly one, and their good neighbor to the south. They know that the cold war which has been raging has not overlooked the frozen north.

In some quarters this realization of danger from the north has conjured up visions of imaginary battles waged in the polar ice; of invading aerial fleets raining atomic destruction on the defenseless cities and towns of our continent. These gloomy speculations have sometimes entered the realm of the fantastic, though there may be a valid foundation for some of them. The revolution in technology, communications and in the development of new weapons poses problems for North America, where Canada and the United States are strategically inseparable parts of the same shrunken world.

Both governments, therefore, have recognized that the common defense demanded a greater knowledge of our northern frontiers, and a greater awareness of the possibilities which exist there for both conflict and coöperation.

Postwar principles of defense coöperation between the two countries were enunciated in Ottawa and Washington in a joint statement issued on February 12, 1947. This statement, which set forth the direction that military collaboration should take, provided that as an underlying principle, all coöperative arrangements should be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory. The statement concluded with a joint affirmation on the part of the two governments that "the close security relationship between Canada and the United States in North America will in no way impair, but on the contrary will strengthen the coöperation of each country within the broader framework of the United Nations."

In implementing these principles of defense coöperation, Canada has taken the position that the granting of permanent or long-term rights in connection with United States defense installations on Canadian soil is undesirable. Apart from the special arrangements prevailing at the leased bases in Newfoundland which we inherited from the United Kingdom, Canada continues to accept and intends to discharge her proper responsibility for the defense of her own territory, and feels, consequently, that all arrangements within Canadian territory should remain under her control. Our Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, in referring to

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this statement of principles in New York in February 1947 put it this way:

> If, on the one hand, the joint statement indicates that we in Canada and the United States intend to maintain our independence of action, it says equally that we are prepared to enter on a basis of honorable partnership into plans for security which must of necessity involve the action of more than one state. We realize that no nation can live unto itself. We realize that the destiny of our country is bound closely with that of the United States. We are therefore prepared to consider with you on the basis of the joint responsibilities and our joint interests whatever combined action either one of us may think desirable. This does not commit either one of us to agree to all the plans which the other may put forward. It does, however, establish the fact that we shall discuss the question of defense freely with one another, and that where joint action commends itself to us both, we shall be prepared to take it.

In attempting to apply these principles of joint defense to the Arctic frontier, we did not make the mistake of committing all—or too much—of our resources to the northern zone. Instead, the American and Canadian authorities worked out their policies or their estimation of the threat of aggression according to the best information obtainable, the common interests of the two countries, and the lessons of history. In doing so, they neither ignored the north, nor became obsessed by it. This is not the place to discuss defense plans. But it is obvious that the threat in the Arctic must be evaluated in the light of the threat in other directions; and that forces and resources must be concentrated where the threat is greatest and where they can be most effective. Through NATO action in the West, and through United Nations action in the East, we participate in collective defense measures with other like-minded states. Similarly we envisage the defense problems of the far north as a joint responsibility.

II

Canadian, and American, northern defense plans include the application of scientific techniques to the problem of detecting movements of aircraft, and the development of systems of early warning. The joint Canadian-United States network of radar stations to provide early warning, and communications facilities to direct squadrons of fighter aircraft, have made considerable progress in the last year. To the temporary mobile facilities which have been in use since the Second World War, new radar installations of the most modern and powerful types are steadily being

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added. Furthermore, the first units of a Canadian Ground Observer Corps have been formed to supplement the radar net. This Corps will be largely civilian and its object is to identify and report on low-flying aircraft. Regular and reserve fighter squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force are being built up as a backbone for the air defense network. The first regular squadron equipped with Canadian built CF-100 all-weather twin-engine jet fighters was recently formed and others are in the process of formation.

Defense research continues to press forward into the field of Arctic problems. Air navigation in northern areas presents unique difficulties and continuing investigations are now being undertaken, adding to our store of knowledge of flying under Arctic conditions.

These developments show that we realize that it would be wrong to ignore the dangers of attack from the north in the event of a total war and disastrous to fail to take adequate defensive measures to meet it. It would be even more dangerous, however, and we would be inviting the very catastrophe we seek to avert, were we to exchange the collective defense strategy which we share with our friends and allies in NATO, and the commitments we have assumed as members of the United Nations, for a narrow continentalism. The problem for Canada is to maintain a balance in committing her limited manpower and defense resources; to weigh carefully the alternative risks of the overrunning of Western Europe by a potential enemy, and the risks of attack by the polar route; and to formulate plans and priorities accordingly.

We do not live today in a period such as the last war, when the Arctic was a valued route for equipment and supplies from North America on delivery to an ally fighting for its national survival. Nor do we live in the state of the relative unpreparedness of the late 1940's, for we have learned that the price of survival is a strong collective defense. Today we must prepare both to defend ourselves and to live at peace at the same time. We have to envisage the prospect of continued arms expenditures and the application of much of our resources to defense. But we sense also the prospect of the kind of world this could be if we were able to put aside our arms and devote our energies and resources to the vast enterprises of peaceful development. In Canadian minds the Arctic is looming ever larger in such develop-

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ment, much of which will be coöperative with the United States as it has been in the past.

If the northern frontier is being slowly but steadily rolled back, this arises not only from our concern for defense, but also from our determination to deepen and extend our knowledge of its economic and scientific secrets. The weather is one example. Over the years the Canadian weather service had done a pioneering job of collecting valuable northern weather data. But it was natural and sensible that the weather station program should become a coöperative venture. Meteorologists of Canada and the United States shared the desire to get better observations from the far north which is the source of so much of our weather.

So plans were carefully laid by officials of the two countries through the winter of 1946–47 for a five-year joint weather program. The United States Navy provided ships on which Canadian and United States officials penetrated as far as navigation would allow in search of sites for the new stations. The choice of sites was enormously difficult. The meteorologists knew where they wanted them from the point of view of weather observations. The mariners had their problems of supply by sea. The airmen had in mind their conditions for the eventual construction of safe and reliable landing facilities. The operators who were to man the stations had yet other considerations related to efficiency and convenience of operation, radio transmission, water supply and shelter. The main station was placed at Resolute on Cornwallis Island. When it was established on the last day of August 1947, time was running short; a delay of a few days in departure of the ships might have meant the difference between return to the south and an ice-locked winter in the Arctic.

Resolute, although the main station, was preceded by Eureka far to the north on the western coast of Ellesmere Island. The history of Eureka goes back to Easter 1947, when it was established in the remarkable space of five days—all by aircraft based on Thule in Greenland. For the rest of that year there were only those two stations. The next spring, the two easternmost stations were put in at Isachsen on Ellef Ringnes Island and Mould Bay on Prince Patrick Island. The final link in the five-station chain was Alert, northernmost of all the weather stations, almost at the tip of Ellesmere Island. It was started in the spring of 1950 by a small group landed by air. Their main supplies had been cached on the beach by an icebreaker two years before.

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Under the joint arrangements for Arctic weather stations, Canada provides all the permanent buildings and installations, and much of the equipment is supplied by the United States. The commanding officer at each station is a Canadian, with a U.S. executive officer under him. About half the staff in each station is Canadian, half from the United States. The R.C.A.F. supplies more than half of the airlift, but the U. S. Navy and Coast Guard will be responsible for much of the sea supply until Canada has sufficient equipment for the entire operation.

The five new stations established in the northern Arctic since 1947 have also had great significance for scientists who have no connection with their primary function. The stations are laboratories for experts of every kind who come up for a week, a month or a season for field work and then return to their offices and laboratories in the south. Before the stations were established, this field work in the Arctic was enormously more difficult because of the lack of bases and the lack of transportation. Now the large aircraft which fly up on the spring resupply mission are filled with a varied assortment of men and equipment. A scientist from the Dominion Observatory travels from place to place with a little box which tells him much about the shape of the earth; a geodesist bearing cases of fragile and complicated equipment establishes fixed points astronomically in order to make navigational charts and maps more accurate. A scientist from the Department of Agriculture spends a summer looking for insects; another, from the National Museum of Canada, is concerned with Arctic plants. Men in these fields of study return year after year to increase the knowledge of Arctic phenomena. But there are also special projects, such as research into the aurora borealis and the characteristics of permafrost, which have now become practicable with the establishment of the new permanent communities.

III

These northern defense activities and scientific projects have given Canada a "new look." This new look was for the first time reflected last year when the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys of the Canadian Government published a new map of Canada for use by the general public. Although it is an ordinary political and administrative map on the scale of 100 miles to the inch, its publication was something of an event, because it was

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the first time, in a publication for general distribution, that all of Canada has been shown.

It may seem curious that only after a country has passed its 85th birthday have its people begun fully to recognize its size. Canada is an awkward shape for a book page, and it was customary to lop off a few thousand square miles from the top for the sake of convenience and symmetry. No one minded much, for to most people the farther reaches of the Arctic were just empty wasteland, useless to anyone except a few curious explorers who, in the heyday of flag-planting, found purpose and pleasure in claiming for their King great undefined areas of ice and barren rock. Within very recent years, however, the Canadian Arctic is being transformed from a vacuum to a frontier, and although it would be a bold man who would forecast the nature of its future development, of one thing we can be sure: if Horace Greeley were alive today, and if he were a Canadian, he would say, "Go north, young man!"

It takes more than a map, however, to give a picture of Canada's size. It takes the story of men with imagination, vision and devotion who have gone far, far "down north" to explore the mysteries of another world which, curiously enough, shares many problems with our own. Some of the men are explorers, who painstakingly map, not just the coastlines and mountain ranges which the aerial camera has already registered, but the nature of the rocks, the glaciers, the structure of the ice, the salinity of the sea, the minerals under the earth. Some are policemen, young constables of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who alone or in pairs have responsibility for the administration of law and order in areas far broader than many European countries. Some are prospectors, traders, missionaries and doctors. Some are air strip mechanics who, 2,000 miles back of beyond, have built airfields out of the gravel left by glaciers. Some are meteorological observers and radio operators who explore the weather from ground to upper atmosphere and send reports which will be recorded on every weather map in North America. Some are botanists, zoologists, seismologists; some cooks. They work in bitter cold under skies darkened half a year and on top of permafrost whose thickness man has just begun to measure. And some are members of our armed forces, learning to operate in this far northland. They have made camps to live and work in, aerial masts, roads and landing strips. Together they are opening a

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new land. In size, in problems, in ultimate rewards, it is one of the most challenging frontiers men have faced. It is important for Americans, as well as Canadians, to know more about it.

Canada is about as broad as it is long. Churchill, at the northern tip of Manitoba on Hudson Bay, was long considered a northern outpost—which it is. But when you have travelled from the United States border to Churchill, you have gone only about a third of the way up Canada. Although there is some difference of opinion on how to define the Arctic, by common consent Churchill is regarded as lying at its southern edge. The tree line which curves from the mouth of the Mackenzie southward to Churchill and continues across the Labrador-Ungava peninsula south of Ungava Bay is a convenient boundary. South of the tree line there are fuel, shelter, soft snow, Indians, snowshoes and toboggans. North there is no shelter from the wind which packs the snow into hard drifts. Eskimos take the place of Indians and the sledge replaces the toboggan. About 1,000,000 square miles, or a third of Canada, lie north of the tree line, and in that area there are now only about 10,000 Canadians—one person to 100 square miles.

Only slowly do we shed the misconceptions about endless flat Arctic plains of ice and heavy snow. On the east, through a high mountainous fringe, peaks rise two miles high and spectacular fiords slash the whole coast line from Labrador to North Ellesmere Island. In the center are some of the oldest rocks in the world—the relatively flat Canadian shield dotted with lakes, like the lower Laurentians but without any trees. Finally, there are the Arctic islands: flat rocks, large plateaus—cut by deep canyons.

Although the winter is long and cold in the Archipelago, the Arctic residents think of it as merely invigorating. The thermometer can remain under 40 degrees below zero for days or weeks on end, but the humidity is low. The winds are only occasionally severe, but are responsible for much of the physical discomfort suffered in the cold. In September the freeze-up begins, and by October the bays are covered by ice. The snowfall is generally light, and in the long spring days the snow runs quickly off the land. By early June most of the snow has gone but the sea ice does not melt away until late July or August. As in the south, ice and snow on land are permanent only on the icecaps and glaciers of the mountains.

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In the short summer the Arctic comes to life. Flowers blossom as soon as the snow disappears and clouds of birds arrive to breed, accompanied by Arctic mosquitoes whose ferocity is legendary, though they are fortunately short-lived. Despite the color of the Arctic summer and the moderate temperatures, most of the residents prefer the crispness of winter to the dust and grime of the warmer months.

IV

The key problem in Arctic development is communications. Hundreds of years ago, natives of the Arctic solved the questions of food, shelter and clothing. But only when the problem of communications was solved could the Arctic develop from a little-known hinterland, the preserve of explorers and hunters and a few thousand Eskimos and white settlers. In summer, travel by boat is possible; in winter, the sledge is the family Ford. There is an in-between time from freeze-up till December when all travel is difficult, for the bays are frozen and there is little snow for sledging. The best time for land travel is from mid-February. By the end of June the season for sledging is past, and the rivers, lakes and salt water are in use.

Sea transport is still the most important means of supply for bulk cargo; but in the lower part of Canada's northland the airplane has been equally important. Without it not only would developments like Port Radium and Yellowknife be years behind, but a tremendous amount of the recent prospecting in the whole of the Northwest Territories and Yukon just could not have been done. The plane is still a costly method of transportation for bulk supplies, and no enterprise in the far north will be commercially possible if it is totally dependent upon air. Fortunately, however, the north is well served by rivers and all forms of water transport from small rafts to large boats.

Further west, the Northwest Highway System which links Alberta with the Yukon is serving the development of a most important area. The system was built during the war as a military highway but since being turned over to the Canadian Government in 1946 it has been developed substantially. Much of the road has been resurfaced, permanent bridges have been built, and the most difficult parts of the roads have been improved. Although it is no superhighway, it is good enough to attract an increasing number of tourists each year, and commercial tourist

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facilities are gradually developing along the way. Perhaps more importantly the highway, along with the air facilities which were built about the same time in the Yukon, has opened the way to many enterprises which otherwise would have been impossible.

With the improvement in communications, there have been significant new developments in the Canadian north, both political and economic. Port Radium, on the shores of Great Bear Lake, has long been one of the world's important sources of radium and uranium. Now, at Beaver Lodge Lake in northern Saskatchewan, the government has opened two uranium mines and a plant capable of dealing with 500 tons of ore a day. Yellowknife is a well-established gold-mining area; production there in 1951 was worth $7,750,000. Although radium and gold have been extracted since before the war, there is now promise of important new developments in lead, copper and tungsten. Pine Point, on the south shore of Great Slave Lake, has large lead zinc deposits which raise hopes for an important new industry and new community in that area. Ore has been proved at shallow depths in blocks over an area about 40 miles long and five miles wide; in some places it is 100 feet thick. The development of Pine Point would require the construction of a 400-mile railway from Grimshaw, Alberta. Large nickel deposits are being investigated at Ferguson Lake, nearly 300 miles north-northwest of the railhead at Churchill, Manitoba. Nickel has been found on the Saskatchewan border north of Black Lake, and copper deposits are being investigated at Dismal Lakes north of Port Radium just south of the Arctic shore. The Yukon, scene of the great gold rush at the end of the last century, is still producing minerals in commercial quantities. The beds of the streams which eager miners panned more than half a century ago are now being torn up by great dredges. In the Mayo district of the Yukon there are large deposits of galena and sphalterite which give hope for important sources of silver, lead and zinc in the future.

Overshadowing all developments in public interest is the search for oil. The great boom in Alberta has turned eyes north again. Oil has been extracted in commercial quantities at Norman Wells on the Mackenzie River since 1920, but the market has been relatively slow. Recently 35,000,000 acres of land have been staked for oil in the Mackenzie basin. In the Yukon, government officials and private companies are looking with new interest at the tremendous potential of hydroelectric power; in

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the southern Yukon it could reach 5,000,000 horsepower. The Eastern Arctic mainland is in the early stages of a tremendous new iron ore development. The whole country is stirring.

V

There is much talk of underdeveloped areas these days, and it is right that there should be. The fight against poverty, ill health and low living standards is a global struggle which the nations of the free world long to undertake on a greater scale. Let us not forget, however, that our northern lands—the lands around the periphery of the Arctic Circle—are also underdeveloped areas. With coöperative effort, with the sharing of scientific experience and information, with the joint use of our resources and energies, we could achieve things that would transform them.

No one can judge what the Canadian north will be like in another 50 years. The pessimist may say that most of the developments at the top of the map are the product of a boom—or a fear—which will not last. More realistic, however, are the hope and expectation of continuous development of which the present is only a modest beginning. This is a new kind of hinterland. There is no pressure of population to fill it, and indeed one of our most serious problems may be the shortage of men to develop its potential. The movement north will come, as it has come, because of the immense attractions of the area despite the obvious drawbacks of distance and climate. Except in the transportation of heavy material to southern markets, distance no longer matters so much, and most of the north is served remarkably well by navigable waters. Climate is, and always will be, difficult at first for the southerner, but a lot of myths are being exploded, and the weather is one of them.

We know that there is much to be gained from the Arctic. It may come in the form of power, oil, gas, minerals and general economic development providing the basis of new and growing communities. It may also come in the form of greater protection against aggression, for the north is a watching place for what may come from beyond the Pole. Canadians have every reason to look to the north. We are now aware of its possibilities. Whatever the direction and emphasis of our activity, the Arctic is coming into its own; and, with it, new opportunities and new responsibilities for Canada.

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EXCESSES OF SELF-DETERMINATION

By Clyde Eagleton

IT IS sad to see a noble word abused, as is the fate—among other good words—of the term "self-determination." Perhaps it has always been abused, in the sense that nationalism tends to run to extremes, but it is being torn to pieces in the United Nations today. The concept which lies behind the term is one which appeals to all human beings. It reaches back to the "consent of the governed" in the American Declaration of Independence; to the "divine right of the people" in the French Revolution; to the democratic nationalism of Mazzini. Woodrow Wilson, in the Fourteen Points and in speeches, made it a basic principle of freedom: "peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty" . . . "every territorial settlement . . . must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned." Such words found lodgings in every human heart; they became the foundation of thought and desire for millions of people. There were actual examples in the peace settlement of 1919 at which they could look; and there was a "wild rush" of nationalism after World War I, which soon became lost in other things.

There is today another wild rush, and in it the United Nations is inevitably entangled. The term "self-determination" was crowded into Article 1 of the Charter without relevance and without explanation; and upon that basis delegates are today making fantastic claims. Their irresponsibility alienates Americans who have sympathized with the struggles of many peoples for independence; they are typical of wild claims being made in other fields, such as Human Rights—so irresponsible as to arouse the fears of the American Bar Association, for example, and to induce the Senate to consider the Bricker amendment to the Constitution, which in reaction swings disastrously far toward the other extreme. The speeches go far beyond anything hitherto thought of in connection with self-determination; it is not merely independence which the speakers demand, but perfect satisfaction for all human desires. Furthermore, they would limit the claims to self-determination to colonial peoples only; and thus self-determination is made the basis of combination against the colonial Powers and against the "domination of the white race."

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Even so, most Americans—and probably most whites, with some shame for past misdeeds or realization of present needs of Asian and African peoples—have some sympathy with the feeling which inspires this attitude. The trouble is that the movement thus far has no standards, no common sense, indeed, no clear objectives. It seems chiefly an urge, born of a resentment which is natural enough, to "get at" the colonial Powers. But these Powers feel that they have much reason to feel pride in achievement. They can justly claim that they have contributed greatly to the advancement of the peoples who now denounce them; indeed, it is that very advancement which has made colonial peoples realize that they could have more, and has given them such ability to stand alone as they may now have. These Western Powers do not believe that they have held back the process of self-determination unduly. After all, they have freed at least half a billion people to manage their own affairs within the last decade.

There is no gain to anyone in pressing every possible cleavage in the community of nations, nor in reducing the strength of the free world by breaking it up into helplessly weak units. The fears and desires of smaller states and of non-self-governing peoples deserve consideration, and valid needs should be met; but the community of nations to which the apostles of fragmentation appeal also has rights and needs.

The concept of self-determination is not a simple one, and it has always defied definition. It is a two-edged concept which can disintegrate as well as unify; consider the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There has never been a judge to pass upon its claims; indeed, there has never been a law by which judgment could be issued. The textbooks of international law do not recognize any legal right of self-determination, nor do they know any standards for determining which groups are entitled to independence; on the contrary, international law holds that a state which intervenes to aid a rebellious group to break away from another state is itself committing an illegal act. Furthermore, if and when a group has factually established itself, other states have no obligation to recognize it as a legal power, a sovereign state. The emphasis has been upon the word "self;" the group itself must fight through to what it wanted. Secession or revolution could not be recognized as a legal right. There was no community law, or judge, or machinery, to uphold a claim of self-determination.

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Today, the community of nations is organized—a fact which profoundly modifies all concepts of "self." The United Nations exists, and appeals are in fact being made to it. It should have criteria and methods by which to measure and satisfy the hunger of peoples to control their own political destinies; but the Charter of the United Nations does not empower it to handle such claims. The United Nations has no authority in the matter, in a legal or constitutional sense; it is not authorized to issue a ukase freeing a people from a state and setting up a group as independent; it cannot establish rules or criteria for self-determination which are legally binding on anyone. On the contrary, the famous Article 2, Paragraph 7, reaffirming the rule of international law mentioned above, forbids the United Nations to intervene in the domestic affairs of any Member; and surely, providing self-government or independence to a part of a state would be interfering in the domestic affairs of that state.

It is apparent, however, that the United Nations can build up tremendous pressures in support of its recommendations—pressure strong enough, for example, to tear Indonesia away from the Netherlands and give to it the independence which it sought, in the face of the indubitably correct legal argument of the Dutch that all this was contrary to the Charter. The combination of political forces which led to independence in this case, while it was denied in other cases, is worthy of more study than it has received, for it was clearly a political decision and set a grave precedent. (To say this, be it noted, is not to comment on the rightfulness of the Indonesian claim; there was no way of determining whether it was rightful or not.) Not only in this case, but in many others, United Nations organs have ridden roughshod over the domestic-questions clause of the Charter. In practice, granted a proper majority, that obstacle may now be regarded as removed; an organ of the United Nations can do whatever it has the votes to do. One may rejoice in achievement, or grieve (as the writer is inclined to do) at the disregard for law thus shown; but, legal or not, the United Nations has shown that it can be a powerful force for the satisfaction of claims for self-determination.

One more point should be noted here: if the decision on such a claim is made by the United Nations, it is no longer correct to speak of *self*-determination; and this changes the whole nature of the inquiry. A group, a people, may as heretofore set up its

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claim and seek to justify it in one way or another; but if the group employs force, as has been necessary in the past, it may be charged with having committed a threat to or breach of the peace. It is no answer (though it should be a legal answer) to say that Article 2, Paragraph 7, forbids the United Nations to interfere in a civil war. If that Article can be overridden to help the claimant group, it can be overridden to help the colonial Power. This consequence of appealing to the United Nations—either not seen or not acknowledged in speeches made before it—is, indeed, a gain; it is a gain, that is, if the United Nations can find fair and responsible principles and procedures for answering claims of self-determination, rather than having them settled by local wars which may result in world war.

II

Who are these "peoples" or "nations" that are entitled to self-determination by the United Nations? The General Assembly, it must be recalled, instructed the Human Rights Commission to insert into the proposed Covenant on Human Rights the exact words: "All peoples shall have the right of self-determination." This, incidentally, was a Soviet initiative, though the Soviet resolution itself was not adopted. The Commission, after some uncertainty, added the words "and nations" but it did not identify either of these units which have the right. No answer, indeed, can be found in the literature of self-determination, though this would seem to be a necessary starting point. Doubtless, the real test is the desire of a group to live together under their own chosen political system. But how is this desire to be measured or ascertained? Should the United Nations listen to the loudest voices? How can it know that they truly represent the wishes of the people? Should the U.N., in its political wisdom, say yes, Indonesia has the genuine desire for independence but no, the Republic of the South Moluccas does not have it? Should the U.N. hold a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the people? This costs money and effort: how can the U.N. make the preliminary decision that the effort is worth while? And, granted the plebiscite, should the will of the majority prevail? And if a desire is ascertained, shall it be granted solely because there is a desire?

Such questions have not burdened the United Nations orators. Occasionally, a definition is attempted, but no agreement has

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ever been reached. The representative of Egypt asserted that the definition would be found in international law, but I have never been able to find it there. The delegate of India spoke of "large compact national groups;" Jugoslavia thought that the people should have territory and be related "ethnically, culturally, historically or otherwise." Others insisted that the group must be widely separated from the parent state by distance. The delegates apparently took the view expressed by the Polish delegate who said that "the search for definitions was unnecessary as self-determination should be proclaimed for all."

Indeed, the arguments advanced and the action taken would seem to give to each individual human being a right to be an independent country. It is the purpose of the Covenant on Human Rights to state the rights of individuals, rights which the world organization is to protect; among them is now the right of self-determination. The argument was advanced during the debates that each individual should have the right to uphold the group of his choice in its struggle for independence; the Jugoslav delegate felt that "exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination could [not] be assured unless every individual was entitled to exercise it." A United States amendment to say "in accordance with constitutional processes" was voted down. This would seem to establish a legal right to engage in revolution; it would leave us in the same anarchy as before, except that the individual could legally fight not only against the parent state but against other individuals on behalf of the group which he supports. It cannot be assumed that all "peoples" want the same thing.

But if there is no definition of "people" or "nation" to guide us, there is a very definite and significant limitation set. If one thinks back to earlier uses of the term, one finds that "self-determination" applied only to nationalistic minority groups, such as Czechoslovakia or Poland. Wilson and his colleagues—among whom were some wise experts and some wise statesmen—were thinking in terms of European minorities, and not of colonies. They thought of colonies as, for the most part, unable to stand alone in the strenuous conditions of modern civilization and therefore in need of a period of tutelage before being considered for independence. But the original Soviet resolution, in the United Nations, differentiated between Non-Self-Governing Territories which were to be assisted toward "national self-determination," and national minorities which should have only the

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right to use their native tongues and cultures. It was explained in connection with the resolution which supplanted this one that some delegations were afraid to include the word "peoples" because minorities might thus be encouraged to ask for self-determination. Though the clause finally adopted and incorporated into the Covenant on Human Rights says "all peoples and all nations," the states which voted for it, as the debates clearly show, were thinking only in terms of colonies. The colonial Powers opposed this discrimination and argued for universal application of the principle. They were defeated, and the rest of the article concerning self-determination stipulates no more than that all states should promote self-determination for Non-Self-Governing Territories. This was adopted in the Human Rights Commission by a vote of 13 for (including the United States) and four against, with one abstention.

Thus self-determination is to be applied only to colonies, and is identified with anti-colonialism—a sad comedown for a great principle once thought applicable to all mankind. If it is a fundamental human right, as its inclusion in the Covenant would indicate, why limit it to colonies? One can sympathize with colonial peoples who are oppressed; one can understand the resentment of others now independent, who support those not yet self-governing or even make claims on their behalf. But colonial peoples are not the only ones who have suffered mistreatment or injustice; why should there not also be sympathy with equally oppressed groups in the Soviet Union, or in the United States, if they can be found? One can argue that the U.N. cannot do everything at once, and that it should deal first with colonial claims; but it might be difficult to show that these claims are more urgent than those of groups within metropolitan areas.

In sum, we have this limitation: only "colonial" peoples are to be allowed to base claims on the Charter term "self-determination." But we still do not know what a people or a nation is; indeed, we do not know what a colony is.

III

What do the delegates themselves mean when they claim self-determination? What aims, what objectives, have they in mind? In the past, the popular assumption has been that what was sought was national independence—though it is to be doubted whether Wilson and his associates went so far in 1919. They were

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thinking rather of autonomy and protection for national minorities; the independence of several states resulted probably from the circumstances of disintegration at the time rather than from their conscious aim or effort.

More broadly, self-determination has been defined as the right of a people to determine their own political destiny: this might mean incorporation into a state, or some measure of autonomy within a state, or a somewhat larger degree of freedom in a federation, or commonwealth, or union; or it might mean complete independence. But today, if we may judge by U.N. debates, the claim leaps far beyond this. What is sought is not merely independence; this is rather a minimum. The delegate of Pakistan interpreted self-determination to mean that weak peoples ought not to be dominated by strong peoples. To Jugoslavia it meant protection against threats to independence emanating from other states. Even the United States asserted that the doctrine applied

> not only to peoples which have not yet attained their independence but also to politically independent States which needed protection from external pressure, threats, the use of force, and subversive activities. . . .

That would be quite a job for the United Nations! Thus self-determination becomes collective security; but the claims reached much further, to include rights adumbrated in the Commission on Human Rights in the economic and social field—rights which go so far that the United States has now announced that it will not accept the Covenant of Human Rights. The delegate of Chile demanded full economic sovereignty; self-determination in his view

> should enable any State in a condition of economic subordination to recover full sovereignty, by acquiring complete control over its own natural resources, even if this meant expulsion or nationalization of certain undertakings.

Subsequent discussion revealed well-grounded fears that this meant a right to confiscate all foreign investments or, at any rate, to compensate for them at the pleasure of the state in which they happened to be found.

With such aims, self-determination loses all meaning, for it is extended to cover everything. Anything a "people" or a "nation" (provided it is a colony), whether already independent or not, may desire it is entitled to have. It would include the right to the protection of collective security, and full protection for all nationalistic economic actions. No law would be allowed to stand in

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the way of what a group desired—or what an individual desired. The United Nations, which is asked to furnish these guarantees, would thus become the midwife of all groups desiring to be politically born. Its purpose would no longer be to uphold peace and justice, but to assure to each "people" or "nation" anything it wanted, regardless of what other "peoples," having the same right, might want. And who would pay for all this? The very Powers against whom this nationalistic movement is directed, the only ones who have the economic, political or military strength to establish such guarantees.

This does not appear to be a practical approach to a solution. Let us assume that the feeling for self-determination is a worthy one; and let us assume that appeals should be addressed to the United Nations. Both assumptions are, I think, sound. What then? The problem is a new one in history, for never before has the organized community of nations been called upon to decide—upon principle rather than by force—when a group is entitled to independence or to self-government or to economic sovereignty, or whatever that group means by self-determination. Some scattered precedents may be found: in the League of Nations Mandates system; in provisions by which a territory becomes a state in the United States; in methods by which a people have been advanced to membership in a federation, commonwealth or union, as tried by the Netherlands, England or France. And some vague principles are to be found in the Charter of the United Nations as regards Non-Self-Governing Territories or Trust Territories.

A promising study has been made by the U.N. in connection with this question of Non-Self-Governing Territories. By Article 73 of the Charter, states administering such Territories are expected to make reports on them to the United Nations, but the Charter does not say how one is to know when a group has become "self-governing." The General Assembly, however, set up a "Committee on Factors" which has tentatively reported on the qualifications for self-government or for independence. As to the latter, it suggested "full international responsibility" for its external or internal acts; eligibility for membership in the U.N.; power to negotiate and to sign international instruments, and freedom "to enter into arrangements concerning its national defense." Internally, there should be "complete freedom of the people of the territory to choose the forms of government which they

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desire;" freedom from interference by another government as to internal affairs; and "complete autonomy in respect of economic, social and cultural affairs."

Many of the recognized sovereign states of the world today could not measure up to these standards; and the Committee noted that no one of the qualifications was indispensable, and that the particular combination of them needed to be known in each particular case could not be determined in advance. If one is thinking in terms of self-determination, some confusion may arise at this point. The question before the Committee was: How may we determine when a group has become self-governing? Bearing in mind that the Charter does not require reports for a self-governing group, one can understand that anti-colonial delegations would seek to set the qualifications as high as possible, so that the Non-Self-Governing Territory (*i.e.* colony) would not escape from the jurisdiction of the United Nations by becoming self-governing. But the setting of such high standards might be disastrous to the colony, from the viewpoint of self-determination, since the colony might not be able to measure up to them.

We do not have an answer, though perhaps we have some help, from this Committee. From the viewpoint of a group claiming self-determination, the most important factor would seem to be a common desire; without this, there is no foundation. At this point the problem of the United Nations would be procedural—how is it to ascertain and measure that desire? Perhaps it would have enough information before it to decide; perhaps it would need to send out a commission of inquiry; after that, a plebiscite might be needed. Presumably, a territorial basis for the group would be essential. Assuming all this—desire, unity and territorial basis—is this enough to justify the United Nations in saying that independence—or whatever is called for in the name of self-determination—should be granted? The assertion is often made that this is enough, and that what may happen thereafter does not matter: the group wants independence so badly that it does not care whether it will be swallowed up immediately by an aggressive neighbor, or what vicissitudes of an economic or political character it might be called upon to endure. The mere fact that it wants independence and is willing to take the risks involved is said to be enough.

But of course the United Nations must take other matters into consideration. Its primary responsibility is the welfare of the

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whole community which it represents. Independence for an ambitious group may be dangerous for the community of nations. The new state may be weak or quarrelsome, and bring upon itself the attack of a covetous or injured or aggressive neighbor; the United Nations nevertheless would then be called upon to defend it. The group seeking independence may be located at a strategic point which the community cannot afford to have weakly held; it may control a strategic waterway of wide importance; it may have within its area natural resources which it is incapable of developing but which the community needs. Does the mere fact that resources vital to the whole community happen to be located within an area to which a group wants exclusive title require the community to surrender control over it?

Other factors must also be considered, including those which affect the happiness of the claimant group itself. Is it able to maintain itself, in an economic sense? If not, the people themselves suffer, and the United Nations may have to support it financially. Should the United Nations make the ability of the new state to protect certain human rights a condition for providing it with self-government or independence? It will be recalled that such conditions were set with regard to European minorities; they would appear to be desirable for a colonial people, who might be misled by false prophets. Some guarantee of democratic procedure seems necessary also, otherwise self-determination would have betrayed itself. And finally—a matter of much importance to the community of nations—there should be some assurance of the ability and willingness of the new group to meet its responsibilities as a member of that community. Will it be disposed to respect the rights of others, or will it selfishly claim "full economic or political sovereignty" for itself, regardless of the needs of the community?

These are not academic questions. Already Libya, created by the United Nations without consideration of such questions, is in economic difficulties. Italian Somaliland has been promised its independence in ten years' time; this is better, for it will during that time be taught something of governing itself; but there is no assurance that it will have learned its lesson or be able to pass an examination. Indonesia is struggling with both economic and political problems, some of them of its own making.

The duty of the United Nations to guard the welfare of the whole community appears to be in direct conflict with its sup-

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posed obligation to produce more and more infant states and turn them loose upon the streets. Three-fourths of its members now are weak states, in the sense that they are unable to contribute to its support in any effective military or economic way; each of them, however, has a vote. Having little responsibility for what results, they are tempted to vote through half-thought-out enterprises, the consequences of which must be faced by the few members strong enough to face them. These members cannot be expected to welcome greater responsibilities forced upon them by the additional votes of other weak states. The United Nations as an organization could be brought to collapse by such disproportionate burdening.

IV

Self-determination, in other words, has reached the age of responsibility. It cannot be allowed to any group for the sole reason that the group chooses to claim it. The United Nations must inquire whether there is enough homogeneity or unity or common desire to hold the new state together; whether it has economic resources and political capacity; how far it can defend itself against attack. And the United Nations must provide some criteria for its own judgment, so that it may act fairly and consistently; it should provide methods of training and testing, to be sure that the new state, when established, will not be a burden on the community, and bring unhappiness to those within it. How far the United Nations should demand democratic forms of government is a difficult question, not only because of the various meanings now attached to the word, but also because there is no assurance that man will not find another form of government more pleasing to him. It does seem clear, however, that self-determination implies a decision based upon the will of the people in the group and that, therefore, some means should be provided by which the people can express their will.

Other difficulties stand in the way of finding criteria for judgment. In view of the current tendencies in the United Nations to take law lightly, one can hardly believe that rules of law could be laid down for the satisfaction of claims based on self-determination—though decision by law might be much more satisfactory to the claimant. The decisions made by the U.N. will doubtless be political ones; and the only hope for just and reasonable solutions must therefore depend upon the attitude of member states.

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That hope must remain slight indeed, if their delegates continue to make the extravagant, impractical and irresponsible claims which have so far characterized the debates—claims which do not at all consider the needs of the community of nations, or even the welfare of the peoples concerned.

Another great difficulty is to be found in the striking historical fact—commented upon by Lloyd George and others in connection with the 1919 settlement—that when a group has maintained a claim for self-determination and struggled under that banner to independent national existence, it immediately abandons the principle for which it struggled and seeks to ingurgitate any accessible claimant to the same right. This autophagous tendency can be illustrated from Napoleon, from Prussia, from Poland; Hitler called upon the principle to justify the unification of all Germans; the Soviet Union employs it today for propaganda against the West. It can also be illustrated, unfortunately, from the recent actions of Asian states with whose claims to independence Americans have had deep sympathy. India marched her armed forces into Hyderabad even while the Security Council was hearing the plea of the latter for protection, and in the face of the legal right of the princely states (under the India Independence Act of 1947) to remain independent if they wished; she rejected arbitration which had been promised under the Stand Still Agreement, promised a plebiscite which was never held, and drove out Hyderabadi from their offices, property and jobs. Hyderabad is now the center of Communism in India. The pressure is being applied also in Kashmir, where the opposition of Pakistan makes the absorption slower; and she is reaching out now for Portuguese and French territories. This is inconsistent behavior for an outstanding champion of self-determination and anti-imperialism.

In the case of Indonesia the inconsistency is both hers and that of the United Nations. The agreement establishing Indonesia as an independent state provided for a federation with autonomous parts, but Indonesia almost at once converted herself into a unitary republic. The group calling itself the Republic of the South Moluccas, deprived thus of its autonomy, claimed self-determination; but Indonesia, forgetting her recent reliance upon that principle, denied the claim by force and is also reaching out for New Guinea. In the United Nations, the Security Council, which had turned a deaf ear to Hyderabad, labored diligently, in

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the face of international law and Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter, to achieve "self-determination" for Indonesia. Why one, but not the other? Of course an easy answer will be given to that question: Indonesia was a "colony," whereas others were not. Only colonies can claim self-determination and the support of the United Nations. But the others, too, are human beings. It is most confusing to find the United States, which gave independence to the Philippines and self-government to Puerto Rico, scorning Hyderabad, supporting Indonesia, and on the fence as to Tunisia. Now, on the edge of Central Asia, a new group calling itself Pakhtunistan lays claim to a third of the territory of Pakistan; others will come along.

It is sad that anti-colonial resentment should have so distorted a noble principle; and it is also understandable. But we can plead with those who feel this resentment to consider the consequences of their extreme demands; and we can plead with all states to vote in the United Nations with regard to some consistent principles, rather than in accord with the political opportunism of the moment. Perhaps the term "self-determination" should be dropped, now that the United Nations is called upon to do the determining, and we should think in terms of such separate problems as self-government, independence, collective security, economic security and human rights—all in the framework of the safety and welfare of the world community. Peoples who, in the future, call upon the United Nations to give them control over their own destinies, invoking the right of self-determination, must be answered in terms of principles on which they can educate themselves in the hope that, when they have proven themselves, the United Nations will support them. Surely it is time for the United Nations, and for its member states both large and small, to take a deep breath and examine the premises on which they are acting in these important matters.

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THE SUEZ: INTERNATIONAL ROADWAY

By André Siegfried

OF all the great roadways of the world, the sea road to India via the Isthmus of Suez is probably the most important, for it joins East and West, Asia and Europe—that is, the two most thickly-populated continents having the most ancient civilizations. The Isthmus itself, by virtue of its geographical position, has always been a focal point, but its greatest significance dates from the opening of the Canal, in 1869, at a time when Europe was triumphantly expanding, thanks to the industrial revolution and steam navigation. The rapid pace of industrialization could not have been kept up without access to raw materials from the uttermost parts of the earth and the opening of new markets for manufactured goods. And the introduction of America to the Far East in the twentieth century further enlarged the rôle of this intercontinental route. If the Canal is blocked or its efficiency impaired the whole Western World is affected.

As an intercontinental crossroad Suez is so important that the great World Powers must, of necessity, either establish a foothold in it or at least make sure of its availability to them. If I knew who was to be its master 10 or 25 years from now, then I should know who had mastery of the whole world as well. Renan was not far from right when he said in his welcoming speech to Ferdinand de Lesseps upon the latter's admission to the French Academy:

> The great sentence, "I came not to bring peace, but a sword," must have come often into your mind. Once the Isthmus was cut, it inevitably became a passageway, that is, a field of battle. So far, one Bosporus had made for quite enough trouble in the world, but you have created a second which overshadows it in importance, for it connects not merely two landlocked seas but all the great oceans. In the event of a naval war, this is the point which the contending powers would struggle most urgently to occupy. You have set your seal on one of the great battlegrounds of the future.

The necessity of organizing exchanges between East and West is common to all ages, but the products exchanged vary from one period to another, and so do the means of transporting them. The Suez Canal is an important factor in the balance of civiliza-

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tions, living standards, communications and trade. For this reason its significance is different today from what it was in the nineteenth century, when Lesseps conceived and built it. And there is an even greater difference between the present conception of East-West trade and that held in ancient times and the Middle Ages.

In ancient Roman eyes, Asia was a fabulous source of riches and luxury. After Alexander the Great had swept away many of the dividing walls which separated one part of the Orient from another, trade on a truly international scale developed between three important centers of civilization: the Mediterranean, the Hellenistic Middle East and the Far East proper (India and China). The goods imported were luxury articles: perfumes, cloth, precious stones, spices and circus animals. Because Rome had little to offer in exchange (lead, pewter, glass and wine), she paid in gold for an unfavorable trade balance. Eventually, all the gold of the West found its way to Byzantium and India.

In the Middle Ages, the trade balance remained approximately the same. Spices, china, aloe-wood, camphor, pearls and perfumes were exchanged for other woods, cloth, metals and fur. Merchants from Genoa, Venice and Catalonia went to Alexandria and Pelusium, where they met their Arab counterparts from all sections of Africa and Asia. Egypt was the great meeting-place.

In the second half of the fifteenth century, two events of capital importance transformed the face of the globe. First, the Turkish capture of Constantinople (1453) cut off the ancient routes to Asia. And, second, Vasco da Gama (1498) opened a new sea route, around the Cape of Good Hope, to India. As a result, the Mediterranean was changed, for three centuries to come, from a passageway into a blind alley. The world center of gravity was displaced toward the shores of the Atlantic and the Great Powers which bordered upon it.

As long as the articles traded remained more or less the same, the Cape of Good Hope was a sufficient and preferable route. It was suited to sailing vessels and offered more security than the pirate-infested Mediterranean. But the relationship between Europe and Asia was radically changed when the industrial revolution came into full force and steam navigation swept the sailing ship from the seas. Industrialized nineteenth century Europe was no longer content with Eastern spices and other luxury products; it needed raw materials for its factories, and foodstuffs

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in wholesale quantities for an expanding population which it could no longer support. Its exports were transformed even more importantly: mass production goods, tools and machinery, all with a great appeal to an East roused by its new contact with the expanding Western economy.

Now the Orient appeared in quite a different light, not as the legendary and marvelous region of the past but as a no less precious reservoir of cheap raw materials, and, at the same time, a market for the West's increasing industrial production. A whole new system of exchanges came into being: Europe imported goods in the raw and sent them back manufactured. This was a healthy and mutually beneficial state of affairs, which made for nineteenth-century prosperity and all the benefits of free trade.

Another result, felt from the end of the eighteenth century to the First World War, was the indisputable and uncontested power of the European nations, based on their industrial monopoly. This power was incorporated in a worldwide system, to all practical purposes under British control. And along with it went a period of security in international relations and a system of free trade, utterly different from both the preceding mercantilism and the closed compartments of the present day.

II

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, when the passage from England to India via the Cape of Good Hope required 140 days by sail and 90 by steam, a direct sea route between Europe and India became increasingly necessary. The Canal was to reduce the time of a journey to India by almost one-half, and of a voyage to the Far East by almost one-quarter. Even before the Isthmus was pierced, the Peninsular and Oriental line took passengers from England to Bombay by a combined sea and land route in 20 days, with transportation by rail between Alexandria and Suez. But freight still had to be carried around the Cape, and, according to Lesseps' calculations, this traffic came to 9,000,000 tons in 1869. The final factor needed to make an all-water route through a canal practical was the more complete development of steam navigation, for sailing vessels could not have coped with the windless waters of the Red Sea. Fortunately, the decisive victory of steam came in 1859, as the Canal was being cut.

It is instructive, after so much time has gone by, to analyze the problem of the Canal as Lesseps saw it in 1854, when he ob-

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tained permission to construct it from Mohammed Saïd, Viceroy of Egypt. This was a liberal century. In 1845 England had established the reign of free trade, and a few years later Napoleon III, in his turn, came under the influence of Richard Cobden. The economic ideology of the period tended toward large-scale international exchanges, and it was generally thought that, following the British example, lower tariffs and the elimination of customs formalities would soon be the rule. Free enterprise was in style, and everywhere it gave continuous proofs of the unlimited possibilities of capital, credit and competition. Lesseps was able to count on financing his project through a private company, to which savings from all over the world would contribute; and in that day of peace and limited wars he could be reasonably sure that in case hostilities did break out the underlying economic agreements would be maintained. There was widespread respect for international law then, and it was natural that the Canal should not be looked upon as the property of any single Power, but as an undertaking shared by all mankind. People were proud of the peaceful civilization which technical progress seemed to be bringing; they had wholehearted faith in it and never imagined that there could be such a thing as regression, or that the new and dazzling scientific discoveries could be used to destroy civilization. This was a time when men made long-range projects, based on the assumption that stability was legalized and permanent, and that progress would be continuous.

Ferdinand de Lesseps found himself in contact with an Egypt modernized by Mohammed Ali. This great sovereign had reestablished order and created a nation, calling in European experts and laying out a vast program of public works. Lesseps was on even closer terms with Mohammed Saïd, his successor. He knew that the Viceroy meant to follow in the footsteps of the founder of the dynasty, that he wanted the Canal built, and that he intended to fulfill the necessary conditions. No doubt Mohammed Saïd, and Ismail after him, preferred "the Canal to belong to Egypt rather than Egypt to the Canal," but they maintained a strictly neutral attitude toward the Company charged with constructing it—that is, they proffered no nationalistic arguments to interfere with the work of the engineers or the administrators. Lesseps never dreamed of asking for the establishment of a "Canal Zone," or a special body of police under his control. He had no fear that the Egyptian authorities would violate his

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contract with them, and indeed his only administrative vexation, which stemmed from the questioning of his right to employ *fellah* labor, was instigated not by the Egyptians but by a jealous England. Only in the twentieth century does violently anti-Western Egyptian nationalism appear. Lesseps never had to defend himself against anything of the sort, even in the time of Arabi Pasha. It must be admitted, of course, that before 1869 the Isthmus was a stretch of desert, detached from the main body of Egyptian territory, even though Egypt's political frontier was 150 miles to the east.

Under these conditions, Lesseps and Mohammed Saïd had no trouble in reaching agreement upon the fundamental idea of the enterprise. Its essential features, just as they exist today, are written into the original concession, signed on November 30, 1854. The concession was a personal arrangement with "our friend, M. Ferdinand de Lesseps," to whom was given full power to set up and direct a "universal" company for the piercing of the Isthmus and the exploitation of a Canal between the two seas. The adjective "universal," as applied to the Company, shows how free of any national bias it was intended to be. Rates were to be the same for all countries, with no chance for any one of them to obtain a special favor. The concession was made for a period of 99 years from the opening of the Canal. This means that it will terminate in 1968, when the Egyptian Government is to replace the Company, paying a sum, to be fixed by arbitration, for the installations and equipment.

Lesseps' real difficulties were neither technical nor financial (as turned out to be the case in Panama), but political—a quite different kind of political difficulty, however, than the Company and the interested Powers are up against today. The example is again instructive. In spite of the solemn declaration of the founders that the undertaking was international in character, England was profoundly mistrustful and feared that under cover of the slogan of *aperire terram gentibus* France was trying to obtain a monopoly of communications between Europe and Asia. In spite of the fact that Lesseps sought to raise his capital of 200,000,000 francs by public subscription, English hostility, instigated by Lord Palmerston, continued to the very end. The principles of availability to all and complete neutrality were not enough to suit the British Prime Minister, and Lesseps' attempt to obtain an international guarantee of neutrality was unsuccess-

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ful. Evidently England would be content with nothing less than a privileged position, asserted by reason of the fact that English traffic would be the Canal's mainstay.

One year after the opening, when Lesseps received a triumphal reception in London, *The Times* gallantly wrote:

> M. de Lesseps has come to a country which did nothing for the Suez Canal, but which, since the opening, has sent more traffic through it than all the other nations of the globe combined. This country supplies most of the money which will be paid in dividends to the shareholders. May this be a compensation for whatever errors we may have made at the start.

Indeed, in the period 1870–80, 76 percent of the total tonnage was under the English flag, and France, which came next, had only 8.3 percent, while the United States, which had supplied up to 10 percent of the traffic going around the Cape, was insignificantly represented. Having been outstripped by France in the creation of the Canal, England proceeded to make up for lost time, first by buying out the 177,000 shares held by the Khedive Ismail, and thus entering the Company's administration; and second, by effecting a military occupation of Egypt in 1882, which gave her effective rule over the country, the Isthmus included. As a result, the neutrality of the Canal took on a peculiar character which to some extent still prevails.

Contrary to general belief, the purchase of Ismail's shares did not give England control of the Company, which had 400,000 shares outstanding; but with Lesseps' consent she achieved minority representation on the Board of Directors, on a basis of friendly and loyal coöperation. The English occupation of Egypt seriously modified the Company's position, however, since the Khedive no longer held the reins. Temporarily, at least, England accepted a status of neutrality, but at the same time she intended to take advantage of the privileges gained by military occupation. Under these circumstances, France all the more strongly desired an international covenant of some kind, and one was eventually adopted, under the name of the 1888 or "Constantinople" Convention.

The principles set forth were largely, but not entirely, based on a presupposition of neutrality, or to be more exact, of "free use." The Canal was to be kept open, in war as in peace, to warships and traders alike; no fortifications were to be built and no blockades allowed. The Khedive's Government, with, if necessary, the support of the Ottoman Government, to which it

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owed allegiance, was to insure the observance of these rulings. The validity of the Convention was not limited to the duration of the concession, but was indefinite. Obviously, by virtue of the military occupation England was the actual guarantor, as the signatories to the Convention saw quite clearly.

This system functioned until 1920 and the application of the Versailles Treaty. During all the period which we have surveyed, it was England's chief interest to keep the waterway to India open. But as a trading Power, England was equally concerned with the free and regular movement of communications among the continents. During the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the freedom of the Canal was respected even by the belligerents, as it was during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911; even though the Canal was on Ottoman territory, Turkey did not oppose the passage of 12,400 Italian soldiers and three warships. This was a truly notable occurrence, and from it we can judge the respect accorded to international agreements in those days. In this regard the twentieth century has fallen far behind its predecessor.

III

In other words, up until 1914, a nineteenth century atmosphere prevailed. But in more recent times the problems of a waterway to India via the Mediterranean have changed their complexion. Middle-Eastern oil is a new and important factor in trade, while such modern weapons as the airplane and submarine have endowed war—whether hot or cold—with a degree of insecurity unknown in the past. The Cape route suddenly seems less vulnerable and has regained something of its former favor.

Since the Second World War, the political map of Asia has greatly altered. An independent India has slipped out of England's hands, while Communist China has abandoned the West entirely. In the days of European, or rather British, hegemony, India's tariff policy was determined in London and that of China through the International Customs Union, headed by the Englishman, Sir Robert Hart. More than 500,000,000 people were removed from the economic domain of the West when this system ended, while everywhere in the Far East there was a flare-up of nationalism, rendered excessive by the fear of a return to subservience. We forget that, during the nineteenth century, the world was a sort of international mercantile republic, with Eng-

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land at its head, in which business affairs were incontestably controlled by white men of European strain. An efficient administrative machine functioned, and guaranteed the stability and security of exchanges between the continents. The people of this period considered such a state of affairs normal and permanent. It seemed to them only logical that non-Europeans should deferentially accept their advice and instructions when it came to building or controlling vast enterprises of public works. When Lesseps dealt with the Egypt of Mohammed Saïd or Ismail, these things were taken for granted. Now the whole atmosphere has changed and every problem has to be examined from a different angle.

Since 1913 the tonnage carried through the Suez Canal has grown to an extraordinary degree: from 24,678,000 tons in the last prewar year to 83,448,000 tons in 1952. And its make-up is quite different from what it used to be. In 1913, traffic from north to south came to 11,320,000 tons, or 44 percent of the total; in 1952, it was 22,001,000 tons, or only 26 percent, whereas traffic from south to north has increased from 14,455,000 tons in 1913 to 83,448,000 tons in 1952. The character of north-to-south traffic has not changed for it is still composed of manufactured or semi-manufactured goods, mostly machines, railway equipment and tools, all directed to countries in the process of industrialization. Although traffic from south to north has considerably increased in volume, it still consists mainly of raw materials. In 1913, raw materials came to 45 percent and foodstuffs to 31 percent, with 5 percent of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods and 19 percent miscellaneous. In 1952, manufactured goods represented 7 percent, foodstuffs fell to 5 percent and raw materials came to 86 percent; but oil made up 83 percent of the raw materials and 74 percent of the total. The extraordinary decreases in volume and degree of foodstuffs are due to the population crisis of an Asia which cannot feed itself, and the increase in oil is, of course, a result of the sensational development of the Middle-Eastern oil fields (in which the loss of Abadan passes practically unnoticed). The excess of oil and oil products indicates an unhealthy situation, which the construction of pipe-lines leading directly to the Mediterranean should, to some extent, allay. Still, it is a fact that oil is the main commodity in south-to-north trade. In view of the decisive rôle played by oil products in both peace and war today, the freedom and security of communications

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through the Canal is becoming more and more important for Europe and for the United States as well.

The largest part of the tonnage is under the British flag—33.3 percent of the total in 1952. Even so this represents a great falling-off from the figures of 51.4 percent in 1939 and 76.1 percent between 1870–80. England still uses the Canal a great deal more than any other nation, and is therefore the Power most directly interested, from both a political and a commercial point of view, in its efficient functioning. Until 1939, hardly any traffic went under the American flag (0.15 percent of the total). The Second World War brought a considerable increase, however, and in 1952, 7.3 percent of the tonnage traveled under the American flag; indeed, if we count the American share in what is nominally Panamanian, Honduran and Liberian traffic, it is 17.1 percent. American imports through the Canal were 6,156,000 tons in 1952—largely oil and manganese; exports (amounting to 4,079,000 tons) were mostly grain (on the way to famine-stricken India) and petroleum products. The United States is present, now, in the Near East with an accumulation of economic and political interests. As a result, no problem concerned with the Suez Canal can be solved without American coöperation.

IV

There are two sides to the military problem of the waterway to India: the question of the defense of the Canal, and of the maintenance of free passage through the other seas and straits along the route. The whole situation has radically changed since the First World War, for the Mediterranean background is not what it was at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Although England still has nominal control of the Isthmus and the road to India, her position is precarious, and the whole sytem calls for revision.

The Constantinople Convention still stands, or rather, the principles which it implies hold good; but it has undergone important modifications. According to the text of 1888, the Ottoman Government, which then held sovereignty over Egypt, was supposed to enforce the Convention, but England, by virtue of military occupation, was in actual control and has been ever since, under a different title. Article 152 of the Versailles Treaty transferred to England the powers given to the Sultan by the Convention. And it is on the basis of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty

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of 1936 that England occupies the Isthmus. After passing in 1914 from the status of a vassal to Turkey to that of a British protectorate, Egypt in 1922 acquired self-government and has been intolerant of foreign military occupation ever since. In October 1951, Egypt abrogated the 1936 Treaty, but England still occupies the Isthmus and will not consent to withdraw until the present makeshift arrangement is superseded by a stable agreement guaranteeing the safety of a route which is indispensable to her status as a World Power. For the Canal is still a vital link in Britain's system of communications. And it must be admitted that British control has served the other users of the Canal well; thanks to the tradition of "fair play," there has never been any discrimination.

If it seems impossible, as things now stand, for the British will to prevail, it is because Egypt's insistence upon complete independence is buttressed by a surge of anti-Western feeling among all the Arab states. In 1882, there was, to be sure, the nationalist movement of Arabi Pasha, but Iraq, Pakistan and Syria did not exist, and neither did the United Nations through which they can now seek international support. The importance of the area where the Canal is located is more crucial than ever. There are trouble spots all around, and its security is vital not only to England but to the whole Western World, the United States included.

The two world wars have taught England that the hostility or even the hostile neutrality of a single one of the Mediterranean Powers can endanger the safety of the Canal. Any enemy that has a foothold on this narrow, winding body of water, so admirably suited to ambush and intrigue, can close it; indeed, to this end, control of the military installations (which England has never lost) is not necessary. The enemy can exercise a veto right, at least upon commercial traffic, and make passage impossible without an armed raid or a minor naval battle. Twice, in the course of the last wars, England has revived Vasco da Gama's abandoned route around the Cape of Good Hope. It is longer and more expensive, but safer, at least comparatively, from attack by airplanes and submarines. Can it be that Palmerston was right, after all? Certain Englishmen have wondered. In 1926 Sir John Marriott said in the House of Commons:

> Looking back after a considerable lapse of time, I am not sure that the British statesmen who opposed the Suez Canal from the point of view of

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both diplomacy and power were not right . . . If the Canal had never been pierced we might find ourselves in a stronger position today. And if this is true, how necessary it is for us to keep the route around the Cape and to see that the African coast, to both East and West, is free of foreign domination!

This point of view has its limitations, however. Even in time of war the Suez route must be kept passable for warships at least, if not for mercantilism. And the Isthmus cannot be considered merely a passageway; it is an advanced position in the defenses of East Africa, West Asia and the Indian Ocean. The question is no longer one merely of the Canal, but of a strategic military base on the Isthmus where arms and armies can be concentrated. It serves the function of a hinge rather than a passageway. Neither Britain nor the United States can possibly withdraw from the Isthmus, any more than they can withdraw from the Mediterranean basin. But the nature of its defense must be changed to fit the political developments in Egypt, and also to fit the new techniques of war. For instance, the Isthmus might be protected, even without occupation, from a string of surrounding points: Cyprus, Cyrenaica and Kenya. It might be possible to set up an inter-Allied defense group, with Egypt as one of the partners. All these things are problematic, but the problems must be resolved if the security of the eastern end of the Mediterranean is to rest on a concord among Egypt and the Western Powers directly concerned. For it is no longer a strictly Anglo-Egyptian matter. Of course, England is not merely a "brilliant second" in a policy where the United States is concerned. But since the defense of the air and sea ways joining the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the Far East is at stake the American interest is very strong. The United States cannot arbitrate between Great Britain and Egypt. Her position is not that of an arbitrator but of a fellow member of the great Western alliance.

In the time of Lesseps and indeed up to the Second World War, the completely free movement of traffic through the canal was never questioned. The first article of the Convention of 1888 established "free use of the canal in time of war as in time of peace," and the Company assured it. But, since the recent war in Palestine, the Egyptian Government has claimed a right to stop tankers on their way to Israel. This is a violation both of the original 1854 concession and the Convention of Constantinople, which is still valid; but protests by the other Powers have not caused the Egyptians to desist from their abuse of the Convention. They justify their action by Article 10 of the 1888 Con-

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vention, which states that other provisions of the Treaty "shall in no case occasion any obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman [read Egyptian] Government may think it necessary to take in order to insure by its own forces the defense of its other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea." It was under the pretext of self-defense and the preservation of law and order that the Egyptian declarations of May 15 and 18, 1948, introduced the inspection of ships in Egyptian ports and the confiscation of goods destined to an enemy. We may argue that according to Article 11, the measures provided for in Article 10 "are not to prevent free use of the Canal." To which the Egyptians may in turn reply that they respect the idea of "free use" and that they object, not to the passage of ships, but to cargoes containing contraband goods sent to a hostile Power. Of course, this is a specious interpretation, for the free passage of a ship has no meaning unless it includes the passage of its cargo as well. Neither the Ottoman Government, in the course of the Italo-Turkish war, nor the Allies in 1914 and 1940, had recourse to any such arguments in order to twist to their advantage the text of an agreement truly international in spirit.

Actually, "free use" is threatened the very moment the Power through whose territory the Canal runs ceases to recognize the principle of the equal rights of all users. Here the problem of the Canal is a complex one, and military occupation of the Isthmus is no solution. For it is a question of defending the Canal not so much against outside invasion as against Egyptian undermining of the basic principles on which our system of world communications reposes. Even in the hands of a man as intelligent as General Naguib, the Egyptian Government does not seem to understand that although the Canal passes through Egyptian territory it has an essentially international character and cannot be run in any other than an international spirit. If British control, arbitrary as it may have been, was for so long accepted, it is because it impartially respected the rights of all users. Is there a chance that a strictly Egyptian control would work the same way? If we judge this unlikely, then obviously some sort of international control must be set up, in agreement with Egypt. And this means that the principles which inspired the original concession must be solemnly restated.

Here we have one of those "essential liberties" without which Western civilization ceases to be itself. Can anyone imagine the

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Republic of Panama doing what Egypt has done? What would be the reaction of the United States? Egypt's sovereignty over the Isthmus (and let us not forget that before Lesseps' time the Isthmus was no more than a desert) would be a precarious one if she were to use it in order to impede the functioning of a piece of international machinery so essential to the whole world. Neither Lesseps nor his immediate successors could have foreseen any such situation as the Canal is in today, for the international atmosphere of their time was infinitely more civilized than that of ours. The negotiations presently necessary in order to guarantee free use are infinitely more complex than those of the past, for they bring into play international sensibilities of a much more delicate kind. There is a world of difference between the psychology of Mohammed Saïd or Ismail and that of General Naguib, who is pushed by almost hysterical nationalistic forces. Is it really an advantage for Egypt, we may ask, to be geographically located at such an important center of communications? Actually, the position is fraught with perils as well as with responsibilities. In the past, Egypt has been fortunate enough to be guided through its hours of crisis by first-class statesmen. Now the need for such statesmen is greater than ever.

V

The Western Powers, looking into the future, wonder what will be the fate of the Canal in 1968, when the original concession will expire. It would be foolish to hazard any prophecies at this moment, for we have no idea what aspect the question will assume. What will conditions be in Egypt and the Near East? What will be the strength of England and France? What balance will there be among the oceans and continents, or, in other words, what will be the respective strengths of the United States and Russia? Will not India and China have something to say? The future régime of the Canal depends on an answer to all these questions. One thing is certain, however: there will be a struggle between Egypt and the users of the Canal, with the former aiming at complete mastery and all the advantages that could be derived therefrom, and the latter preoccupied with the maintenance of a satisfactory service. The Egyptian Government would be naïve to suppose that it can take over a piece of machinery with such an essentially international function without assuming any obligations in return. The Powers which rule the seas 15

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years from now will insist upon having their say in regard to tolls, general procedure and managerial efficiency. A new concession may be given to the present Company or to another newly formed, but even if the Egyptian Government itself insists on taking possession, it will be called upon to provide an administration both technically adequate and respectful of the rights of international transit.

From both these points of view, the present Company has been beyond reproach. In its relations with shipping firms, it has always tended to lower its rates and in general to behave less like a commercial enterprise than like a public service. In the same way, even during these last years of the concession, it has conscientiously kept all the equipment of the Canal in good order. Seven improvement programs, undertaken since 1870, have increased the dimensions of the Canal and thus enabled it to meet the demands of sensationally increasing traffic.

The great international services of Panama and Suez have functioned so regularly that we have almost forgotten the conditions essential to their maintenance. We have not stopped to think that Western personnel (European at Suez and American at Panama) have kept everything up to standard—a standard derived from a combination of Western engineering technique and nineteenth century economic liberalism. If the management of the Suez Canal is to pass into other than Western hands, then the new managers—if they want to make themselves acceptable to the rest of the world—must give proof of the administrative efficiency and devotion to liberal principles of trade which have built up the incontestable superiority of the West during the past century.

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THE MEDITERRANEAN: PIVOT OF PEACE AND WAR

By W. Gordon East

THE Mediterranean region has always played a conspicuous part in history. Alike in prehistoric, ancient and medieval times—in peace and in war—high civilizations and great political activity characterized it. It is not one of those regions, like prewar Germany and the present Soviet Union, whose concentration of population and economic resources is great enough to make it a political base for a bid for world mastery. It engages the interest of the Great Powers, notably the great naval Powers, because of its political disunity and weakness, and its geographical location and character. Only once in history—in the heyday of the Roman Empire—did all the Mediterranean lands form one political unit.

In modern times, with the decline of Turkish and Spanish power, and in a world which had become "oceanic" in its relationships, Britain intruded her sea power into the Mediterranean to suppress piracy, to protect her commercial interests, to help maintain the balance of power in Europe, and to defend her territories east of Suez. Certainly Britain made good use of the geographical opportunity presented by the Mediterranean-Red Sea short route which flanked or pierced great desert obstacles and linked the two most populous and civilized regions of the Old World—Europe and monsoon Asia. It was possible for her to exploit this opportunity, among other reasons, because the entries from the Atlantic Ocean and the Arabian Sea were restricted and thus easily controllable, because island groups in the Mediterranean provided necessary ports of call and bases; and, not least, because the African flank of the Mediterranean and the desert coastlands of the Red Sea offered few political or naval dangers.

But today, when so much has changed politically both inside and outside the Mediterranean basin, it does not follow automatically that the part which this sea played for Britain in the past is the one it should now play for the American-led Western World. The place of the Mediterranean and Middle East in British defense policy was seriously questioned before the Second World War, and though their rôle in the defense policy of the West has been much discussed it has never been clarified. We

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must remember that this continuous waterway is made up of two unequal and distinct parts, which until 1869 perforce functioned separately—the Mediterranean proper and the Red Sea—the two tenuously linked at the Suez isthmus. And while the present

defense policy of the West, expressed above all in the formation and activities of NATO, assigns unmistakable functions to the Mediterranean area, policy in respect of the complementary Red Sea-Middle East area remains obscure.

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The scale and nature of the political changes wrought since 1939 must be recalled, because they help to define the practical problems. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy together only narrowly failed to dominate the Mediterranean, and the former won control of the inner Black Sea basin. When they were destroyed, the Soviet Union emerged as the danger to world peace and the catalyst of Western defense planning; and the Soviet Union, beyond the Turkish Straits, is the chief Black Sea Power. Alongside Britain, driven by the stream of events, the United States found itself in 1945 in control of the whole Mediterranean and Middle East areas. France, which had occupied a powerful position in the Mediterranean in 1939, was greatly weakened by 1945; she had been deprived of her emplacements in Syria and Lebanon, which became independent states in 1944, but was still in control of vast territories in Africa; today the routes across the western Mediterranean provide her with the vital links with French North Africa.

Britain's relationships to her overseas territories have also changed greatly. Although most of these are still within the Empire and Commonwealth, so many have ceased to be controlled from London that it is necessary to reassess Britain's defense responsibilities and her facilities for carrying them out. India, Pakistan and Ceylon have assumed Dominion status and taken full control of their foreign policies; and Burma opted for complete independence of the Commonwealth. Thus Britain lost not only the principal base which made her a formidable Power in the Indian Ocean, but also a strong support to her position in the neighboring Middle East. The termination of the Palestine mandate, the withdrawal, now in progress, from her condominium with Egypt in the Sudan, and the expected withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone are also basic facts which must affect plans of defense both for the British Commonwealth and for the whole Western World.

And there are other well-known changes around the shores of the Mediterranean, of course, including the revolutionary advent of the state of Israel and the creation of an independent Libya in place of Italian North Africa. Trieste remains under Anglo-American occupation on the tense Italo-Jugoslav frontier. Many, but not all, of the Mediterranean countries share a new political and military allegiance under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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II

Given a world of changing political attitudes and forces, in which air mastery invites new geographical evaluations, it is clearly necessary to reëxamine the political interests which focus on this sea and the assumptions on which they rest. Britain's interest in the Mediterranean began as early as the sixteenth century with the Levant trade, which helped to establish good relations with the Turkish Empire, the principal territorial Power in the eastern basin. For three centuries the sea was a useful field of political and military operations for her. In the western basin naval pressure could be exerted against France and Spain. In the eastern basin sea power, supplemented at times by military forces, was effectively applied at two points and for two distinct purposes. On the one hand, by supporting Turkey, especially in the area of the Turkish Straits, Britain sought consistently in the nineteenth century to thwart Russian expansion and thus to preserve the balance of power in Europe and Asia. On the other, as the failure of Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1798 showed, Britain could defend India, at long range, in Egypt, mainly by naval superiority. The maintenance of naval forces in, or available for, the Mediterranean and Red Seas contributed to Britain's political independence, commercial progress, imperial unity and security, and stature as a World Power. Nor was this policy merely national and self-interested. Greek independence, the unification of Italy, the liberation of Arab peoples from Turkey, the creation of the Jewish national home in Palestine and of the present Libyan state were all in some sense by-products of British naval power and political initiative in the Mediterranean area. It can also at least be claimed that—as Captain Mahan argued—the application of naval power there, as in other waters, contributed to peaceful international relations.

It should not be thought that naval control of the Mediterranean by Britain was either easily or continuously held. Physically it depended on the possession of a few well-selected bases, of which some remain: Gibraltar, taken in 1704 and ceded by Spain in 1783; the Maltese Islands, which voluntarily joined Britain in 1800; Aden, originally leased to the East India Company in 1839; and Cyprus, leased to Britain by Turkey in 1878. But these small footholds would scarcely have proved adequate but for two powerful supports: political control of Egypt from 1882 until 1936, of which the military base in the Suez Canal

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zone marks the last vestige; and a skilful diplomacy which produced allies and neutrals within the Mediterranean basin. Indeed, Britain's delicately poised position there seemed at times untenable: in 1893–94, when war with France and Russia appeared imminent; in 1935–37, when Mussolini was waging war in Abyssinia and talking of *mare nostrum;* and in 1940, when, with the fall of France, Italy joined Germany in World War II.

These dangers were met successfully, but they raised a broad strategical problem. Is the Mediterranean a vital link in British imperial defense, to be preserved at all costs? Have developments in the art of war, notably aircraft and rocket projectiles, undermined the efficacy of naval warfare in such confined waters? Can this sea be virtually closed to merchant shipping by the air forces of peripheral land Powers aided by submarines? Is the Suez Canal really defensible from all likely forms of attack? Is the Mediterranean-Red Sea only a "short cut," and, if so, should it, in a major war, be abandoned in favor of the longer oceanic (Cape) route, where fewer hazards are to be expected? Do air routes across Africa dispense with this waterway as a direct route to the Middle East? In short, is the Mediterranean-Red Sea route a major factor in world politics or only a local convenience?

The experience of World War II provides provisional answers. While France stood firm and Italy remained a nonbelligerent, *i.e.* until June 1940, use of the Mediterranean raised no difficulties. With the fall of France and Italy's entry into the war the situation was worse than could have been envisaged: the sole factors favorable to British operations were the neutrality of Portugal, Spain and Turkey and the temporary availability of Crete and the Cyrenaica coast. Only shortcomings in the technical equipment of the Italian naval and air forces—notably their lack of radar, aircraft carriers, and dive bombers armed with torpedoes, as well as their shortage of oil—made it possible to continue war there; and as a route for through traffic the sea was useless for some time. The epic struggle waged in the Mediterranean, costly on both sides, was virtually won, however, late in 1942, when Malta was not only relieved but again became a base for active operations.

Various factors were essential for the success of this effort. Thanks to both military and naval action, control of the Red Sea approach to Egypt was never lost. Malta was supplied with fighter aircraft flown from carriers. The Takoradi air route was

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organized across Africa; and, above all, a powerful base was created in Egypt, from which Libya was finally conquered by the end of 1942. While Hitler's employment of submarines and torpedo-bombers had added greatly to the hazards of Mediterranean warfare, his strategical failures were probably the greatest cause of Allied success, for had he succeeded in carrying out his plan for the capture of Gibraltar in the winter of 1940–41, the gate to the Mediterranean nearest to the United States and Britain would have been closed. Had either Malta or Egypt been occupied, or had the Suez Canal been more than temporarily closed by enemy action, the sea would have lost much of its strategical value. Actually the enemy was successful in only one of the *critical sectors of the sea—the approach to the Turkish Straits* —which he controlled largely by air power based on Greek territory and the Italian Dodecanese Islands. In short, the Mediterranean seaway was preserved only with great difficulty to facilitate the first Anglo-American invasion of Europe.

Allied sea power, taking advantage of the peninsular character of Europe, thus made practicable the invasion of Italy; and Churchill argued that further advantage of this might have been taken by an invasion of the Balkan Peninsula. The "Mediterranean" school of strategists had justified its views, and the grandiose strategy of the enemy, which would have outflanked the Allied position in the Mediterranean by a gigantic pincer movement directed toward the Middle East from the Caucasus and from Libya, came to nothing. This success contrasts with the failure of the Mediterranean strategists—"Easterners" they were called—in World War I. While the "Westerners" had then argued that only an all-out effort against the Germans in the West could win the war, the "Easterners" urged an attack on Turkey (then allied with the Central Powers) in the area of the Straits. This was attempted, but just failed to force the Dardanelles in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915.

These experiences offer some help in our present problems. In the defense of Europe, at least, the Mediterranean has a clear rôle, although a powerful and resolute enemy who had gained territorial bases on the sea could intervene with powerful effect against shipping. Some of the questions raised remain unanswered, however, and to pursue them we must turn to the history of Russian political and military operations during the nineteenth century.

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III

If only because her territories front the Black Sea, from the Danube delta to the coast of Georgia, the Soviet Union necessarily has political interests in the Mediterranean, and above all in the Straits which link these two seas. Yet they developed late, when Britain and France were well-established Mediterranean Powers. It was only in the latter part of the eighteenth century that Russia expanded southward to the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, and set about building a Black Sea fleet. By the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774 the Turkish Black Sea outpost of the Crimea was ceded to Russia, and it was then also that the Straits were forced open to her commercial navigation. Thereafter Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire, whose European and Asiatic territories flanked the Straits, were the prime factor in the so-called Eastern Question which engaged the continual attention of the European Powers. Either control of the Ottoman Empire by Russia, or its disruption, would have upset the whole balance of power in Europe; and now that the U.S.S.R. and the Turkish Republic have replaced the former Tsarist and Ottoman Empires, the problem in some measure persists, especially as concerns the Straits.

Certain basic geographical facts lie behind these problems. The Straits consist of the narrow and winding Dardanelles channel, which leads from the Aegean Sea to the Sea of Marmara, and the yet narrower and shorter Bosporus, which in turn links this sea to the Black Sea. The work of nature here has defined a critical intercontinental area where land and seaways cross. Within the Straits stands the historic city of Istanbul—the Constantinople and Byzantium of earlier days. Situated on a hill by a natural harbor where the Bosporus enters the Sea of Marmara, Istanbul controls access between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. The capital in turn of two remarkably long-lived empires —the Byzantine (or East Roman) and the Ottoman Turkish— it was in itself so tempting a prize to imperialist ambitions that no Great Power could afford to let it fall to another. Further, the neighboring lands of the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor are the meeting places of political pressures generated by land-based military power and long-range sea power, and as the Ottoman Empire weakened they were bound to become areas of high international tension. In his well-known analysis of the political significance of the Heartland, Sir Halford J. Mackinder

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showed how the strategic prize of Constantinople and the Straits has been in contest throughout history between Continental and Mediterranean Powers. Moreover, Istanbul is a key point on the land route from Central Europe via Iraq to the Persian Gulf, a potential path of imperial expansion which outflanks the Mediterranean Sea—as Kaiser Wilhelm II, for example, was well aware.

For legitimate reasons of defense Russia had perforce to keep a steady eye on these confined waters: they were and remain "keys to her house." This did not, however, exclude territorial aspirations at the expense of Turkey. Russia might have profited greatly from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, provided certain Balkan areas, the Straits included, fell safely into her hands; but other watchful Powers—Britain, Austria and France —had every reason to prevent this. Britain especially saw in Russian control of the Straits a danger to her own Mediterranean position and to India.

The Straits question engaged international attention continually during the nineteenth century. While Turkey had accorded the right of passage to merchant ships of the chief maritime nations, she held firm to her ancient rule which closed them to foreign warships, a rule essential to her survival as an independent state. At one time—in 1833—when British sea power was at a low ebb, Russian influence dominated at Constantinople. At another—in 1841—a workmanlike compromise, upholding the Turkish view, was written into the public law of Europe, thanks mainly to Lord Palmerston's diplomacy, backed by a newly-built fleet. The Crimean War of 1854–56 showed Russia how dangerous to her was the intrusion into the Black Sea of the sea power of Britain and France, in alliance with Turkey. In 1856 and 1878, settlements of the question of the Straits (which always eluded Russia's grasp) veered in favor of Britain; but the Straits tended to remain, under international law, a zone of insulation between the Black Sea forces of Russia and the Mediterranean forces of the Western Powers. And this facet of the political geography of the nineteenth century suggests a conclusion still valid. The area of Istanbul and the Straits (like Korea, a meeting point of maritime and continental power) is one of the pivots on which the wheel of peace and war turns.

During World War I, when the Turks were at war with Russia,

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Britain and France (but not with the United States), the Straits were fortified with German help, and Turkey was able to deny them to her enemies and to frustrate the efforts of the Western Allies to send help to Russia by this convenient route. But at the end of that war, Turkey was disrupted. The Allies hoped to neutralize the Straits under the authority of the League of Nations, but the success of Mustafa Kemal as leader of the Turkish Republic necessitated a different solution. By the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 they were demilitarized and left in Turkish hands, but when new dangers arose in the Mediterranean, especially from Fascist Italy, this Treaty was replaced (in 1936) by the Convention of Montreux. Ten states, including the U.S.S.R. and Australia, were signatories.[1] By implication Turkey was left free to fortify the Straits, full freedom was accorded to merchant shipping, and it was provided that in time of war, if Turkey was not a belligerent, warships of belligerents could not pass through the Straits; if, however, Turkey was a belligerent, or if she were "threatened with imminent danger of war," the passage of warships would be left "entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government." It is this provision of the Convention of Montreux which greatly disturbs Soviet sensibilities, and its importance needs no emphasis.

By a direct approach to Turkey in 1946 the Soviet Union sought to revise this convention in a way which would transfer control of the Straits to her hands. Her proposal—that defense, control and use of the Straits by warships should be the concern solely of the "Black Sea Powers"—was tantamount to reasserting the position temporarily won in 1833 by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. But this Soviet démarche failed (as did the Soviet claim to trusteeship over Tripolitania in 1947). The Montreux Convention, however, expires in 1956, unless renewed; prior notice of two years is required for its "denunciation."

IV

The interest of the United States in the Mediterranean area, which finds powerful expression in the political and financial support of Italy, Greece, Turkey and Jugoslavia, military guarantees, and the maintenance in these waters of its Sixth Fleet, is a legacy of World War II. Before that war the Mediterranean

[1] The signatories were Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Australia, Japan, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, the U.S.S.R. and Jugoslavia. Italy signed the Convention in 1938.

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had no particular importance to the United States, although it was the scene of occasional American activity; a United States squadron was kept there during the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, and took part in the suppression of piracy along the North African coast. The foundation of the American University at Beirut was an interesting cultural enterprise in the Levant. At the end of the century, during the Spanish-American war, the United States came to appreciate the strategical importance of the Suez Canal. American warships operated in the Mediterranean during World War I and an American Naval Mission was stationed in the Adriatic from 1918 until 1921. Later—from 1928 onward—American oil companies, and indeed the State Department, intervened in the Middle East to secure oil interests or concessions—in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia. Americans found themselves there in commercial rivalry with Britain, which had aided national movements against Turkey and then assumed administrative control of many areas.

But none of these earlier considerations accounts for the present large-scale American commitments in the Mediterranean theater. The challenges of German and Japanese armed might, developments in the art of war, and the consequent weakening of the defensive value of the flanking oceans—no longer dominated as in the nineteenth century by British sea power—and the overseas interests and responsibilities which attach themselves to great political power, help to explain the present American policy which seeks defense by economic and military coöperation with states near to areas of likely conflict.

It seems clear that American foreign policy in the Mediterranean area was at first determined by the logic of events rather than applied as part of a preconceived plan. American intervention in North Africa in 1942—Operation Torch—brought American armed forces into the Mediterranean when the assault which they would have then preferred—an invasion of France—was too hazardous a venture. By 1944 there were nearly 1,000,000 American troops, as well as the Sixth Fleet, in the Mediterranean area. Jointly with Britain, the United States found itself in 1945 in a controlling position from the Western Mediterranean to the Middle East. As French influence and power in this area declined and as Britain reduced her commitments, the United States projected material aid, influence and power into the Mediterranean area under the symbols—beneficent to Europe but

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disquieting to the U.S.S.R.—of Marshall Aid, the Truman Doctrine and NATO.

This policy has given practical effect to the realization that Mediterranean Europe, linked by the sea, is Ridgway's right flank in the defense of Europe. It has achieved notable successes marked by the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, the support of Tito, and the recent military agreement among Greece, Turkey and Jugoslavia; and an American military and economic agreement with Spain is pending. But, as readers of *Foreign Affairs* were reminded not so long ago,[2] it is to the abrupt edges of regional pacts that attention should be focussed. One edge is marked by the Jugoslav-Italian frontier of tension in Istria, where a militarily weak gap makes vulnerable not only Trieste but the whole of north Italy. The other edge flanks the Middle East from Syria to Egypt, a politically unstable and militarily vulnerable region where Western defense policy is faced with difficult and far-reaching decisions. For it must be clearly recognized that the geopolitical value of the Mediterranean Sea has hitherto rested on the British control of Egypt, junction of sea routes from the outer oceans and passageway between them. Associated with the British position in Egypt, reduced now to the base in the Canal zone which may before long be abandoned, were the special positions held also by Britain in Iraq (under a treaty of 1930) and in Jordan (under a treaty of 1947). British withdrawal from Egypt and the Sudan, taken together with her withdrawal from Palestine and India, and the loss of French emplacements in Syria and Lebanon, raises urgently the question of the rôle in Western defense of that large region which we oddly call the "Middle East."

Before grappling with this question, however, let us review the main functions of the Mediterranean area proper in Western defense and note the territorial bases available for performing them. The fleets of NATO, which rule its waters, have at their disposal the many mainland and insular bases and harbors of Britain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey—all member states. Since Spain, like Egypt, occupies so outstandingly important a position in relation to the Mediterranean—her territories border both ocean and inland sea and command both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar—it is not surprising that the United States has been at pains to seek an agreement with her. With air bases in Spain

[2] "Eisenhower's Right Flank," by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1951.

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and with the existing American establishments at Port Lyautey, Rabat, Casablanca and elsewhere in French Morocco, defense in depth will become available at the Mediterranean's Atlantic entry. The United States is thus quietly writing a new page of history by replacing Britain as the principal guardian of the western gateway to the Mediterranean. As the use of this narrow seaway must depend increasingly on the air support from the land, it is advantageous that the new Libya, fronting the center of the basin, stands in friendly relations with the West. Only Albania—another delicate area in Italo-Jugoslav relations—constitutes an outlier of the Soviet world on the shores of the Mediterranean. But in war, peacetime maps sometimes need rapid revision; there are weak spots—notably Istria, Macedonia and Thrace—at which a powerful continental enemy might quickly strike.

The functions which are, or can be, carried out by NATO naval power in the Mediterranean may be briefly listed. This long, ready and mobile arm helps to defend vital objectives, such as the Strait of Gibraltar, and to apply the policy of containment to potential aggressors. It provides a strong southern flank to the NATO forces in Western Europe, which occupy defensive positions determined more by political necessity than by military choice. Control of the Mediterranean seaway is indispensable to the efficient coöperation of the member states of NATO, and links France with her important source of manpower and supplies in Africa. The possibilities in war both of flank attack from this sea and support to land operations exist so long as air-naval supremacy is held; such operations have been a recurrent feature of Mediterranean warfare and owe their success in part to deficiencies in surface transport in many areas around the basin. The seaport of Trieste, which remains under Anglo-American occupation, has a striking strategical position where the Mediterranean projects farthest north into Europe; and, by way of Alpine passes, leads to the Middle Danube basin and Vienna, for which it was originally created.

Moreover, naval control of the Mediterranean can, in some areas at least, gain prestige, no mean consideration. It provides the opportunity of winning friends and of diverting neutrals from hostile action. The Turkish Straits, one of the water gates to the Soviet Union, lead not only to its industrialized south, but also to the Caucasus regions. Then again the Mediterranean

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provides the shortest route to the Middle East for both the United States and Britain. To the holders of this sea, in time of war, falls the trade in the many valuable commodities which its ports provide: oil, piped to the Levant coastlands, iron, copper and chrome, fertilizers and foodstuffs; control of these waters makes possible economic warfare generally, and maritime blockade in particular. And lastly, since Africa is virtually an island and contains large areas dependent politically on West European countries, its defense, and all that this implies economically and strategically for its defenders, rests primarily on air-naval supremacy in the Mediterranean-Red Sea area.

V

But if Western defense in the Mediterranean area appears firmly grounded, it is weak and growing weaker in the Middle East—"the land of the five seas." Although during the inter-war period Britain and France were strongly established in this area, their tenure of power in the face of nationalistic pressures has either ended or is waning. Britain's position in 1939 was still sufficiently strong to enable her to create in Egypt a powerful, elaborate and highly-organized base for the defense not only of Egypt but of the whole Middle East. In retrospect the British positions in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Iraq would appear to have served more than a narrowly British Commonwealth interest in the war against the Axis Powers. It is now open to discussion whether this costly defense commitment in the Middle East is strategically justified in the best interests of the British Commonwealth and Empire, even if it can still be maintained. No other base in the Middle East can possibly be as efficient as one in Egypt[3] where the Suez Canal zone, accessible to shipping from both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, commands the single invasion route into Egypt from the Levant coastlands. The loss of this linchpin of the British Middle East defense position must inevitably weaken its remaining defense footholds in Jordan and Iraq. The practical possibility of preserving the Canal from all likely forms of attack also appears more than doubtful, and though loss of its use would not be disastrous to the base it would be serious.

[3] It is Egypt, not merely the Canal, which makes the base so important. In World War II it provided a large labor force and repair center as well as airfields, railroads, headquarters and ports.

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In short, although it may take time to adjust thought to such a fundamental reorganization of the British defense system—if time is allowed—it would seem sound British policy to build up defense in depth, as some military experts have long argued, in and around the Indian Ocean, behind the shores of which lie two-thirds of the area of the British Commonwealth and Empire. There the Gulf of Aden and the narrow Red Sea entry could be secured from nearby British territories; Kenya, linked with West Africa by air routes and roads, might be made a base for supplies; while the Persian and Ormuz Gulfs might be held with the aid of outlying defense positions in Iraq. For this the coöperation of Pakistan, India and Ceylon would be most desirable. Such a deployment of forces would impose on an aggressor from the north the weakness of lengthened lines of communication through difficult country, shield the oil fields of Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and utilize the facilities provided by command of the sea for the movement of men and matériel to required points.

Such a change in the geography of British defense organization, which might in any case be enforced by events, has its clear implications for the United States. Americans must necessarily have pondered the questions whether, and to what extent, their own foreign and defense policies were at times underwriting the waning imperialism of Britain. A delicate and careful analysis would be necessary to explore these questions, and the concept "imperialism" in its more decent modern dress would need evaluation. But the power vacuum that would be created by the British withdrawal from Egypt would not easily be filled. Defenses, now barely strong enough for their possible tasks, would become inadequate. While Turkey, set between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, may appear a substantial obstacle, both Persia on her eastern flank and the Arab states to the south remain areas of political and military weakness, exposed to the Soviet Union's sharpest weapon, ideological infiltration. The cooperation and bases which are necessary if the Middle East defense gap is to be filled are not to be easily obtained, in some at least of the states associated under Egypt's leadership in the Arab League. Recollection of American support for the new Israel, with which, in their view, a state of war still exists, desire for revenge against Israel and fear of her expansion, distrust of alliances with Great Powers, the aspiration for full independence in countries whose faith and culture are alien to those of the West,

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unwillingness to incur Soviet hostility by defense arrangements that will be deemed provocative in Moscow, predilection for neutrality—all present a stern challenge to Western diplomacy.

If the age of miracles has not passed and if Stalin's heirs were actually thinking of peace and not merely talking about it, the Middle East, east of Egypt, might be made the test case in an attempt at settlement between the U.S.S.R. and the West. Here nature has provided a spacious and largely desert frontier of separation between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Africa and the Indian sub-continent and ocean on the other—an area of ancient cultures and historic interest as also of poverty and ill-health despite its oases of Western industrialism. Here, in a dream world of sanity, the rich oil resources could be exploited not only for consumers within the dollar and sterling areas. Westerners and Russians would agree to leave these Middle Eastern peoples free to develop in their own ways, with such financial and technical aid as they were willing to accept and able to absorb.

But pending the miracle, the broad strategical problem persists, and it is primarily an Anglo-American problem. Complete withdrawal from British positions in the Middle East would leave the eastern flank of NATO's Mediterranean position exposed to land attack and threaten the loss of the Suez Canal passway; available forward defenses would exist only in Turkey, Jordan, Cyprus, Crete and Tripolitania. To hold the area in strength for adequate defense clearly requires the collaboration of the Arab States and Israel, and the provision of bases in their territories. But if this cannot be achieved, or alternatively, if its achievement is found not to justify the outlay involved, we may well give careful attention to the Iskanderun area of southeastern Turkey, which is covered seaward by Cyprus and commands the historic invasion route into Syria; and to Israel, which has demonstrated her ability to defend herself at least from local enemies and could potentially provide both Red Sea and Mediterranean ports and even a canal link between them.

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NEW ZEALAND AND THE NEW PACIFIC

By L. K. Munro

ON September 1, 1951, New Zealand, jointly with Australia, entered into a treaty of mutual security with a foreign Power, the United States. Great Britain was not a party to the pact, commonly known as the Anzus Treaty. The new alliance is a practical recognition of the defense requirements of the two Dominions and an earnest of their determination to defend themselves against any future aggression, in conjunction with the United States, the strongest Power in the Pacific. The Treaty is unprecedented in the history of the British Commonwealth, but it does not weaken, and is not intended by any of the parties to weaken, the existing close ties of affection and interest between Great Britain and New Zealand and Australia. In particular, it will not detract from the close military, naval and air liaison among these three members of the Commonwealth.

Indeed, the average New Zealand citizen does not regard the Anzus Treaty as one made with a Power which he would describe as foreign. To quote from a speech of General Smuts delivered in 1934, "There is a community of outlook, of interests, and perhaps of ultimate destiny between the Dominions and the U.S.A. which in essence is only the first and most important of them."

New Zealand realized that it was the path of wisdom to give the Japanese a generous treaty of peace and not seek a vindictive settlement. Nevertheless, the New Zealand Government, with the Australian Government, felt strongly that the resurgence of Japanese militarism is possible. Because of that possibility both Australia and New Zealand considered that while they were justified in agreeing to a lenient treaty of peace with Japan, they were entitled to an undertaking by the United States that if Japan again launched an aggressive war in the Pacific, the United States would come to their aid. We in New Zealand were anxious to secure ourselves against any aggression in the Pacific, whether from a resurgent and militaristic Japan or, what is certainly of equal importance, from Communist disturbers of the peace.

New Zealand's Minister of External Affairs, Mr. T. Clifton Webb, has rightly said that the most important provision in the Treaty is the one which declares that an attack in the Pacific on

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any of the three parties constitutes a common danger to all, and consequently each one pledges itself to come to the other's aid in accordance with its constitutional processes. The parties have established the Anzus Council "to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty."

The strategic importance of the Treaty is emphasized by the foresight of a great American: ". . . we must instantly move to save Hawaii, Fiji, New Zealand, and New Caledonia, and we had to make certain of the safety of Australia itself . . . . we simply had to save the air lifeline through Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Hawaii. . . . Our base must be Australia, and we must start at once to expand it and to secure our communications to it. In this last we dare not fail." These are the words of Brigadier-General Eisenhower, as he then was, in an official report written by him on December 14, 1941, for General Marshall. His observations concerning American interests in the event of aggression in the Pacific have an enduring significance for New Zealand and Australia.

As Secretary Dulles, who negotiated both the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Anzus Treaty for the United States, correctly pointed out in February 1952:

> In one sense this Treaty merely formalizes a fact which all the world knows, namely that each of our three countries would consider that an armed attack upon the other would endanger its own peace and security and that it would act accordingly. That fact has been proved in two World Wars when we were fellows in arms. However, it is useful to declare publicly and formally our sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of us stands alone in the Pacific area.

And he continued, "The Treaty will, I hope and believe, have by-products beyond the formal contemplation of the Treaty itself. It will, I hope, help to bring about greater unity of policy in the Pacific between the United States and the Commonwealth." It is to be observed that Mr. Dulles refers to the Commonwealth as a whole, not solely to New Zealand and Australia.

The New Zealand Government is aware that Great Britain has shouldered heavy military obligations in Europe and elsewhere; as Mr. Webb said in October 1951 during the debate on the Treaty in the New Zealand House of Representatives, "It would not be fair to ask her to come and commit herself in the Pacific when she has committed herself in the Middle East." It is surely wise for New Zealand to enter into military arrange-

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ments with the United States and Australia for the preservation of peace in the Pacific, thus lightening Britain's burden. The Government of the United Kingdom was kept fully informed of the negotiations for the Treaty and warmly welcomed it as a valuable reinforcement of the security of all the members of the Commonwealth and as complementary to the understanding and mutual support existing between the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

The Treaty is indeed an example of one of those regional organizations sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nations. The Anzus Council is authorized by the Treaty to maintain a consultative relationship with states in the Pacific area which are in a position to further the purposes of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Pacific. There is thus an express provision for full consultation with interested Powers. Great Britain, who is responsible for the defense of Hong Kong and Malaya and administers such territories as the Solomons and the Fiji group, is obviously an important Pacific Power. The United Kingdom is and will be kept fully informed of all plans and developments under the Treaty.

The Treaty is not in itself a Pacific pact, but, as Mr. Webb said on February 27, 1953, "only one of a series of Pacific defense arrangements, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter." Thus, it should be remembered that there is a security pact between the United States and Japan, and a mutual defense treaty between the Philippines and the United States. These are valuable beginnings which should be strengthened before their extension is considered. Moreover, it is to be noted that Five Power military discussions on defense problems affecting Southeast Asia were held at Honolulu in April of this year as part of the routine process of military liaison among the United Kingdom, the United States, France, New Zealand and Australia. The Anzus Council must necessarily be concerned to ensure that Southeast Asia should prepare for its effective defense. And in a significant statement to the House on April 28, 1953, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. S. G. Holland, declared that the Government "would welcome Britain being added as a party" to the Treaty, and that in his opinion the solution of the problem would be found in the development of the Five Power discussions. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was being advised on every development under Anzus.

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II

If Britain's independence and strength are essential to the survival of the free world, then the defense of New Zealand against invasion and the maintenance of her sea communications with Britain are interests that New Zealand shares with all free people. The suggestion that the Anzus Treaty represents a weakening of New Zealand's ties with Great Britain shows a complete misapprehension of her history, and of her position in the British Commonwealth and Empire. Although New Zealand is a little larger than England, Scotland and Wales together, she has a population of only 2,000,000. Her importance and influence in the British Commonwealth of Nations, of which she is, under the Crown, an autonomous member, stem from many factors. Owing to a benign climate and a most efficient system of agriculture, New Zealand is able to send to Britain quantities of butter, cheese and meat without which the United Kingdom could not feed her citizens in peace or war—twice as much meat, for example, as Britain gets from both Australia and the Argentine. Her soldiers, moreover, have won a reputation as good fighting men in two world wars. There are approximately 2,000 New Zealand troops in Korea at the moment. Though this may not seem a large number, it represents one out of every thousand of her population—a proportion that few other members of the United Nations can equal.

From her remote position in the southwest Pacific New Zealand has to send her products to Britain over a very long route, and a great proportion of the manufactured goods she requires are imported across the oceans. And in war her forces must be transported great distances to the scene of battle. Thus geographical considerations have had a considerable influence on her foreign policy, and always will have. But, of course, a nation's foreign policy is not determined by any single factor. Dr. Nicholas Mansergh has pointed out that New Zealand's attitude to Britain has been conditioned by the origins of her people, by the smallness of her population, by her geographical isolation, by the nature of her economy and by her history. And of these various factors he rightly puts the origins of the people at the top of the list.

The population of New Zealand is overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon; 93 percent of the inhabitants have British or Irish antecedents. Of the remainder, only 1 percent were born in other

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foreign countries, and 6 percent are Maoris. It has been said that the Colony provided "the nearest approach attained to successfully accomplished intention in colonization"—a rather clumsy phrase meaning, in simple English, that in 1840 and afterward those who founded New Zealand took every care in the selection of emigrants. Not that there are no dissenting voices! One of the most famous founders of the Colony, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, remarked in 1849: "The whole emigration to Upper Canada and New Zealand furnishes no instance of the ultimate settlement of a gentleman's family with satisfaction to themselves and their friends at home." Be that as it may, a great many families of English and Scottish blood were among the early settlers in New Zealand, including many from middle-class families experienced in government and the professions, and the fact was reflected in her politics. It has been said that in the middle of the nineteenth century the standard of debate in the New Zealand House of Assembly was not outrivalled in the Empire.

The character of the early colonists and their profound affection for Great Britain, against whom they had none of the ill feeling nourished by those who had been transported to some colonies, and the complete dependence on Britain in matters of trade and defense linked New Zealand very closely to the mother country and have had a deep and continuing influence. Indeed to this day when a New Zealander speaks of going home, he frequently means that he is proposing to take a trip to the United Kingdom.

It is true that there have been and are New Zealanders ready to criticize the survival of a "mother and daughter complex" in the relations of the Dominion to the United Kingdom, but even though a more independent outlook developed in the thirties of this century, the close kinship with the British plays a part of overwhelming importance in New Zealand's view of international relations. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that even in the nineteenth century New Zealand was unwilling to make the strongest representations to Downing Street in the realm of Pacific affairs. A New Zealand historian, Dr. J. C. Beaglehole, hardly exaggerates when he puts the matter thus:

> It is a mistake . . . to regard this country as traditionally the most uniformly and unthinkingly loyal of all British dominions or colonies. . . . New Zealand, in common with the generality of colonies, either in the old empire of the Atlantic seaboard or in the new empire the world over, throughout

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most of its history has had no difficulty in reconciling a high degree of devotion to the person of the ruler with a great capacity for assailing the deeds and motives of the ruler's constitutional advisers.[1]

New Zealand's politicians of the nineteenth century, Sir Julius Vogel in particular, were aware of the agricultural prospects of the two islands and of the significance of their strategic location, and they nursed visions of a Pacific federation of all the southern islands led by New Zealand and including Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. The federation was to be an integral part of the British Empire, and thus New Zealanders would be the "custodians of the British imperial tradition in the south seas."

In 1884 Vogel took part in an inter-colonial conference called by Australia, whose various governments were concerned over German aspirations in New Guinea. The Colonial Office described Sir Julius Vogel as "the most audacious adventurer that perhaps has ever held power in a British Colony." Indeed, Vogel had more vision than the Colonial Office, which repudiated the attempt by Queensland to annex northern New Guinea. This territory fell into German hands and eventually, when the Japanese occupied it, became a dagger pointed at the heart of Australia.

The Colonial Office likewise showed scant sympathy with Vogel's proposal for the annexation of Tonga and Samoa and for their federation with Fiji. When Germany occupied Samoa in 1884, Downing Street, anxious to retain the goodwill of Bismarck, recognized the occupation and disregarded vigorous protests from both Australia and New Zealand. It was not until the outbreak of the First World War that New Zealand rectified this error and seized Western Samoa.

One of the country's best known Prime Ministers, John Richard Seddon, who held office from 1893 to 1906, was ready to follow in Vogel's footsteps. On his way to London in 1897 he called on President McKinley and informed him of New Zealand's interest in Hawaii. London, however, took no notice of his representations on this subject and two years later the United States annexed Hawaii. In 1891, however, London had approved New Zealand's annexation of the Cook Islands, and in fairness to Downing Street it should be said that in 1874 Britain had yielded to pressure from both Australia and New Zealand and annexed Fiji. The Colonies were given no voice in the administration of

[1] "New Zealand," edited by Horace Belshaw. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947, p. 292.

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the Fiji group and, not unnaturally, refused to share in its cost.

Throughout the nineteenth century, and indeed until 1935, New Zealand governments accepted the principle that Great Britain had the right to decide foreign policy for the whole Empire. Men of the stature of Vogel and Seddon made the strongest possible representations to Downing Street on occasion, but they always finally accepted its decisions. They were well aware that the Royal Navy was the guardian of New Zealand's long line of communications with England and, not content to accept its protection passively, New Zealand contributed a battleship to the Grand Fleet. In 1909, a proposal for a separate Dominion Navy was firmly rejected. The attitude of New Zealand politicians was summed up in the phrase, "One sea, one navy, one empire." It was only in 1921 that the New Zealand naval forces were officially designated as the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, a title changed to that of Royal New Zealand Navy in 1941.

A distinguished Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, suggested an Imperial Federation in 1911, animated by the desire to have some influence in the formation of British foreign policy. His proposal for federation was the very antithesis of separatism, but he had to bow to the dictum of Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, who stated categorically that high policy—foreign policy in supreme issues, affecting all the members of the Empire—remained and must remain exclusively in the control of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom. "That authority," Mr. Asquith said, "cannot be shared."

Even the events of the First World War, in which New Zealand's contribution in blood and money was so high in proportion to her population, did not weaken her adherence to the principle of imperial unity, or, in particular, to the idea of a common imperial foreign policy. The Government did not regard its separate signature to the Treaty of Versailles as a step towards greater independence, either constitutionally or in the determination of foreign policy. When, in the Chanak crisis of 1922, Mr. Lloyd George proposed action to halt the Turks, the New Zealand Government offered, immediately and without consulting Parliament, to send a contingent to the Middle East. In 1925 Prime Minister J. G. Coates thus explained New Zealand's rôle in imperial affairs:

> The method that has been adopted is just this. The British Government

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carry on the negotiations. We . . . express our opinions quite definitely. If the Government . . . think that arrangements under consideration are likely . . . not to be in the interests of New Zealand, we say so. But if after that it is decided to go ahead, we say to the British Government, after knowing all the facts of the case: "Very well, if that is the arrangement to be made, we are prepared to stand by it."

This readiness on the part of New Zealand to follow Britain, after saying her piece, was, I reiterate, the product of kinship, of the realization that geographical isolation made British protection necessary, and close economic association.

A change in the attitude of the New Zealand Government towards the formulation of foreign policy came with the accession to power of the Labor Government in 1935. There occurred no weakening of the ties between Great Britain and New Zealand. The Labor Government was as loyal to the throne as any of its predecessors, and even though it embarked on new methods of trade through bulk selling of primary products and import licensing, it was no less anxious to maintain close economic ties with Great Britain. The Labor Government was, however, convinced that wars arise from economic causes and can be prevented by creating economic security for all nations. It took a strong line against the appeasement of Italy in the Abyssinian crisis. Its views are best explained in the words of the Right Honorable Walter Nash,[2] New Zealand's first Minister in Washington, former Minister of Finance and now Leader of the Opposition:

If, in the days before Munich, the attitude of the New Zealand Government on specific issues differed from that of other governments, it was simply because New Zealand firmly believed that for small and relatively defenseless nations collective security through the full and effective application of the League Covenant offered the best and only guarantee against aggression. . . . Mistakes were, no doubt, made; but it is true, nevertheless, that as early as 1936, New Zealand imposed an embargo on the export of scrap iron to Japan, that at Geneva and elsewhere she gave her strong and unequivocal support to China's successive appeals for enforcement of the Covenant, that as late as May, 1939, New Zealand formed one-half of a minority of two which favored the principle of collective aid to China in her resistance to Japan, and that still later in 1940, she protested vigorously at the closing of the Burma Road.

New Zealand took the lead in arranging a Pacific Defense Conference in 1939 and, as Mr. Nash says, from the moment war

[2] "New Zealand: A Working Democracy," by Walter Nash. N. Y.: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943, p. 271–2.

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broke out in Europe her defense policy was based on the assumption that Japan would attack.

> These facts [he wrote] are mentioned not in any spirit of commendation of New Zealand's past actions and policies since her voice has, after all, been a very small voice in the councils of the nations, but for the purpose of suggesting that small nations, equally with big ones, may often have something to say that is worth listening to, worth paying attention to, even, perhaps, worth acting on. These small voices—and there are many besides that of New Zealand—may well express useful ideas and progressive trends of thought that will prove valuable in the task of reconstruction which lies ahead. The magnitude of the task will be such as to tax the capacity and the ingenuity of the wisest leaders. Neither Britain nor America, nor any other great power, can claim a monopoly of wisdom and inspired leadership. China and India, the Philippines and the Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia will each have a significant contribution to make and their contributions will be very much needed when the time comes for facing the problems of a "New Pacific."

When war broke out in September 1939, there was no doubt where New Zealand stood. Her Prime Minister, Mr. Savage, spoke decisively: "Where Britain goes we go, where she stands, we stand." Evidence of New Zealand's status as a sovereign nation is supplied by her separate declaration of war, which was made without reference to her Parliament, although Parliament subsequently and unanimously approved the Cabinet's action. The declaration, while an example of the exercise of sovereign power, thus emphasized New Zealand's unity of purpose and action with Great Britain.

III

Weighty considerations of geography and mutual interest have naturally brought Australia and New Zealand into the closest relations. It is true that they have sometimes approached their common problems from a different angle, as when New Zealand decided in December 1942, at the request of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, to leave her Division in the Middle East, while Australia thought best to bring her forces back to the Pacific. Special factors distinguished Australia's case, but New Zealand's decision is strong evidence that, when the occasion requires, she can look beyond the Pacific and recognize vital interests in areas like the Mediterranean.

In January 1944, Australia and New Zealand signed an agreement, generally called the Canberra Pact. This document en-

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visaged coöperation in defense and in the organization of peace, and in particular the application of the principle of trusteeship to the peoples and territories of the Pacific. New Zealand was the first Power to accept that principle under the Charter of the United Nations and to apply it to the Territory of Western Samoa. Her administration of the Territory is both an earnest of her devotion to the ideas of the United Nations and of interest in the progress of the peoples of Polynesia towards self-government. The Canberra Pact was supplemented at the instance of New Zealand and Australia by the Six Nation Agreement, establishing the South Pacific Commission, an advisory body to the six governments administering dependent territories in the Pacific south of the Equator. The United States recently proposed the extension of the scope of the Commission to include the American trust territory of the Pacific Islands and also Guam, and the other member governments agreed.

Since the very earliest days of colonization there have been close relations between the United States and New Zealand. There were colonists who believed that eventually New Zealand would gravitate towards the United States. Fox, who was Prime Minister of New Zealand in 1870, disturbed the British Foreign Office by suggesting that the New Zealand and American Governments should confer directly and not through London on the question of admission of New Zealand wool to the American market free of duty. There was talk in 1869 and 1870 of the secession of New Zealand from the Empire and of independence or accession to the United States, but events proved that this was only talk and superficial talk at that. The New Zealand Parliament made plain the country's intention to remain within the Empire, and the Governor declared: "Even those who five months ago were all agog for separation from England and annexation to the United States are now loyal again."

In the twentieth century the average New Zealander displayed a much greater awareness of the significance of events in Europe than of those in Asia. If Manchuria was ignored, the importance of the Middle East and of North Africa was understood. One of the two life lines in the flow of New Zealand's primary products overseas lies through the Suez Canal. She is always concerned that this trading route should remain open, and is therefore vitally interested in any political unrest that occurs in the countries near the Canal. In the First World War New Zea-

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land troops were for some time stationed in Egypt; thousands fought at Gallipoli and a considerable force in Palestine. And in the inter-war years the danger of Mussolini's ambitions in Abyssinia was quickly perceived and the Government refused to recognize the King of Italy's title as Emperor of Abyssinia.

But it took the attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrifying onrush of the Japanese forces through Malaya and Indonesia down to New Guinea and Guadalcanal to make many New Zealanders realize that they were very much a Pacific people, that the Far East was the Near East for them—and that it lay, not at their back door, but at their front door. The onslaught of the Japanese immediately brought the United States and New Zealand close together. New Zealand's military forces were then engaged in the Middle East, and Britain was unable to afford effective defense for the Pacific—a fact proved with brutal suddenness after the fall of Singapore. Of necessity, it was the United States which then protected New Zealand and Australia from Japanese aggression.

Thousands of American troops came to New Zealand in 1942 and 1943, received their training there, and left to fight magnificently for the liberation of the Pacific. Naturally, therefore, we came to know Americans as individuals, and to understand something of the American outlook. The New Zealand Government showed its awareness of the necessity for forging close relations with the United States by establishing a legation at Washington, later to become an embassy.

The country is proud of its contribution in goods and services to the value of more than $280,000,000 made to the United States forces in the Pacific during the war. Besides maintaining land, air and naval forces and furnishing equipment and supplies, camps, warehouses, hospitals and ships, New Zealand largely fed the American forces sent from her shores to the Pacific, dispatching to that area a quarter of her vegetables and apples, a seventh of her meat and a twelfth of her dairy produce. The whole of the Pacific needs in butter was met by rationing in New Zealand, without reducing the quantity sent to the United Kingdom.

By deciding to leave her Division in North Africa, New Zealand proved her traditional interest in the Middle East and her awareness that in a world war the fate of a small country can be decided in a far-off area. But she was fully committed to transferring all her troops to the Asiatic theater after the collapse of

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Germany, and would have done so if Japan had not capitulated; as it was, New Zealanders took part in the occupation of Japan. The Government attached the greatest importance to the terms of the treaty of peace with Japan, fully appreciating the argument of Mr. John Foster Dulles that a weak and impoverished Japan could create a power vacuum in the Far East which might be filled by Communism. New Zealand accordingly became a party to the Japanese Peace Treaty. The accession to power of the Communists in China, closely aligned as they are with Soviet Russia, is one of the most significant events in the history of Asia and the Pacific. New Zealand continues to recognize the Nationalist régime in Formosa and regards the Anzus Treaty as one of the defensive outworks erected against the expansionist tendencies of Communist China.

IV

Controversy over whether Asia or Europe is more vital to the countries of the Pacific is sterile. These regions are interdependent. New Zealand has vital interests in both and does not believe that the problem of guarding against aggression should take the form of a conflict for priority between the two areas. Obviously, my country would not be a party to the Anzus Treaty unless we were ready to play our proper part in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. On the other hand, our ties with Great Britain, our interest in the Middle East, and the necessity of preserving our line of communication make European affairs very important to us. It is not surprising therefore that we have dispatched a unit of our Air Force to Cyprus and have agreed to participate in the proposed Middle East defense organization.

Lenin said that the road to Paris lies through Calcutta and Peking, and Communists show their awareness of this by doing their best to drain British resources by insurrection in Malaya and French resources by the continuous fighting in Indo-China. If the forces of France and Vietnam were overwhelmed, the countries of Southeast Asia would be exposed to a deadly peril, fraught with menace to Australia and New Zealand. No one is inclined to underrate the significance of Communist imperialism in Asia. But there is also a road to Paris across the Elbe and the Rhine, and it would become a shorter and more convenient one if it were not well guarded.

Conversely, again, there is need for creating economic condi-

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tions that contribute toward peace in the East, as well as in the West. As one of the original signatories to the Colombo Plan, New Zealand has shown her recognition of the obligation succinctly described by Mr. Webb: "If we wish to maintain our standard of living we must bestir ourselves to raise the standard of living of others less fortunate than we are." The plan aims at raising the standard of living in the countries of South and Southeast Asia, where present poverty is a threat to peace everywhere. New Zealand's agricultural system is one of the most efficient in the world, and we can help the countries of Southeast Asia in their problems of rural development. Although we have a population of only 2,000,000, and our resources are therefore limited, the Government has promised to provide $2,800,000 a year during the first three years of the plan, with the sole restriction that this sum should be devoted to agreed-upon projects, which are to be placed high in the scale of priorities of the recipient countries. In addition, we shall provide training, experts and equipment to the value of $1,120,000 over the first three years of the scheme, and have offered to provide $700,000 as our first year's contribution for economic assistance to Ceylon, preferably for financing a dairy-farming scheme.

Economic assistance will also be given to Pakistan and India, with whose magnificent soldiers the New Zealand Division fought as comrades in North Africa in the last war—$700,000 to cover part of the capital cost of the All-India Medical Institute at Delhi, $700,000 to be spent on an irrigation scheme in Baluchistan, and a like sum to be placed in reserve for later allocation. And, with Australia and Canada, we shall assist in the establishment of a livestock development and research farm in the Thal area of India. Scholarships are being provided to enable students from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Borneo to study in New Zealand, and these young men and women receive a warm welcome. These are only a few examples of the practical interest shown by New Zealand in the prosperity of Southeast Asia and in the legitimate aspirations of the newly independent Asian nations. In particular, the Asian states of India, Pakistan and Ceylon have been welcomed as free and equal partners in the British Commonwealth.

William Henry Seward said in 1852, looking eastward from North America: "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands and the vast regions beyond will become the chief theater of events

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in the world's great hereafter." Evidence accumulates today of his prescience. Today the chief threat to the peace and freedom of this whole area comes from the effort of Communist imperialism to exploit conditions of weakness in Southeast Asia. To combat the Communist aggression and to prevent its further extension, the free nations must do three things: first, strengthen its defenses, in regional groups and as part of the world organization of the United Nations; second, be prepared to fight if necessary; third, assist in the economic development of the countries of South and Southeast Asia.

New Zealand, an autonomous member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, is committed to all three of these objectives. She is a member of the United Nations and a devoted adherent of the principle of collective security. Her men are now fighting for that principle in Korea. She has established a system of universal military training, and has military commitments in conjunction with Great Britain, Australia and the United States. She has entered into a treaty of alliance with the United States and Australia "whereby each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." She is pledged to come to the assistance of any one of her allies who is the victim of aggression. She is playing her part in the economic development of Southeast Asia, under the Colombo Plan.

We have come a long way since the day when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840 and the Maori people gave their allegiance to the Queen. Modern inventions have annihilated distance and made isolation a thing of the past. While as close to Britain as ever, we have become an ally of the United States. We see the web of our destiny woven in Europe, the Middle East and in Asia. As a democracy living in One World, we seek, within the limits of our resources, to discharge our responsibilities to those weaker than ourselves. Above all, we have learned the lesson that in a world confronted by forces dominated by an aggressive and wicked philosophy, the chief guarantees of survival are the unity and strength of all democracies.

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SPAIN IN WESTERN DEFENSE

By Lawrence Fernsworth

NO ONE doubts that Spain is part of the West, but few are sure what part she can play in Western defense. The Spanish Chief of State, Francisco Franco, and the Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, issued a joint statement on April 15, 1952, declaring that the Iberian peninsula was a single and indivisible strategic bloc and that this "implies the adoption of adequate measures to carry out a policy for the defense of both countries within the general framework of Western defense." While the two leaders were holding their conference near the Portuguese frontier, United States and Spanish military and economic experts were instituting discussions at Madrid for the purpose of bringing Spain into the scheme of Western defense. These were resumed in April of this year, following the arrival of the newly-appointed United States Ambassador, James C. Dunn. Parallel discussions with Portugal were unnecessary since that country is a member of NATO.

The geological accident which cuts Portugal off from the high Spanish tableland, plus other geographical and historical factors, have firmly established Portugal's political separation from Spain. The recognition of the strategic unity of the two countries is nevertheless of prime importance to the military planners. Strategically Spain is a redoubt, a fortified castle in the European theater of war, if by this latter term is meant that part of Europe and the Atlantic lying westward of a line drawn from the Scandinavian Peninsula to the Persian Gulf. Within that larger theater of war Spain is considered to be an indispensable stronghold in the Mediterranean operational area and a bridge between North Africa and the European peninsula. Though Hannibal used it for the invasion of Rome, it has in fact seldom served as such a bridge because of the natural barriers between it and the main body of Europe. But the increased range and effectiveness of sea power and especially of air power, to which labyrinthine mountains are no longer a formidable obstacle, have given Spain's rôle a new importance.

One familiar with Spain may well understand why this land of castles is itself a vast redoubt in the eyes of the military planners. It is hemmed in by great walls of mountains, and by the

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sea. Its sierras drop down to the coast, leaving only narrow strips of land between them and the water. Its interior is crisscrossed by mountain ranges with their deep valleys. The central area is a mountainous tableland covering two-thirds of the country. The average altitude of the *meseta* at the base of its mountains is 2,000 feet. Highways and railways climb up and along precipitous sides of these mountains, like the paths of the native *izards* or wild goats. These are the geographical features that have kept the castle of Spain on the margin of European wars, except when armies have been invited to enter by elements within the castle itself.

Even so, Spain's position has made her a central factor in the struggle for Mediterranean power for more than 250 years. The War of Spanish Succession (1701–1713) was fought on the issue of whether Spain's future kings should be Hapsburgs or Bourbons. Although the Bourbons, members of the ruling family of France, held the throne, England cancelled this French advantage by the seizure of Gibraltar (1702) and of the Isle of Minorca with its magnificent, land-encircled, deep-water harbor (1708), and by so doing took a long step toward making herself the mistress of the Mediterranean. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) provided that Spain should never form a political—and consequently a military—union with France.

During the Napoleonic Wars Spain made the fatal blunder of becoming one of Napoleon's satellites. She was coerced into ceding the Louisiana Territory to France (1800), and her South American colonies began slipping away. Nelson at Trafalgar (1805) broke the combined sea power of Spain and France, while Wellington helped the Spanish popular armies drive the French out of the country. Spain has never since been an important naval or military Power. Possession of Malta made England's Mediterranean position so strong that she returned Minorca to Spain in 1802 in the peace of Amiens.

Thus the Napoleonic War had the double effect of extricating Spain from her political entanglements with France, and of casting her in the rôle of a neutral Power in European conflicts. But in this rôle she continued to be a vital factor in the Mediterranean equilibrium. Her neutrality during World War I was of utmost importance to the Allied Powers in preventing the entire Mediterranean area from being converted into an area of war. The intervention of the Axis Powers on the side of General

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Franco during the late Civil War was an attempt to destroy this equilibrium. Republican President Don Manuel Azaña noted this when he said in a speech to his ministers at that time: "They have come to checkmate the Western Powers, both England and France, which have been interested in maintaining this equilibrium, in the international political orbit of which Spain has revolved for numerous decades." Soviet Russia also entered the scramble to upset the traditional Mediterranean balance.

During the Second World War, the Axis Powers hoped to make Spain a base of operations and thus to catch France and her allies in a trap between the Rhine and the Pyrenees; but their plan missed fire.

What are the fundamental factors which help determine Spain's present place in the strategy of Western defense? To what degree are her territory and her resources "a bastion of defense, a vital link in the lifeline of a free and peaceful Europe," as the Commander of the United States Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral John H. Cassady, said during the fleet's courtesy visit to Spain early in January? Any attempt to answer the question must seek to estimate the rôle of Spain as a link between the European continent and North Africa; the likely strength and effectiveness of Spanish land forces; the strength of the Pyrenees as a defensive barrier; and the strength and weakness of her communications, air bases (existing or potential) and harbors.

II

Historically, the military traffic on the Mediterranean sea route between North Africa and Spain has been almost entirely one way; and almost invariably the invaders have stopped upon reaching Spain. The Spanish peninsula has not been used as a causeway for passage to other parts of the Continent or its outlying isles, such as Great Britain. Spain seems to have been more a *cul de sac* for overflows from Europe and incursions from Africa than a bridge between the two continents. A major reason for this is Spain's peculiar geographical formation: her high central tableland, her maze of sierras and the barrier of the Pyrenees. The country offers no natural routes of traffic either between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, or between North Africa and the European continent. Her principal rivers either flow back into the Mediterranean or southward and westward in the opposite direction from Europe.

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The earliest migrations to Spain without doubt came from Africa, perhaps over the true land bridge that existed before the Atlantic pushed through to the Mediterranean lake and formed the Straits of Gibraltar. The ancient Carthaginian and the later Arab-Berber invasions also flowed from Africa. As late as the Civil War the Axis invaders came over from North Africa. However, long-range air power has changed the situation radically. Though from the standpoint of land communications Spain remains the old *cul de sac* and perhaps always will be that, from the standpoint of air traffic the peninsula has become, if not exactly a bridge, at least an important way station between the two continents. And it has potentialities for serving as an auxiliary springboard in long-range air operations.

Looked upon as an "outpost" of Europe, Spain also offers to military strategists the promise of a last-ditch European stand against an invasion from the East, and of an evacuation center for allied forces and civilian populations which found themselves forced to retreat. Any plans for use of the peninsula in the event that the Russians scored a smashing victory in a drive across Germany and France are, of course, subject to the charge of "defeatism" by the French and Germans, who are alarmed at any suggestion that Western defense calculations embrace a theory of warfare that involves the abandonment of the Western European countries to Russian occupation. The fact remains that should the enemy reach the Pyrenees, Europe's last stand could be made only on the Spanish peninsula. The next line of defense, and of counterattack, would lie in North Africa.

III

What help might be expected from the Spanish land forces? Spanish soldiers at home would give a good account of themselves. They excel especially as guerrilla fighters, and they know the configuration of their homeland as outsiders never could. In the extreme case of an invasion their natural tactic would be to wear down the enemy, as they did when Napoleon's armies overran Spain. They might well be able to fight a delaying action which would permit European armies to form their battle lines anew. It must not be forgotten that Spain has a strong body of professional soldiers—the Foreign Legion and Berber natives—in Spanish Morocco and some smaller North African colonies. In short, for defense at the line of the Pyrenees, or in the contin-

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gency that the war were carried down into the peninsula, Spain's forces would add welcome strength.

Whether the Spanish Army is suitable for use as an expeditionary force is, however, a different matter. The Spaniard is a fierce, unyielding fighter when defending his homeland, his pueblo and his particular idea of things worth fighting for. But he has an inborn distaste for foreign wars. Paradoxical as it may seem, the man who can be such a formidable warrior under exceptional circumstances is fundamentally a man of peace and tranquillity. Nothing is dearer to him than to live quietly in his own village or town. This has ever been so. Even in the sixteenth century, under Charles V and Philip II who carried their wars to Flanders and Holland, the Spaniard fought with repugnance, and was defeated at last. This revulsion from war on foreign soil was expressed by one of the finest soldiers of the time, who was also its most celebrated ballad maker, Garcilaso de la Vega, killed fighting in Provence at the age of 31:

> And each of us has felt the touch of war,
> War after war, and exile, hunger, fear,
> And each of us is weary to the core
> Of seeing his own blood flow 'long a spear,
> And being alive because it missed its aim.
> And everything is gone, even the name
> Of house and home and memory.
> And what's the use of it? . . .

The exploits of the Conquistadores in the New World, however, served to bring into relief the splendid qualities of Spanish soldiers when their hearts are in the fighting. Here was adventure linked with the promise of glory and of rising fortunes for the individual soldiers, as well as a share in forging the grandeur of Spain. Imagination and ambitions were stirred as they never could be by the sordid wars of the Continent, in large part waged with foreign mercenaries. The bands of Conquistadores were not regular armies. They were mainly recruited from the nobility; the members of each band served no one but their leader, under the King. But when an attempt was made to send out an effective expeditionary force in the first quarter of the nineteenth century to subdue the South American colonies which were rising in revolt, the result was complete failure. Much the same happened in the effort to put down the Cuban rebellion and in the sequel to it, the Spanish-American War.

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The memory of the ill-fated Moroccan expedition of 1921 is fresh in the minds of all Spaniards. "Anual" is still a byword which expresses their horror of being sent off to war. At the Moroccan stronghold of Anual, Riff tribesmen massacred or captured 15,000 Spaniards; some of the prisoners were ransomed and the others died in captivity. The disaster shook the country. Troops flatly refused to embark for new expeditions, and the spirit of rebellion that swept the country led to the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1923. Troops on both sides fought with great bravery during the Civil War. The Blue Division sent to the Russian front during the Second World War, however, failed to distinguish itself.

For at least 150 years—that is, since the beginning of the nineteenth century—the Spanish soldier has constantly found himself in wars for causes in which he was supposed to believe, but often did not. During the Peninsular War (1808–1814) regiment after regiment deserted the crown to join forces with the rebellious populace. In 1820 most of the rank and file followed the lead of Colonel Rafael de Riego in the constitutional uprising. Nowhere but in Spain could such a scene have been enacted as the "Revolt of the Sergeants" on the night of August 12, 1836, at the height of the Carlist War, when a committee of sergeants went over the heads of their officers and obliged the Queen-Regent to proclaim the Constitution of Cadiz. The fears and hopes of the rank and file of the Spanish Army, drawn almost exclusively from the pueblos, must be taken into account in estimating the probable effectiveness of Spanish soldiers in wars abroad.

On paper Spain has one of the largest standing armies in Europe. Some Spanish sources place its strength at between 350,000 and 400,000, but this seems exaggerated; perhaps 250,000, or 22 divisions, is about the actual number. It has been noted that not more than three battalions, the normal strength of a regiment, have participated in manœuvres in the Pyrenees at one time under the existing régime. The army is recruited by a system of conscription for 18-month periods. The general staff claims to be able to mobilize 2,000,000 men, but no such number could, in fact, be mobilized without destroying the country's economy. An air force officer, speaking in the Cortes on December 18, 1952, said, "The present army could not even remotely assume the necessities for a minimum national security."

The existing army is poorly paid, insufficiently trained, ill

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clothed and fed, entirely lacking in modern equipment. All that is implied by the term "infrastructure" for the maintenance of an army and the physical preparation of a country for war is lacking. The rehabilitation of the army would practically mean starting from scratch. In the event of war in Europe, Spain's army would keep order at home, and would defend the home soil in case of invasion. It is unwise to count on it for more than that.

IV

Throughout history the Pyrenees—the great mountain chain which so sharply divides the peninsula from the rest of the Continent—has been an effective wall against attackers. True, in pre-Roman times the migrating Celts undoubtedly seeped down into Spain over high passes and through narrow defiles, while much later the barbarian Suevi, Alani, Vandals and Huns came the same way. But no Roman expeditionary force, with its horses, chariots and other rolling equipment, could ever find its way through these mountains. After centuries, some passes still remain mere mule trails, often as steep as cliffsides; in some places they are not even mule trails. No wheeled thing has ever moved over them.

In the eighth century Charlemagne recognized the effectiveness of these towering barricades as a protective wall against the influx of Arab and Berber into France, and established a chain of buffer states, the so-called Spanish March, of which Andorra and the Spanish enclave known as the Val d'Aran, facing France, are vestiges. However, as a defensive line, the Pyrenees share one serious defect with the Maginot line—it can be outflanked: at each end its ridges taper down to the sea. The Romans first came into Spain, not through the Pyrenees, but by the sea from Marseilles; but thereafter they made their way through the gateway known as the Col de Perthus, a low-lying pass near the Mediterranean terminal of the range. Since those days the Perthus pass has been the favorite route of invading armies, and it is also the main portal for rail and highway travel to and from Spain. The only existing defenses are some outdated batteries on low-lying crests and a mediæval fortress at Figueras.

At the northerly end of the Pyrenees, where the mountains also taper down to the Atlantic and then swing southward along the Spanish coast to form the Cantabrian Mountains, another

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main highway reaches Spain from the direction of Bayonne and Biarritz. At this point the terrain is fairly low. There are also two secondary roads in this northerly extension, one of them through the Roncevalles pass (3,220 feet), made famous by the Chanson of Roland, that romance of knightly adventure that served to inspire the misadventures of Spain's own knight errant, Don Quixote. During the Carlist War which began in 1834, the Basque general, Tomás Zumalacárregui, simply played hide-and-seek with his adversaries in the mountainous mazes to which these roads lead, exasperating the government forces and taking them on wild-goose chases.

The fighting between French and Spanish forces in 1793–4 has still another lesson for today. Then the Spanish revolutionary forces took the initiative, driving into France and capturing French mountain towns all the way to and including Perpignan. The breakthrough came at the eastern pass of the Pyrenees. But their general, Antonio Ricardos, had failed to protect his rear. French forces slipped around him by other less favored passes and harried the Spanish line of supplies. At the end of a year, the Spaniards retreated to Spain in disorder. The French managed to advance to and cross the Ebro, and to threaten Madrid.[1]

From France five railroads converge upon Spain. The two main lines carry the continental trains which enter by the passes at either end of the range: at Port Bou, overlooking the Mediterranean, and at Irun. Spanish tracks are wider than the standard gauge of the Continent, to impede rail traffic from outside in wartime. Heavy troop movements into Spain would almost certainly have to be routed over these two main lines. But another important line now reaches the Spanish border from Toulouse and accommodates through coaches from Paris—one of two French lines that converge at La Tour de Carol and connects with a secondary electric line on the Spanish side of the border at Puigcerda. The other French line that ends at this point comes up from Perpignan. From Prades the electric steam line becomes a winding electric line, almost a scenic railway, twisting its way through deep gorges, over high passes and across bridges of dizzying altitudes which would be extremely vulnerable to bombing and of doubtful value for troop movements.

[1] Another road of which account should be taken runs through Andorra in the eastern Pyrenees, but at the French end it traverses an exceedingly high pass which is blocked by snow five or six months of the year. *Cf.* "Andorra, Europe's Last Feudal State," by Lawrence Fernsworth, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1934.

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The Spanish electric line to which these roads transfer their passengers and freight winds through the lower outposts of the Pyrenees to Barcelona, a three-hour journey. It is another scenic railway built for moderately heavy traffic, but could possibly be employed for limited military purposes with some reconstruction. The fifth railroad is a quite uncertain affair, running from the French town of Pau to the Spanish frontier post of Canfranc, whence it reaches down into Spain by way of Jaca.

From the airman's point of view, however, the Pyrenees are not the barrier which they are to the movement of land troops. The peaks are not high as great mountain ranges go; most are from 7,000 to 9,000 feet in height; the tallest, Pico de Aneto, somewhat eastward of center, is 11,169 feet. The problem would be to coördinate land forces with measures against air attack—not too difficult a military problem but, of course, essentially defensive, not a question of strategic warfare based on the fortress of Spain.

V

The communications problem that would confront a modern army in Spain is tremendous. In fact, communications, as modern warfare comprehends that term, are almost nonexistent. The wide-gauge railroads are single tracked, rolling stock is antiquated and roadbeds are in disrepair; the circuitous highways are largely also in a state of neglect, and telephone and telegraph lines are patched up and of uncertain utility.

In his six-year dictatorship, Primo de Rivera did succeed in giving Spain a fairly good system of roads. But even had they not been maltreated and inadequately repaired, they could never carry the weight of armored equipment and mechanized armies of modern warfare, or even the ordinary services of supplies. Aside from this, they are not laid out to provide quick travel from one part of the country to another. Many go from town to town and from pueblo to pueblo following the meandering lines of valleys and streams or hugging the mountainsides; others start out by taking the traveler for miles in the opposite direction from the one he wants to go. The best road from Barcelona to Madrid is southward along the coast to Valencia and thence northward. In general, roads from the various regions converge on Madrid, in the middle of the high central plateau. The railroads are laid out in much the same way, converging on Madrid like the

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crooked spokes of a wheel. Some take snake-like courses around the periphery. None goes directly across Spain in any direction.

The once-excellent telephone system, which the International Telephone Company, an American subsidiary, constructed about 30 years ago, has deteriorated since it was taken over by the government. The telegraphic service is also uncertain; in some towns the offices are open only a few hours a day and on some days not at all. If Spain were to be prepared for defense, the communications and transport systems would have to be reconstructed and rehabilitated from top to bottom. Railroads would have to be rebuilt, main lines double-tracked, new rolling stock and other equipment provided. Though the population has increased by about 5,000,000 since the Civil War, there is less rolling stock than there was before, despite efforts to make good the wartime damage. Some of the cars are old-fashioned, American-built, wooden coaches which American roads discarded years ago; platform plates on some show they were built at Oswego, New York, in 1891. The cost of rehabilitating Spain's communications and transport systems has been placed as high as a billion dollars—an estimate that does not seem exaggerated.

The question of communications bears closely on the utility of air bases. They would have a threefold function in Spain: to support an army defending the Pyrenees; to provide a springboard for attack on an enemy on the other side of the mountains; and, most importantly, to facilitate long-distance bombing. Without communications and transport, the storage facilities, radar stations, warning systems, barracks and all the complicated machinery of the air age cannot be protected and supplied and a base cannot function. But the advantages of Spanish bases for strategic warfare engage the attention of military planners, who consider "theaters of operation" as component parts of larger theaters. Thus Spain is part of the European theater of operations, which in turn is the core of the Atlantic theater of war. Strategic bombing from bases within this European theater, whether in Morocco, France or Spain, would aim at protecting the Middle East crossroads, and at striking at the major areas under enemy control—the Caspian region, for example, with its oil fields and its traffic routes from Russia into the Middle East by sea and by land.

In a scheme of global defense Spain also forms a component part of three main Eurasian flanks that would have to be guarded

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against Russia and her probable allies. One flank is the Malayan peninsula and its Indonesian extension; another is the Scandinavian peninsula and its extension toward the American continent by way of Iceland and Greenland. The third is the flank formed by France, Spain and Portugal themselves, which also has island extensions and ramifications in the Balearics, Madeira, the Canaries and the Azores. In this larger picture, the main advantage of possession of air bases in Spain, in the eyes of the airman, is not that bombers might thereby be stationed somewhat nearer this or that objective than bombers in France, North Africa or England, but that there is safety in numbers. The larger the number of bases that the enemy has to try to knock out, the more his air strength is dispersed.

But, of course, this general principle has to be equated with the resources available for equipping bases, and with the strengths and weaknesses of particular locations. Among the factors to be considered in connection with Spanish air bases are the rugged terrain, as around Madrid and in the north, and the exposed location of some sites, as at Barcelona, Valencia and the isle of Mallorca. The inland river port of Seville, and the neighboring seaports of Cadiz and Huelva on the Atlantic around the corner from Gibraltar, offer favorable conditions for strategic bases, where air and naval forces could operate in conjunction. Gibraltar now has air-base facilities of the first order, and already links the peninsula with the general picture of the Atlantic area. Portugal is in a position to offer facilities on the tip of the peninsula and on the Azores Islands.

On paper, Spain now has 40 airfields, a personnel of 40,000 men and 400 planes. Actually, only a few of the airfields are used; most of them were plotted during the Civil War. How many of the 40,000 personnel are qualified no one knows. Few, if any, of the 400 planes would be likely to be of use in modern war. All the equipment is obsolete. The proposal to establish air bases in Spain entails a complete rebuilding, quite literally from the ground up.

VI

There is no doubt at all that Spain possesses magnificent harbors, which could provide first-class naval bases. Naval operations are inseparably joined to air strategy in the new pattern of war. Spain's shores and islands offer a number of deep harbors

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which nature herself seems to have designed for protection and servicing of ships in wartime. Three focal points may be noted in particular: the deep island waterways of Galicia, centered at El Ferrol, looking out upon the Atlantic in the northwest; Cadiz, with its cliffs, just around the corner from Gibraltar; and the Balearic islands, especially the deep-water harbor of Mahón on the shores of Minorca.

El Ferrol and Coruña and the adjacent deep-water harbors on the northwest tip of the peninsula guard the approaches to the west coast of France and the English Channel. They would be dangerous in enemy hands. It was at Coruña that the Spanish armada took refuge and was refitted after it had been battered by a storm on the way to England in 1588. Although El Ferrol has drydocks, they would not accommodate modern warships.

Cadiz is as much a Mediterranean as an Atlantic port. It was founded by those adventurous seafarers, the Phoenicians, and was their base of operations for that part of the world—the farthermost westerly reaches then known to man. Forming part of the inland recesses of the Bay of Cadiz is the port of Santa Maria, where a fleet could lie well protected. From Huelva, nearby, Columbus first set sail for the New World. Some 50 miles up the Guadalquivir river lies the deep-water port of Seville, which can be reached by ships up to 12,000 tons.

This area would be ideal for coördinated air and sea action. Fleet activity could be extended in every direction: northward and southward in the Atlantic; eastward through the Mediterranean, and along the sea lanes between North Africa and Europe. On the Mediterranean side is the submarine port of Cartagena, a logical site for a modernized submarine base which could be utilized in connection with the activities of the main fleet, whether based at Cadiz or elsewhere.

Valencia and Barcelona have the most amply-developed harbors in Spain for the purposes of commerce. Barcelona's is a made harbor, exposed to attack, as is Valencia's to some degree; but Valencia has inland estuaries which offer protective advantages. Both would probably be useful for auxiliary purposes. The Canary Islands, and especially the harbor of Santa Cruz on the island of Tenerife, offer naval facilities particularly suited to South Atlantic defense.

In the Balearic Islands, the largest of the "Three Sisters of the Mediterranean" (as they are called) is Mallorca. It has deep-

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spreading bays at Palma, its principal port, and at Alcudia, on the northwest. During the First and Second World Wars, German submarines were either secretly based on or provisioned from Alcudia, and from this base German planes attacked allied ships bound for North Africa. Radar stations on the coast of Spanish Morocco reported the movement of every Allied ship passing through Gibraltar straits. But both harbors of Mallorca are exposed, and were easily taken by the insurgents during the Civil War.

The northward isle of Minorca, however, has a marvelous, land-locked harbor—Mahón—which offers perfect protection to ships. Gun emplacements stand on high cliffs which show forbidding sides to the sea, whose waters, more often than not, are being whipped into storms by the "six winds." Ships enter the port through a narrow channel guarded by more cliffs, on which stand old, whitewashed forts. The channel follows a snake-like course, twisting around some fortified islands, then broadening into a deep narrow basin upon which the cliffs look from all sides. Sprawling over their tops is the whitewashed city of Mahón. It used to be said that all the navies of the world could find anchorage in this harbor. They would be completely invisible to an enemy, and, lying in dead space, could only by some miracle be touched by shells fired from the sea. During the Civil War, anti-aircraft batteries showed they could provide a strong defense against air attack. The cobblers, cheesemakers, numerous barbers and fishermen of Minorca, coöperating with an absurdly small garrison, for 31 months defied the efforts of the German and Italian planes to make a dent in their defenses. If England, which once held Minorca, had possessed it during the recent world wars, the story of German sea raiders in the first and of air raiders in the second might have been different.

Spain's navy, consisting of six cruisers, 22 destroyers and eight submarines, would be practically useless to the West in the event of another war. All vessels are obsolete and some cannot even put to sea. There is no modern equipment. The official naval personnel is 23,000 men. Here again the political question enters; at the outbreak of the Civil War the Republican-minded sailors seized their officers, killed many of them and took over the ships. If Spain were an ally, the Western Powers would either have to write off the Spanish fleet or give the country a new one.

In connection with this, and indeed with a plan to provide

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Spain with new naval installations, it is fair to remember that the present régime entertains expansionist aims. The Falange program proclaims that Spain must assert "the will of an empire" and that "Our armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air must be as powerful and as numerous as is necessary to assure Spain her rightful place in the hierarchy of nations." On the other hand, use of Spanish harbors would not only greatly assist in defense of the Mediterranean, but would place Allied naval units several hundred miles nearer North Atlantic objectives than would bases elsewhere on the Mediterranean.

Moreover, Spanish territory flanks both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar, the gateway to North Africa, described by military men as a redoubt and a base of manœuvre for the whole European theater of operations. During World War II, American and British naval forces opened an avenue from Gibraltar on which to carry the war to North Africa, thereby also opening an immeasurably greater route for carrying the war back to Europe by way of Sicily and Italy. North Africa thus became a turntable for the defense of the continent of Europe.

VII

Such is a picture of some of the plus and minus factors of a defensive alliance with Spain. It is, of course, incomplete, omitting political aspects of the complex question which are well enough known, and others which are unknown quantities. It makes no attempt to answer the important question of what the objectives of the Spanish Government are in considering an alliance, and how they would fit with the objectives of the United States and the other countries of NATO. By Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a unanimous vote of the signatory Powers is required if a new member is to be admitted. Would Spain be acceptable to the members of that body, and, if not, would liaison with her be maintained through the United States or Portugal, or both? How would the Spanish people react to the presence of a considerable body of foreign soldiers in their country and to the possibility that Spain would be exposed to attack? What would follow from an "Americanization" of Spanish economic, social, cultural life—that is to say, in plainer words, what would be the effect of Americans spending a great deal of money there? The effects could be prodigious, but it would be a rash man who would try to forecast them.

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The entire burden of cost of projects such as are outlined above would fall on the United States, and unofficial estimates of them vary from one billion dollars for combined M.S.A. assistance and military installations to three billion dollars. As long ago as 1948 Spanish Government circles were putting out feelers for a $700,000,000 loan from the United States. They commenced M.S.A. negotiations last year by asking for more than a billion dollars to cover this part of the program. In the preliminary survey of 1951, Sidney C. Sufrin, who headed the team of economic experts, had made an estimate of $400,000,000 for M.S.A. assistance. This estimate was incorporated in a report by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Reports from Madrid indicate that General Franco is not disposed to consider less than a billion dollars by way of a starter, exclusive of the costs of military installations to be paid for directly by the United States. Unofficial American estimates of a billion-dollar program, to be carried out in four to six years, had already been made by the time negotiations got under way last year.

The Spanish view was expressed by General Franco when he stated: "If the world situation demands some coöperation from Spain, it is obligatory to assist her total and rapid economic recovery and help her perfect her military preparations." There is some feeling in Western countries that to aid Spain's economic recovery might be a step toward advancing Spain's return to the democratic fold; others declare that the contemplated economic, technical and military assistance would merely serve to strengthen Spain's totalitarian régime, and some of these believe further that to join hands with the present Spanish régime would compromise the moral position of the free world. Most, perhaps, feel that the part of wisdom in the difficult and precarious situation which confronts Western civilization lies not in a freezing of old attitudes but in an effort to understand the particulars of the Spanish situation and to make a reasonable estimate of costs, advantages and safeguards.

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THE FUTURE OF THE RYUKYUS

By Joseph W. Ballantine

ONE of the unresolved territorial questions growing out of the Second World War is to determine what is to be done with a chain of rugged, storm-swept and overpopulated islands in the Western Pacific Ocean that came into American hands in the closing months of the war. Just 100 years ago, these islands, known to the Japanese as the Ryukyus and to the Chinese as the Luchus, were visited by Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry while on his historic mission to Japan. Impressed by the advantages that the Ryukyus offered as a station for refitting American sailing vessels which frequented Far Eastern waters, he recommended to Washington that the United States acquire a foothold there. His recommendation was rejected. When, a few years later, steam superseded sail, the islands were forsaken by the main routes of travel, and they rapidly passed out of significance in international commerce. The Western World forgot them. Today, because they afford valuable air bases in the defense of the Far East against Communist aggression, their importance has become greatly enhanced.

Public American interest in the Ryukyus was awakened in the spring of 1945 when United States forces in their advance toward Japan were landed on the main island of Okinawa. After a bitter struggle with the defenders, in which more than 12,000 Americans and nearly ten times as many Japanese lost their lives, Okinawa was captured on June 25. Since the Ryukyus were to be a forward staging area for the contemplated assault upon Japan, nearly 200,000 allied troops were subsequently massed on the islands.

After the fall of Okinawa, the Ryukyus, as well as all other Japanese islands south of the 29th parallel and north of Formosa, were detached from Japan and placed provisionally under American military government, where they still remain. The present critical situation in the Far East and the protraction of the conflict in Korea make it essential that we give serious consideration to deciding what future political status for the islands will best serve the interests of the United States. Such consideration necessitates taking into account a wide range of factors—strategic, ethnic, historical, cultural, economic and political.

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The primary American interest in the islands is strategic. This is immediately apparent from a study of the map. The Ryukyus form a part of the insular chain that extends southwestward from Kamchatka to the Malay peninsula and curtains off a greater part of continental East Asia from the full sweep of the Pacific Ocean. The entire chain, except the Kurile Islands, to the farthest north, which were taken over by the Soviet Union after Japan's surrender, are in hands friendly to the United States. Lying between the main islands of Japan and Formosa, the Ryukyus form an arc measuring about 500 miles from northeast to southwest. They have an area of 1,291 square miles, which is somewhat greater than that of Rhode Island. The island of Okinawa is one-third of the total area, and is easily defensible, being surrounded by well-placed island outposts. Its air bases are within convenient striking range of important mainland targets extending from Vladivostok to Canton. Vladivostok is only 1,200 miles distant, Shanghai a mere 440 miles, and Mukden, Pyongyang, Port Arthur, Tientsin and Canton lie at intermediate distances. Sorties conducted almost daily by Okinawa-based planes are rendering invaluable assistance to United Nations forces in Korea. Okinawa is rapidly being converted into a formidable bastion for the defense of the free world in the Far East. This half-a-billion-dollar project will make the island the key air base in the Western Pacific.

II

Race, history and culture largely determine Ryukyuan and Japanese attitudes toward final disposal of the islands. The Ryukyuans are closely allied to the Japanese in race and language. They are generally shorter and stockier than the Japanese, and the men more heavily bearded, but these divergencies are probably due to the blending in somewhat different proportions of the racial strains common to the two populations.

During a considerable part of their recorded history, the Ryukyus were under the dual suzerainty of Japan and China. Japanese influences antedated those of China, for the Prince of Satsuma claimed jurisdiction there as early as the latter part of the twelfth century. Two hundred years later, the islands began to feel the effects of Chinese penetration, the impact of which was strongest among the upper classes. Chinese art, literature and political patterns were introduced, and trade developed between

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the two countries. China exacted tribute from the native government. In the fifteenth century, the Japanese likewise forced the Ryukyuans to pay tribute. In 1609, Japan detached the northern islands, known as the Amami-Oshima group, and added them to the feudal domain of the Prince of Satsuma. The southern is-



lands, while retaining a large measure of local autonomy under their own king, became a Japanese protectorate, though they continued to pay tribute to China also and to retain a Chinese form of government until 1871, when Japan formally annexed the islands despite China's protests. Japan's claim to sovereignty

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was strengthened internationally by a diplomatic incident involving a Ryukyu vessel which was wrecked on the coast of Formosa where its crew was murdered by tribesmen. The Japanese Government made representations to Peking and eventually obtained a payment of 100,000 taels for the relief of the families of the dead Ryukyuans.

With the abolition of feudalism in Japan, the empire was divided into prefectures. The Amami-Oshima group of the Ryukyus was incorporated into Kagoshima prefecture, and, a few years later, the southern islands became the 47th prefecture, which took the name of Okinawa. The entire island group thus formed part of the Japanese political structure, under a policy of eventual economic, social and cultural integration. The king of the Ryukyus was made a marquis in the new Japanese peerage, as the feudal lords in Japan had been given ranks in that peerage corresponding to the importance of their fiefs. Although the governor and his principal assistants were career officials appointed from the Tokyo Ministry of Home Affairs, the islanders enjoyed proportional representation in the Japanese Diet and held many local administrative posts. Also, a locally-elected assembly was advisory to the governor. In the cities, towns and rural communes the people enjoyed a considerable degree of local autonomy. In these respects, Okinawa was no different from any other of the 46 prefectures of Japan, and its citizens enjoyed the same political rights as other Japanese subjects.

The standard Tokyo dialect was taught in the schools and the curricula were prescribed by the Department of Education of the central government. A census taken by the American military government in 1950 showed that 75 percent of the population over 15 years of age could read and write, literacy being conspicuously high for those between 15 and 24 years of age. Japanese cultural assimilation was more complete in the northern islands than in the south where much of the indigenous culture still persists. Following the precedents established in Japan after the break up of feudalism, the Japanese introduced reforms for eliminating class distinctions and for the transfer of agrarian holdings from the landed gentry to the actual cultivators. An economy geared to that of Japan stimulated the production of cash crops and the establishment of small-scale industries. Textiles produced on hand looms found a luxury market in Japan. When it came to religion, however, the Japanese made little impression.

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Only a small fraction of the Ryukyuans are Buddhists or Shintoists, the large majority having retained their ancient animistic forms of worship.

III

Many changes have followed in the wake of the American occupation. On June 21, 1945, military government was established under the Deputy Commander for Military Government, subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, with headquarters at Tokyo. Except during the period from September 1945 to June 1946, when the Navy was in charge, responsibility for governing has rested with the Army. The staff and liaison officers who assisted the Deputy Commander became the core of the administrative system. In August 1945, an Okinawa Advisory Council was formed, and its members later became directors of 12 separate executive departments. In April 1946, the Deputy Commander selected a governor (*chiji*) from a panel of three nominated by a convention of Okinawan leaders. Since few Ryukyuans possessed the requisite training for high executive posts and since the people as a whole lacked experience in self-government, the transfer of authority and responsibility to the natives has had to be effected gradually. However, in February 1952, a single chamber legislative assembly was chosen by popular election, and two months later a "Government of the Ryukyu Islands" was formed. These steps represent a long advance toward the assumption by the Ryukyuans of operational control of their government. Eventually the Ryukyuan chief executive is to be an elected official.

Construction and maintenance of the air bases employ a large corps of American engineers, technicians, mechanics, foremen and office workers, in addition to native labor. Americans, civilians and military, dwell in communities of their own which have sprung up, complete with cement-block homes, schools, churches, clubs and shops. Here they enjoy the amenities to which they were accustomed in the United States. American civilization viewed at such close range must have its effect, both good and bad, on the Ryukyuans. When a people whose cultural foundations are so different from our own try to emulate us they often become confused. Moreover, these transplanted American communities are not typical of those at home. Being under military government they provide no example of local self-rule; and the

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wide extent to which natives are employed in our households abroad is a marked contrast to the almost servantless life in the United States.

The American authorities have tried to recast the educational system of the islands, and despite the early handicap of few school buildings, few suitable textbooks, and few qualified teachers, much has been accomplished. By December 1, 1950, 97 percent of the children between 5 and 14 years of age were in school. For higher education, a Ryukyu university has been built. As in Japan during the Allied occupation, there is a reorientation program to explain democratic concepts. It includes sending Ryukyuan leaders to the United States for short periods of study and observation, enrolling promising students in American schools, assigning American experts to the islands as technical and cultural emissaries, and supplying documentary films, musical recordings, books, exhibits, and material for local radio broadcasting stations, newspapers and periodicals. It is obvious, however, that such efforts can be valuable only to the extent that they serve Ryukyuan needs. A relatively high standard of living is required to support our way of life. The adoption of American democratic concepts and practices by the Ryukyuans is handicapped by the wide disparity between their per capita production and ours. At the same time, the islands afford little opportunity for the inhabitants to better their lot materially, however industrious and ambitious they may be.

The best evidence that we have not been as successful as might have been hoped is the native sentiment, everywhere expressed, for the restoration of the islands to Japan. For example, one of the first measures passed by the Ryukyu legislature called for such restoration. Later, the three major parties proposed a similar bill, which contained a provision for petitioning the Japanese and the American authorities to seek some agreement in that direction. The desire was also expressed for repeal of Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Meanwhile, Ryukyuans at a conference of the Institute of International Education thanked us for our generous aid but affirmed that, because of racial and cultural ties, they would make more rapid progress if reunited with Japan. Ryukyuan leaders have made representations on this matter directly to the Japanese Government. There it was brought out that, though they were grateful for the American aid received, a source of considerable dissatisfaction was the rental

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which landowners were paid for land expropriated by the American military authorities. The Ryukyuans assert that it is lower than prevailing private rentals and that adequate compensation is not paid for the resettlement of the dispossessed families.

The agitation for the return of the islands to Japan is echoed in that country. There, the emphasis has been upon the recovery of the northern islands, which are more closely linked to the homeland. Last January, the Japanese Foreign Minister presented the American Ambassador with a petition from a group of Japanese educators which called attention to the need for improving education in the northern islands and asserted that it could best be done through their return to Japanese administrative control. Prime Minister Yoshida has publicly expressed the hope that a satisfactory solution of the problem of the Ryukyus would be reached. And both Japanese and Ryukyuan leaders have indicated to Americans that they would willingly let the United States retain necessary military bases on the islands.

Economics must necessarily play a large part in determining the attitude of Ryukyuans toward the question of the future political status of the islands. It also must be taken into account by the United States in weighing the advantages and disadvantages of continuing the American occupation indefinitely. With a population of 917,000 and a density of 709 persons to the square mile, the islands are more crowded than Rhode Island, which has a population of 792,000 and a density of 652. The island of Okinawa has a density of more than 1,000. When one considers that in the Ryukyus as a whole less than one-third of the land is arable and only one-sixth under cultivation, and that nearly three-quarters of the population is agrarian, the acuteness of the problem of overpopulation becomes clearly apparent. The diminutive farms, averaging less than two acres, however intensively tilled, cannot provide more than bare subsistence. One-half the tilled land is in sweet potatoes, which is the staple article of diet. Sugar cane is the principal cash crop and black sugar the leading export. Rice and other cereals and many varieties of vegetables and semi-tropical fruits are also grown. Small numbers of goats, hogs and cattle are raised.

Under Japanese administration many Ryukyuans were forced to emigrate to find livelihood. They went largely to the Japanese Mandated Islands, and to Hawaii and Peru. After the American occupation, those in the Mandated Islands were repatriated. The

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total number of all repatriates was 132,000. Today, some 36,000 Ryukyuans, or 9 percent of the working population, find employment with the American occupation forces. Except for this, and for direct aid from the United States in the form of processed grain foods, building material, petroleum products and fertilizers, it would be extremely difficult to sustain the present economy of the islands. In fact, the economic outlook for the Ryukyus is not at all promising. Such arable land as has not been cultivated is of inferior quality and would scarcely raise the crop supply substantially even if planted. The so-called cottage industries manufacture only for local consumption, and are incapable of expansion for want of markets. Whether they could be converted into handicraft industries catering to American tastes is problematic. Generally speaking, there are few advantages, other than cheap labor, for developing export industries to pay for needed imports. Exports, largely to Japan, had amounted to $14,000,000 in 1940. In 1950, they did not exceed $3,400,000. The production of black sugar dwindled from 229,000,000 pounds in 1940 to one-tenth of that in 1950. For the time being, employment is being maintained by the activity in housing and defense projects, and by the manufacture of building materials, such as lime, cement, bricks, tiles and lumber. This is hardly a permanent solution. A better prospect for the ultimate health of the islands would seem to lie in restoring them to Japan. As long as the Ryukyus remain an American responsibility we shall have to continue economic aid, either direct or indirect.

IV

The legal basis for the presence of the United States in the Ryukyu Islands rests on the Potsdam and the Cairo Declarations, the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, and the Peace Treaty with Japan. The Allied peace terms were laid down in the Potsdam Declaration (July 26, 1945), to which the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union expressly committed themselves. For one thing, that declaration stipulated that Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the four main islands of Japan and such minor islands as the Allied Powers might determine. The Cairo Declaration, issued December 1, 1943, had announced it to be the purpose of the "Three Great Allies" (China, the United Kingdom and the United States) to expel Japan from territories "which she had taken by

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violence and greed." No specific mention was made of the Ryukyus. In the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, signed September 2, 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam terms. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan deals expressly with the Ryukyu Islands together with all other Japanese islands south of the 29th parallel of latitude. In that Article Japan agreed to concur in any proposal that the United States might make to the United Nations to place these islands under its trusteeship, with the United States as the sole administering authority. The Article further provides that pending the making of such a proposal the United States shall have the right to exercise the powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the islands. The Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951, by the United States and 47 other members of the United Nations and by Japan. It was not signed by the Soviet Union, its satellites, and a few other member states, including India and Indonesia.

To date, the United States has made no such proposal to the United Nations. If we were to do so, we would presumably wish to insist that the islands be declared a strategic area, since their chief international—and therefore American—importance is strategic. We might also wish to insist upon a trusteeship agreement similar to the one adopted for the Japanese Mandated Islands in a resolution of the Security Council of April 2, 1947. Those islands, now known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, were taken by Japan from Germany during the First World War and were mandated to Japan by the League of Nations. The Trusteeship Agreement of 1947 designated the United States as the sole administering authority and entitled it to establish military bases and fortifications in the trust territory. The stationing of armed forces in the territory was authorized for purposes of fulfilling obligations to the Security Council, for local defense, and for maintenance of law and order. The Trusteeship Agreement also places United States nationals in a preferred position in the "Pacific Islands" over the nationals of other members of the United Nations. If a similar agreement were reached with regard to the Ryukyus we would enjoy as complete freedom of action there as we now possess for taking any steps we deem necessary for the islands' defense and security.

The chief advantage claimed for such a disposal of the Ryukyus is that the United States would thereby be morally sup-

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ported in having the sanction of the United Nations. Yet, however fine a line of moral distinction may be drawn between holding a conquered territory as an internationally recognized "trust" and as an outright annexation, Asians would tend to regard it as a difference in name only. This is especially so because they object in principle to the presence of Western military forces on their soil and to the subjection of fellow Asians to Western political control. Indeed, one of the reasons given by India for her refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty was that the treaty did not provide for the return of the Ryukyus to Japan. However, last but not least, a strategic trusteeship for the Ryukyus would require the approval of the Security Council of the United Nations, and there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union would fail to exercise its right of veto.

There are three other choices open to the United States: 1, to continue to administer the islands as at present, pending a general Far Eastern settlement; 2, to hold only the southern islands where the best base-sites are located and return the northern islands to Japan; and 3, to declare recognition in principle of Japan's sovereignty over all the Ryukyus and to offer to conclude with Japan arrangements for military bases and for restoring the islands to Japanese rule.

The first choice is reasonable in that the United States seems justified in retaining the islands until a stable peace has been fairly assured in the Far East. It might also afford the United States a measure of bargaining power as we attempt the herculean task of bringing the Soviet Union and Communist China into a negotiated Far Eastern settlement. Meanwhile, Japanese dissatisfaction might be somewhat allayed if the United States were to declare itself prepared to turn the Ryukyus over to Japan on condition that the Soviet Union did likewise with the Kuriles and South Sakhalin. However, if the Soviet Union failed to accept the offer, which is practically a foregone conclusion, the resentment felt by Japan might be increased. And since a general Far Eastern settlement now seems entirely remote no advantage would appear to be gained in holding the islands as an anti-Soviet lever.

The second alternative, a compromise between the first and the third, would satisfy our present and future requirements for bases without the necessity of negotiating for them with the Japanese Government. If an unfriendly government should

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some day rise to power in Japan and we were forced to relinquish our bases there, those in the Ryukyus would still be ours. But this is a dubious advantage, for with both Communist China and Japan unfriendly, even hostile, the United States would find its position in the islands most precarious, possibly untenable. Moreover, to attempt to hold them under such circumstances would be locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen. Returning the northern islands might soothe Japanese feelings temporarily, and the people of Amami-Oshima would be entirely placated, but discontent would be inevitably heightened in the southern islands.

The third choice seems to be the best solution: an American declaration of Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyus linked with an offer to conclude an arrangement whereby Japan would grant military bases in the islands to the United States and the United States would restore the islands to Japanese rule. Most urgent is a clarification of American intentions that will put an end to present uncertainties in the minds of the Ryukyuan people, encourage them and the Japanese to start preparing for their common future, and remove a source of serious dissatisfaction with the United States. There can be little doubt that such a proposal coming from the United States would be welcomed by Japan if it did not sound like an insistence by us on having the bases first before we promised to let the islands go. Japan would probably agree even to deferring the actual transfer until the present emergency in Korea is over, or at least for a specified period of years. Assurances have been given by Japanese and Ryukyuan spokesmen that such an arrangement would be acceptable to them. The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, informed the Diet last July that he expected that the islands would continue to be held by the United States as long as military necessity required and would then be restored to Japan. Mr. Yoshida's statement was apparently deliberately evasive and intended to put off the raising by the opposition of an embarrassing issue.

There have been Japanese suggestions that once Japan's sovereignty over the islands was recognized, mutually satisfactory terms could be reached for United States military bases, at least until Japan was ready to assume responsibility for them as a part of the defense of the western Pacific. It would be strange indeed if Japanese attitudes were otherwise, since the apparent alternative to granting us bases would be a loss to Japan of the islands

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altogether. Moreover, it would be illogical to expect that Japan would withhold from the United States rights on outlying islands that she had freely granted in the home area. Officials of the Ryukyu Government, on a tour of the United States last August, declared that their people would have no objection to the maintaining of bases by the United States. As long as we pay reasonable rentals for the land used, the Ryukyuans have much to gain by our presence in the islands, for our forces there spend money freely, give employment to natives, and guarantee external security.

From the American standpoint also there are many advantages in this choice. It would relieve the United States of a long-term economic burden. It would greatly improve our moral stand. At present our position in the Ryukyus appears little better than that of the Soviet Union with respect to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin. The United States has many times declared that it supported the principle of self-determination. The Ryukyuans do not want independence, and a Ryukyuan nation could not hope to become a going concern. But they do want to be reunited with Japan. The return of the islands to Japan would be hailed by the Ryukyuans and the Japanese as giving heed to their aspirations. It would tend to cement their friendship with us, to instill confidence, and to dispose the Japanese Government to wholehearted coöperation in the defense of the free world in East Asia. Japan's united, disciplined and patriotic people, 85,000,000 strong, can be a potent force on our side. The American people are becoming more and more insistent that Asians assume a greater share in their own defense, and have heartily supported measures for arming them. But it is just as important to give Asians a cause to fight for as arms to fight with. To return the Ryukyus to Japan would be concrete proof that we meant what we said in the Atlantic Charter. It would strengthen the cause for which we fight and would give our allies in Asia and elsewhere renewed spirit and hope.

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General: Political, Military and Legal

HOLMES–LASKI LETTERS. EDITED BY MARK DEWOLFE HOWE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 2 v. $12.50.

From 1916, when Justice Holmes was 75 and Harold Laski 23, until 1935, these two highly articulate but quite dissimilar men carried on a steady correspondence. While there is much chat and gossip, especially on Laski's part, the correspondence illuminates not only the personalities of the writers but much of the intellectual climate of the years between the First World War and the New Deal.

HAROLD LASKI (1893–1950). BY KINGSLEY MARTIN. New York: Viking, 1953, 278 p. $4.00.

This friendly biography concentrates on Laski's political activities from the late '30's until his death in 1950. There are interesting sidelights on history and some illuminating letters to and from Laski, including an excellent statement by Attlee of the differences between them, but the most memorable passages depict Laski as a teacher. A good final assessment couples his great influence with failure to fulfill his scholarly promise or to achieve what he wanted in politics.

THE WORLD AND THE WEST. BY ARNOLD TOYNBEE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 99 p. $2.00.

Six lectures developing Mr. Toynbee's theme that Western civilization's "aggressiveness" throughout the world in recent centuries is now getting its comeuppance —from Russia, from Islam, from India and from the Far East.

A CENTURY OF CONFLICT. BY STEFAN T. POSSONY. Chicago: Regnery, 1953, 439 p. $7.50.

An effort to delineate the Soviet pattern of conquest through a historical survey of "the development of the Communist doctrine of conflict management." Convinced of the unrelentingly aggressive nature of Soviet intentions, the author concludes that the aim of American strategy should be the gradual modification, contraction and replacement of Soviet rule.

CONTAINMENT OR LIBERATION? BY JAMES BURNHAM. New York: Day, 1953, 256 p. $3.50.

Contending that the policy of "containment" is self-defeating, the author urges that the United States should explicitly aim for the liberation of the peoples and nations now enslaved by the Russian-centered Soviet state system, including the Russian people. Despite some telling criticisms of inconsistencies in the American position in recent decades, the logic of Mr. Burnham's line of reasoning is not impeccable and his temper at times outruns his argument.

THE ULTIMATE WEAPON. BY OLEG ANISIMOV. Chicago: Regnery, 1953, 163 p. $3.50.

The author's proposal for a vigorous political warfare aimed at unseating the Soviet régime leaves some very decisive questions unanswered. But the main value of the book to American readers is the stimulating and rather original analysis of

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the state of the world by a man who is a refugee from Eastern Europe—he lived for many years in Riga—and who also comprehends the present mood in Western Europe.

YOUR WAR FOR PEACE. By Frank L. Howley. New York: Holt, 1953, 166 p. $2.75.

The United States Commandant in Berlin during the airlift is a man of vigorous opinions and in this book they range from India and Iran to Germany and France. He is generally irritable about recent American policy and calls for an attitude of "aggressive righteousness."

PEACE, WAR AND YOU. By Jerome Davis. New York: Schuman, 1952, 282 p. $3.00.

While Mr. Davis' peace dove may not be of the Picassan breed, there is certainly a danger that the two could mate.

LYING IN STATE. By Stanton Griffis. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 315 p. $3.75.

Reminiscences of a businessman turned diplomat. Between 1947 and 1951 Mr. Griffis was successively American Ambassador to Poland, Egypt, Argentina and Spain. Considering the strenuous responsibilities of each of these posts the author displays a remarkably relaxed and affable disposition.

DER WEG NACH JALTA. By Max Walter Clauss. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1952, 276 p.

An unpleasant indictment of the prewar and wartime diplomacy of President Roosevelt, whose actions the author tends to put on the same level as Hitler's.

THE DIPLOMATS, 1919–1939. Edited by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 700 p. $9.00.

Seventeen authors collaborated in this diplomatic history of the inter-war years. Based for the most part on the careers of individual diplomats and officials in the Foreign Offices, the biographical approach is of particular value in showing the vicissitudes of the old art of diplomacy under the political and social changes of our present era.

AVENUES OF HISTORY. By L. B. Namier. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 202 p. $3.00.

Sir Lewis Namier's ten-page essay on the study of history, which opens this collection of articles, is a masterpiece in itself. Other pieces deal ably with various facets of German, diplomatic and British history.

FRONTIERS FOR FREEDOM. Edited by R. Gordon Hoxie. Denver: University of Denver Press, 1952, 327 p. $3.75.

A commemorative symposium dealing with areas where freedom may be advanced—the United Nations, underdeveloped regions, through democratic alliances, and within the United States itself.

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES: PROBLEMS IN COOPERATION. A Joint Report Prepared by Henry L. Roberts and Paul A. Wilson. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1953, 253 p. $3.50.

This report on current problems in British-American relations is the joint product of study groups at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The principal aim of the groups was to ascertain whether citizens of two countries could agree on an extended statement of the nature of the disputes and differences dividing their national policies.

BULWARK OF THE WEST. By Arthur C. Turner. Toronto: Ryerson (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 106 p. $2.00.

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A discussion of the problems confronting NATO, based on discussions carried on by a study group of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

THE PROBLEM OF POWER. By The Right Honourable Lord Radcliffe of Werneth. London: Secker and Warburg, 1952, 110 p. (New York: Macmillan, $1.75.)

Seven lectures relating to the question "what really prevents men who have authority from abusing their authority?"

WHY DEMOCRACY? By Alf Ross. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 249 p. $4.50.

A Danish professor of public law reëxamines the principles of democracy, especially in the context of recent European experience.

THE GREAT FRONTIER. By Walter Prescott Webb. Boston: Houghton, 1952, 434 p. $5.00.

Mr. Webb makes the frontier—taken to mean all extra-European lands discovered since the sixteenth century—the major determinant of modern history. The hypothesis seems subject to many of the same criticisms which have been directed against similar approaches since Frederick Jackson Turner.

THE GERMAN EXECUTIVE, 1890–1933. By Maxwell E. Knight. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 52 p. $1.00.

KUOMINTANG AND CHINESE COMMUNIST ELITES. By Robert C. North and Ithiel de Sola Pool. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 130 p. $1.50.

SOVIET ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. By Alexander Vucinich. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 150 p. $1.75.

Three further volumes in the Hoover Institute Studies concerned with the "world revolution of our time and its consequences for world politics and national policy." The first two are part of the group of analyses of "élites." The third is an analysis of the Soviet factory, kolkhoz and other production units as social organizations.

LE DROIT DE VETO DANS L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES. By Georges Day. Paris: Pedone, 1952, 244 p. Fr. 2000.

LA RÈGLE DE L'UNANIMITÉ DES MEMBRES PERMANENTS AU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ. "DROIT DE VETO." By Pierre-F. Brugière. Paris: Pedone, 1952, 267 p. Fr. 1500.

Two monographs on the origin, employment and efforts at modification of the so-called "veto power" in the Security Council.

DAS RECHT DER KRIEGSGEFANGENEN UND ZIVILPERSONEN NACH DEN GENFER KONVENTIONEN VOM 12.8.1949. By Franz Groh. Hamburg: Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Offentliches Recht, 1952, 145 p.

A monograph on the rights of war prisoners and civilians under the Geneva Convention of 1949.

PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL ABROAD. By Carol McCormick Crosswell. New York: Oceana Publications, 1952, 198 p. $6.00.

A study of the law and practice relating to the privileges and immunities of international organizations and their functionaries.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

HERESY, YES—CONSPIRACY, NO. By Sidney Hook. New York: Day, 1953, 283 p. $3.75.

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Incisive and illuminating essays on cultural freedom. Opposing both "cultural vigilantes" and "ritualistic liberals" Mr. Hook grounds his argument on a sharp distinction between heresy, the right to which must be upheld, and conspiracy, which must be checked. The Communist issue is, of course, the central topic.

CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE. By Mulford Q. Sibley and Philip E. Jacob. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 580 p. $6.50.

An extensive, serious and responsible examination of the treatment of the conscientious objector in the United States during the Second World War.

THE QUAKER APPROACH TO CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS. Edited by John Kavanaugh. New York: Putnam, 1953, 243 p. $4.00.

Essays by American, British and French Friends on the approach of their faith to various problems in the contemporary world—war and peace, economic life, education and civil liberties.

IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION. By Cyril Garbett, Archbishop of York. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 318 p. $4.50.

Dr. Garbett's aim is clearly stated in his introduction: "to give the Christian explanation of the world crisis, to show the reason for the failure of substitutes offered for Christianity, and to indicate the answer which the Church gives to man's most fundamental and spiritual needs."

THE NATURE OF CULTURE. By A. L. Kroeber. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 437 p. $6.50.

A welcome collection of a leading American anthropologist's writings over the last 50 years on culture and civilization.

THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION. By Harold A. Innis. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951, 226 p. $4.50.

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF TIME. By Harold A. Innis. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952, 142 p. $3.00.

Professor Innis, who died in 1952, became concerned with the rôle of communication in historical development. Most of the papers collected in these two volumes relate to aspects of this subject. The second and more topical volume also has some very sharp things to say about the United States.

THE SOLUTION OF THE KARELIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM IN FINLAND. By Axel de Gadolin. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952, 47 p. Guilders 3.

SOME FACTORS INFLUENCING POSTWAR EMIGRATION FROM THE NETHERLANDS. By William Petersen. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952, 80 p. Guilders 4.25.

Two new volumes in the useful series of brief studies put out by the Research Group for European Migration Problems.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY. By R. G. Hawtrey. New York: Longmans, 1952, 191 p. $4.75.

The first half of this book is a reprint of lectures given in 1929 on the subject, broadly, of imperialism. The second half, dealing with events since then, is more concerned with the issue of the balance of power and its economic implications.

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION. By Walter P. Egle. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the University of Cincinnati), 1952, 264 p. $4.00.

A theoretical discussion of the problem of achieving economic stabilization, critical of the efforts to develop "built-in" stabilizers.

FEDERAL FINANCE AND UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMY. By Baljit Singh. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1952, 176 p. Rs. 10. (New York: Heinman, $3.50.)

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A critique of recent welfare economics as regards its applicability to problems of underdeveloped countries. The report is part of a Public Finance Research Project at the Lucknow University.

AGRICULTURE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. By E. M. Ojala. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 220 p. $6.00.

A monograph on the long-term relationship of agriculture to the economic welfare of the community, the evidence drawn primarily from the British, American and Swedish experience.

INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS. By Daniel Marx, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 323 p. $6.00.

An investigation of international shipping conferences, an early form of cartel, their virtues and their vices.

THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE WORLD. By William Van Royen and Others. New York: Prentice-Hall (for the University of Maryland), 1952, 181 p. $10.75.

A conspectus of the world situation with respect to the output and reserves of some 29 important mineral commodities.

WORLD PRODUCTION OF RAW MATERIALS. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953, 104 p. $1.50.

A concise summary.

FLYING SAUCERS. By Donald H. Menzel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 319 p. $4.75.

An able, popular exposition of the probable sources of these oft-reported "space ships." The author is an astrophysicist at Harvard.

The Second World War

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC: THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES. By Robert Ross Smith. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953, 623 p. $5.50.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. CHINA–BURMA–INDIA THEATER. STILWELL'S MISSION TO CHINA. By Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953, 441 p. $5.00.

Two further volumes in this extensive official history. Mr. Smith's book deals principally with the amphibious and ground operations along the New Guinea coast in 1944. Of greater political interest is the volume on General Stilwell's mission. The authors' conclusion, based on extensive inquiry, is that Stilwell's "interest in the Chinese Communists was minor and his relations with them casual and incidental. General Stilwell's interests in China centered on his attempt to carry out the War Department orders to reform the Chinese Army to a passable level of efficiency."

THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II. VOLUME FIVE. THE PACIFIC: MATTERHORN TO NAGASAKI, JUNE 1944 TO AUGUST 1945. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 877 p. $8.50.

This fifth of the seven-volume series deals with attacks on Japan by the B-29's, air support of China, the return to the Philippines, and the dropping of the atomic bombs.

GUYS ON ICE. By Lyman R. Ellsworth. New York: McKay, 1952, 277 p. $3.00.

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An entertaining account of a wartime Army assignment on St. Paul's Island in the Pribilofs.

THE WHITE RABBIT. By Bruce Marshall. Boston: Houghton, 1952, 262 p. $3.50.

The wartime exploits of Wing Commander F. F. E. Yeo-Thomas, who worked with the French Underground.

LA GUERRA IN AFRICA ORIENTALE, GIUGNO 1940–NOVEMBRE 1941. Rome: Ministero della Difesa, 1952, 358 p. L. 1200.

SECONDA CONTROFFENSIVA ITALO-TEDESCA IN AFRICA SETTENTRIONALE DA EL AGHEILA A EL ALAMEIN (GENNAIO–SETTEMBRE 1942). Rome: Ministero della Difesa, 1951, 432 p. L. 1800.

Two volumes in the series of monographs prepared by the Ufficio Storico of the Italian Ministry of Defense. The first is a detailed military history dealing with the war in Somaliland, Eritrea and Abyssinia in 1940 and 1941. The second deals with the last major Axis offensive in North Africa. The preceding volume in the series was noted here July 1951.

DIE DEUTSCHE BESETZUNG VON DÄNEMARK UND NORWEGEN 1940. By Walther Hubatsch. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1952, 511 p.

A detailed account of the planning and execution of the operation by which Germany occupied Denmark and Norway in 1940. Extensively documented.

ARMEE IN DER ARKTIS. By Hermann Hölter. Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1953, 67 p.

The reminiscences of the chief of staff of the 20th Alpine Jaeger army group, covering German military operations in northern Finland.

GUERRA IN EPIRO. By Fernando Campione. Naples: Guida, 1952, 215 p. L. 650.

The diary of an Italian soldier in the unhappy Epirus campaign of the autumn of 1940.

HÉROES, AVENTUREROS Y ESPÍAS EN LA II GUERRA MUNDIAL. By Waldo de Mier. Madrid: E.P.E.S.A., 1951, 309 p. Ptas. 30.

A mélange of episodes and sketches from the Second World War.

The United States

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH. By Morris V. Rosenbloom. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1953, 325 p. $3.95.

A review of Bernard Baruch's proposals and recommendations over the last 40 years relating to the general subject of national strength and security.

WINGS FOR PEACE. By Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers (Ret.). Chicago: Regnery, 1953, 248 p. $3.50.

A vigorous plea, by a retired ground force General, for greater expansion of United States strategic air power, if necessary at the expense of the Army and Navy.

POLITICS, PRESIDENTS AND COATTAILS. By Malcolm Moos. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952, 237 p. $4.50.

A statistical presentation of election returns in pursuit of the question, "How many congressmen can ride into office on the President's coattails?"

CHAMPION CAMPAIGNER: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. By Harold F. Gosnell. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 235 p. $3.50.

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An interesting study of the late President as a supremely successful campaigner —victorious on eight of the ten occasions in which he sought public office.

AMERICA AND THE INTELLECTUALS. New York: Partisan Review, 1953, 118 p. $1.00.

A symposium of somewhat self-consciously intellectual responses to a set of questions concerning the American intellectual's attitude toward, and place in, American life.

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 1945–1950. By Robert K. Carr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 489 p. $6.50.

A detailed review of the activities of this important standing committee since 1945. Although Professor Carr recognizes some important positive achievements, his judgment on balance is unfavorable, primarily because of the manner in which the committee conducted its investigations.

REPORT ON THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST. By Morris L. Ernst and David Loth. New York: Holt, 1952, 240 p. $3.00.

Based on the personal accounts of some 300 former American Communists, this book attempts to show why people enter the Party and why they leave. Although it contains illuminating information it is not a particularly successful piece of social analysis.

McCARTHYISM, THE FIGHT FOR AMERICA. By Senator Joe McCarthy. New York: Devin-Adair, 1952, 101 p. 50 cents.

The Senator's response—in question and answer form—to a number of the criticisms made of his activities.

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE. By Robert R. McCormick. Chicago: Chicago Tribune, 1952, 120 p. $2.50.

This volume comprises two essays by the editor and publisher of the Chicago *Tribune:* one written in 1942 on the development of the United States to 1917; the second in 1952 on the hypertrophy of the "American Empire" and its commitments since 1945.

RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY. By Eric F. Goldman. New York: Knopf, 1952, 503 p. $5.00.

A lively and well-grounded history of American reform and reformers since the Civil War. Of particular interest in tracing the antecedents, growth and present quandaries of the peculiarly American brand of liberalism.

THE NEWS IN AMERICA. By Frank Luther Mott. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 236 p. $4.50.

A compact exposition of the way news is assembled, edited and disseminated. Critical of certain foibles of the American press but balanced in its general judgment.

GENERAL BILLY MITCHELL. By Roger Burlingame. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952, 212 p. $3.00.

MY BROTHER BILL. By Ruth Mitchell. New York: Harcourt, 1953, 344 p. $4.00.

Two new biographies of the early, embattled, and subsequently justified advocate of American air power. Mr. Burlingame's book is the more dispassionate; Miss Mitchell's the more intimate and intense.

SIDNEY HILLMAN. By Matthew Josephson. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 701 p. $5.00.

A sympathetic but controversial biography of the late labor leader, founder of

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the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, and an influential national figure in the New Deal era.

Western Europe

PORTRAIT OF EUROPE. By Salvador de Madariaga. London: Hollis, 1952, 204 p. 18/.

An ardent believer in Europe, with all its varieties and tensions, the author is adept at the art—or is it a game?—of delineating and contrasting the different national characters.

UNDERSTANDING EUROPE. By Christopher Dawson. New York: Sheed, 1952, 261 p. $3.50.

A somber review of Europe in eclipse and an appeal for a spiritual revival. The author, well known as a Roman Catholic historian, is not wholly successful in coming to grips with his problem, especially in the task of relating European culture to that of the rest of the world—one of the sources of the present crisis.

DER SCHUMAN-PLAN IM EUROPÄISCHEN ZWIELICHT. By Frederick Haussmann. Munich: Beck, 1952, 266 p.

A useful commentary on a number of aspects of the Schuman Plan, including the views of it that have prevailed in France, Germany, the United States and Britain. Haussmann rejects oversimplified views of the Plan and stresses uncertainties and ambiguities in its provisions and in what different people expect it to do.

INTRODUZIONE STATISTICA ALLA STUDIO DEI PROBLEMI ECONOMICI DELL'EUROPA FEDERATA. Genoa: Istituto di Economia Internazionale, 1952, 164 p. L. 750.

A convenient collection of statistics concerning the "Europe of the Six," showing the position of individual countries—France, Italy, Western Germany and Benelux —and some comparisons of the whole area with Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

IN THOSE DAYS. By Edouard Herriot. New York: Old and New World Publishing Co., 1952, 276 p. $3.75.

JADIS. VOLUME II: D'UNE GUERRE À L'AUTRE 1914–1936. By Edouard Herriot. Paris: Flammarion, 1952, 650 p. Fr. 975.

The first volume of the memoirs of the former French Premier—dealing with the years before 1914—has now been translated, not too successfully. The second volume of the French edition carries the narrative to 1936; it is a substantial addition to French and diplomatic history between the two wars.

JEAN DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, MARÉCHAL DE FRANCE. By Pierre Croidys. Paris: Spes, 1952, 200 p. Fr. 370.

LA VIE EXALTANTE DE JEAN DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, MARÉCHAL DE FRANCE. By René Thomasset. Paris: Baudinière, 1952, 221 p. Fr. 375.

DE LATTRE, MARÉCHAL DE FRANCE. By Michel-Droit. Paris: Horay, 1952, 156 p. Fr. 225.

Three brief, commemorative biographies of the late Marshal, none very substantial.

DER AUSWÄRTIGE DIENST FRANKREICHS. By Ludwig Dischler. Hamburg: Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Offentliches Recht, 1952, 2 pts.

A compendium of information on the history, development and present structure of the French Foreign Office and diplomatic service.

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JUIN 36. By Jacques Danos and Marcel Gibelin. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1952, 285 p. Fr. 550.

An analysis of the French strikes of May and June 1936, with an appeal for a renewal of the unity of the labor movement.

L'ANNÉE POLITIQUE 1951. Paris: Éditions du Grand Siècle, 1952, 784 p. Fr. 2400.

A useful chronology, by months, of the principal political and economic events in France and the Union Française. Extensive documentary annex.

SCANDINAVIA. By Eric de Maré. London: Batsford, 1952, 262 p. 21/. (New York: British Book Centre, $4.50.)

A well-written book for the prospective traveller—especially good for Sweden.

NORTH NORWAY. By Frank Noel Stagg. London: Allen and Unwin, 1952, 205 p. 18/. (New York: Macmillan, $4.25.)

A brief history of that part of Norway lying north of the 65th parallel.

GREENLAND. Edited by Kristjan Bure. Ringköbing (Denmark): Rasmussen (for the Royal Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 1952, 166 p.

Eight articles about Greenland—its geography, administration, cultural and economic life.

MINNEN. By Ernst Wigforss. Stockholm: Tiden, 1951, 2 v. Kr. 33.75.

Memoirs of one of Sweden's most prominent Social Democrats, and former Minister of Finance.

L'ÉCONOMIE ALLEMANDE CONTEMPORAINE (ALLEMAGNE OCCIDENTALE) 1945–1952. By André Piettre. Paris: Médicis, 1952, 672 p. Fr. 1500.

A very valuable study. Mr. Piettre, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Strasbourg, has accumulated, organized and presented a vast amount of information on the stages of Germany's economy from defeat to recovery and association with the Western Powers. A wealth of statistics but also a coherent analysis and exposition of the various problems, financial and social, which have been encountered.

GERMANY: A GENERAL AND REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY. By Robert E. Dickinson. New York: Dutton, 1953, 700 p. $10.00.

A comprehensive and valuable advanced geography.

THE RUHR: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY. By Norman J. G. Pounds. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1953, 283 p. $4.00.

A useful handbook, by a professional geographer, about Europe's principal industrial concentration, its development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its current international importance.

GERMANY PLOTS WITH THE KREMLIN. By T. H. Tetens. New York: Schuman, 1953, 294 p. $3.75.

Mr. Tetens' thesis is that Germany is an altogether untrustworthy partner and may readily move to the Russian side as soon as we have contributed sufficiently to her reconstruction. The argument is based on historical analogy from the German past and a deep mistrust of the Adenauer régime. While the need for wariness on this issue is certainly indicated, Mr. Tetens drives his argument well beyond his evidence.

OUR LOVE AFFAIR WITH GERMANY. By Hans Habe. New York: Putnam, 1953, 247 p. $3.00.

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A personal, rather journalistic and frequently strident criticism of United States policy toward Germany since 1945. The author's major target is the rearmament of Germany.

THE BERLIN STORY. By Curt Riess. New York: Dial Press, 1952, 368 p. $3.75.

A rather anecdotal depiction of Berlin's vicissitudes since 1945. The author, a former Berliner, is now an American journalist.

ADOLF HITLER. By Walter Görlitz and Herbert A. Quint. Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1952, 656 p.

A long but hastily constructed and somewhat journalistic biography; not in the class of Bullock's recent study (noted here April 1953).

VON RUNDSTEDT. By Guenther Blumentritt. London: Odhams, 1952, 288 p. 16/.

A biography of the field marshal by his former chief of staff. Most of the story is familiar by now, but the book adds some light to Hitler's complete domination over German strategy in the second half of the war.

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF, 1657–1945. By Walter Goerlitz. New York: Praeger, 1953, 508 p. $7.50.

A somewhat abridged translation of the German edition noted here July 1951.

MEMORIE POLITICHE 1916–1925. By Antonio Salandra. Milan: Garzanti, 1951, 138 p. L. 500.

Published some 20 years after his death, these memoirs by a leading Italian politician relate to the cabinet crisis of 1916, the advent of Fascism, the question of Salandra's collaboration with the Fascist régime, and the Corfu crisis.

CRISI DI UNA GENERAZIONE. By Valdo Magnani and Aldo Cucchi. Florence: Nuova Italia, 1952, 94 p. L. 400.

The two former Italian Communists who bolted the Party in 1951 here explain why they entered the movement under Fascism and why they subsequently felt obliged to leave.

ITALIA NUOVA. By Leonardo Lo Curto. Milan: Vallardi, 1951, 248 p. L. 800.

Proposals for dealing with some of Italy's current problems: emigration, housing, economic development and social welfare.

THE PAPACY: A NEW APPRAISAL. By John P. McKnight. New York: Rinehart, 1952, 437 p. $5.00.

The author, a newspaperman, is more successful in his analysis of the Papacy's rôle in present world affairs than in his effort to deal with religious and doctrinal questions.

IL VATICANO TRA DUE GUERRE. By M. M. Sceinman. Rome: Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, 1951, 329 p. L. 500.

A hostile account of Vatican policy since 1914, translated from the Russian original published in the U.S.S.R. in 1948.

VALORACIÓN HISPÁNICA EN EL MEDITERRÁNEO. By R. Gay de Montellá. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1952, 378 p. Ptas. 60.

A survey of the rôle of the Mediterranean in international politics and of the strategic importance of Spain.

GIBRALTAR. By Juan de la Cosa. Valencia: Semana Gráfica, 1952, 191 p. Ptas. 25.

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Broadcasts over Radio Nacional de España on a variety of current international topics.

Eastern Europe

A WINDOW ON RED SQUARE. By Frank Rounds, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1953, 304 p. $3.00.

From January 1951 to July 1952 Mr. Rounds, who handles the Russian language well, worked in the American Embassy in Moscow. He contrived to do a great deal of sightseeing both in and out of the city, and his journal of these 18 months is exceptionally fresh and perceptive.

DAS OSTPAKT-SYSTEM. Edited by Boris Meissner. Hamburg: Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Offentliches Recht, 1951, 2 pts.

A collection of the treaties and agreements made by the U.S.S.R. since 1943 in binding up its system of alliances and dependencies in East Europe and Asia.

LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Solomon M. Schwarz. New York: Praeger, 1952, 364 p. $6.00.

A valuable, scholarly and much-needed study of Soviet labor policy and its impact on the lives of Russian workers. The author, who has devoted many years to the subject, has based his work almost exclusively on Soviet sources and has extracted an enormous amount of information from them. The resulting picture is not a bright one.

HISTOIRE ÉCONOMIQUE DE L' U.R.S.S. By Serge N. Prokopovicz. Paris: Au Portulan (Flammarion), 1952, 627 p. Fr. 2100.

The author—who has been writing on Russian economic topics since before the turn of the century—here presents his views on the Soviet economy since 1917. Somewhat loosely organized, with sections of unequal merit, the book contains a great deal of solid information.

THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE. By Terence Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press (for the Scott Polar Research Institute), 1952, 162 p. $4.25.

An examination, based on Russian language sources, of the efforts to develop a sea route along the northern coast of Siberia.

ONE OF THE FIFTEEN MILLION. By Nicholas Prychodko. Boston: Little, Brown, 1952, 236 p. $3.00.

A Ukrainian's account of his years in prison and at forced labor in Siberia.

OT MOSKVY DO N'YU-lORKA. By M. M. Novikov. New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1952, 404 p. $3.00.

Memoirs of an elderly Russian scientist, at one time president of Moscow University, who was expelled by the Soviet régime and spent most of the inter-war period in Prague.

I DREAMT REVOLUTION. By William Reswick. Chicago: Regnery, 1952, 328 p. $4.50.

Reminiscences of an American correspondent in Moscow in the 1920's and early 1930's, of interest because of the author's personal acquaintance with members of the Bolshevik "right opposition"—Rykov, Bukharin and others.

STALIN VERSUS MARX. By Klaus Mehnert. London: Allen and Unwin, 1952, 127 p. (New York: Macmillan, 1953, $2.00.)

An interesting discussion of the "dialectical" relationship between Marxism and Stalinism, proceeding from the sudden and enforced reversal, in 1934, of the Soviet historiographical approach to the Russian past.

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CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT. By Guenther Reinhardt. New York: Hermitage House, 1952, 322 p. $3.50.

A controversial report on the activities of Soviet secret agents—especially in planning political murders—by a former F.B.I. counterintelligence investigator.

THE DECLINE OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA, 1855–1914. By Hugh Seton-Watson. New York: Praeger, 1952, 406 p. $7.50.

Professor Seton-Watson, who approaches his subject from a background of interest in the smaller countries of Eastern Europe, traces the crises of the Russian Empire from the Crimean War to the First World War. His approach gives him some useful insights.

MAAMME ITSENÄISTYMISEN VUOSILTA. By K. G. Idman. Helsinki: Söderström, 1953, 359 p. M. 750.

The memoirs of a well-known Finnish diplomat, covering the important years from the collapse of the Tsarist régime to the establishment of the Finnish republic.

HEROIC FINLAND. By David Hinshaw. New York: Putnam, 1952, 306 p. $4.50.

An enthusiastic sketch of Finnish society and history, not for the specialist.

THE FORGOTTEN REPUBLICS. By Clarence A. Manning. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 264 p. $2.75.

Professor Manning, well known as a champion of Ukrainian independence, has here taken up the cause of the Baltic republics. His attempt, however, to cover the whole range of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian history has made his account rather thin in places.

THE HISTORY OF ESTONIAN PEOPLE. By Evald Uustalu. London: Boreas, 1952, 261 p. 21/.

A sober presentation of Estonian history which also throws light on many problems of the Baltic countries in general. The restrained account of events since the Russian Revolution is particularly valuable.

CRUSADER IN THE SECRET WAR. By the Countess of Listowel. London: Johnson, 1952, 287 p. 18/. (New York: British Book Centre, $4.00.)

A rather erratic book on the exploits, during the Second World War and after, of a Polish diplomat and secret service agent—here called "Peter Nart"—evidently an accomplished practitioner of what the author brightly calls "the fascinating art of intelligence work."

9.15 TO FREEDOM. By Martin Fiala. London: Wingate, 1952, 135 p. 7/6. (New York: British Book Centre, 1953, $2.00.)

The story of the Czech train which crashed through the Iron Curtain in 1951.

EIN LEBEN FÜR UNGARN. By Reichsverweser Admiral Nikolaus von Horthy. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1953, 327 p.

Writing from exile in Portugal, the aged former Regent of Hungary reviews his long and troubled career. Nearly a third of the volume deals with the years of the Dual Monarchy; the inter-war period is treated rather briefly.

FACE AU TRIBUNAL FASCISTE. By Matyas Rakosi. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1952, 222 p. Fr. 300.

WIR BAUEN EIN NEUES LAND. By Mátyás Rákosi. Berlin: Dietz, 1952, 244 p.

The first volume concerns the Hungarian Communist leader's arrests and trials as a revolutionary in the 1920's and 1930's. The second is a selection of his speeches and articles, between 1948 and 1951, when the wheel had turned—half-circle.

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TITO OF YUGOSLAVIA. By K. Zilliacus. London: Joseph, 1952, 303 p. 21/.

It was more or less inevitable that Mr. Zilliacus should write this favorable biography, and the conclusions drawn are not unexpected. His attempt, however, to relate the Titoist problem to his own hopes for coexistence between the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds is of doubtful merit.

AUS DER GESCHICHTE DER VATERLÄNDISCHEN FRONT BULGARIENS. By I. B. Walew. Berlin: Dietz, 1952, 132 p.

The Communist interpretation of the wartime resistance movement in Bulgaria; translated from the Russian.

CRETE. By Leland G. Allbaugh. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 572 p. $7.50.

A valuable report of an extensive field survey undertaken by the Rockefeller Foundation. Intended as a case study of the economic, social and health conditions of an "underdeveloped" area, it provides a wealth of well-organized data which should be of use in finding the means and techniques for improving the situation not only in Crete but in other areas with analogous problems.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

KING GEORGE THE FIFTH. By Harold Nicolson. New York: Doubleday, 1953, 570 p. $7.50.

After King George's death it was decided that his biography should be written in two installments. A private life was prepared by John Gore ("King George V. A Personal Memoir," London, Murray, 1941). Mr. Nicolson was chosen to chronicle his public life. He has been remarkably successful in presenting the King against the background of the two major themes: the functioning of a monarchy in a modern state and the changing power and influence of the monarchy during the 25 years' reign.

STANLEY BALDWIN. By G. M. Young. London: Hart-Davis, 1952, 266 p. 21/.

Although Mr. Young was asked, "somewhat languidly," by the late Prime Minister to write his life, this modest biography does not conceal Baldwin's shortcomings, especially in the field of foreign affairs, for which he had little talent and less interest. These shortcomings, however, are correctly put in the broader setting of the prevalent indecision and uncertainty of the 1930's.

ERNEST BEVIN. By Francis Williams. London: Hutchinson, 1952, 288 p. 21/. (New York: British Book Centre, $4.50.)

An affectionate biography by a close associate; less satisfactory, perhaps inevitably so, in its portrayal of Bevin as a Foreign Secretary than in its account of his earlier career as trade union organizer or Minister of Labor.

PORTRAIT OF AN ADMIRAL. By Arthur J. Marder. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 407 p. $6.00.

A well-edited publication of the papers of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, during the critical years of naval history, 1909 to 1920.

THE LIFE OF GEORGE LANSBURY. By Raymond Postgate. New York: Longmans, 1952, 331 p. $4.75.

An affectionate but discerning biography of the late British Labor leader and pacifist by his son-in-law.

THE BRITISH SOCIALIST ILL-FARE STATE. By Cecil Palmer. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1952, 618 p. $6.00.

The title indicates both the subject and viewpoint of this ponderous indictment by a late British journalist.

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THE SOCIAL SERVICES OF MODERN ENGLAND. By M. Penelope Hall. London: Routledge, 1952, 332 p. 25/.

A useful, and readable, general description of the recent extension of social services in Britain.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1914–1919. By Henry R. Winkler. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952, 288 p. $3.00.

A study of the currents of opinion in Britain which contributed to the establishment of the League of Nations; particular emphasis on the rôle of such ideas within the major political parties.

THE AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY HANDBOOK, 1952. Edited by W. Farmer Whyte. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1952, 338 p. (New York: Anglobooks, $8.50.)

The first year of publication of a useful handbook and who's who of Australian parliamentary life and public administration.

BRITISH COLONIAL CONSTITUTIONS, 1947. By Martin Wight. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 571 p. $8.50.

The texts of 11 constitutions, intended as a representative cross-section of the Dependent Empire.

The Middle East

THE SUEZ CANAL IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Hugh J. Schonfield. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953, 174 p. $4.50.

Mr. Schonfield, who has already written a study of de Lesseps, here reviews the history of the Canal down to the current Anglo-Egyptian disagreement. Critical of recent British policy.

TO JERUSALEM. By Folke Bernadotte. London: Hodder, 1951, 280 p. (New York: British Book Centre, $4.50.)

The Palestine journal of the late United Nations mediator.

PANORAMA DEL MUNDO ARABE. By Rodolfo Gil Benumeya. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1952, 202 p. Ptas. 50.

A broad survey of the Arab world from Morocco across North Africa to Saudi Arabia.

THE ARABIA OF IBN SAUD. By Roy Lebkicher and Others. New York: Moore, 1952, 179 p. $6.00.

An attractively-prepared and informative handbook, originally designed for the employees of the Arabian American Oil Company.

PERSIA IN LOTTA. By Maria Antonietta Macciocchi. Rome: Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, 1952, 216 p. L. 350.

An Italian journalist, of the Communist persuasion, visits Iran, finds Anglo-American imperialism bad, the Tudeh Party good, and Mossadegh playing an important "objective" rôle.

FRÜHROT IN IRAN. By Schulze-Holthus. Esslingen: Bechtle, 1952, 356 p.

Memoirs of a German espionage agent in Iran during the Second World War.

A GUIDE TO IRANIAN AREA STUDY. By L. P. Elwell-Sutton. Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1952, 235 p. $4.00.

A useful guide and bibliography for the prospective student of Iranian affairs.

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South and Southeast Asia

THE INDIA I KNEW, 1897–1947. By Sir Stanley Reed. London: Odhams, 1952, 262 p. 21/.

Pleasantly-written recollections of the editor of *The Times of India* from 1907 to 1923.

NUTRITION IN INDIA. By V. N. Patwardhan. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1952, 345 p. (New York: Heinman, $5.50.)

A review of the work done in India in the field of nutrition and dietary deficiency over the last 40 years. The author is a director of nutrition research laboratories in southern India.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN BURMA. By F. S. V. Donnison. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs (in coöperation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1953, 119 p. $2.50.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN MALAYA. By S. W. Jones. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs (in coöperation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1953, 229 p. $3.00.

Competent studies of the establishment and growth of British public administration in these two areas. Mr. Donnison was formerly Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma; Mr. Jones was an officer in the Malayan Civil Service for some 30 years.

LE DESTIN DE L'INDOCHINE. By General G. Sabattier. Paris: Plon, 1952, 466 p. Fr. 990.

A somber assessment of the course of events in Indo-China since 1941. General Sabattier, who directed the resistance movement in the area after the Japanese took control in May 1945, finds much to criticize in French policy before and since the war.

SOLDATS DE LA BOUE. II: NAM-KY. By Roger Delpey. Paris: Martel, 1951, 253 p. Fr. 540.

SOLDATS DE LA BOUE. III: GLAS ET TOCSIN. By Roger Delpey. Paris: Martel, 1952, 253 p. Fr. 540.

Two further volumes of reportage on the war in Indo-China. Volume I appeared in 1950.

NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN INDONESIA. By George McTurnan Kahin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, and Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University), 1952, 490 p. $6.00.

A detailed and extensively-documented study of the Indonesian drive to independence after the Second World War. The author, who spent a year in the islands in 1948–1949, is extremely critical of the whole Dutch rôle but hopeful for the prospects of the new republic.

LAND AND PEOPLE IN THE PHILIPPINES. By J. E. Spencer. Berkeley: University of California Press (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1952, 282 p. $4.50.

A bleak study, based on recent field work, of the critical problem of the Philippine rural economy and its deleterious effects on the life of the new state.

ROMULO: VOICE OF FREEDOM. By Cornelia Spencer. New York: Day, 1953, 256 p. $3.00.

Not for the adult reader.

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The Far East and Pacific Ocean

WOODROW WILSON AND THE FAR EAST. By Russell H. Fifield. New York: Crowell, 1952, 383 p. $5.00.

WOODROW WILSON'S CHINA POLICY, 1913–1917. By Tien-yi Li. New York: Twayne, 1952, 268 p. $4.50.

Two able studies. Mr. Fifield traces with skill and dispassion the diplomacy of the Shantung question from its origins before 1914 through the Versailles Conference. Dr. Li's book is limited to the years 1913 to 1917 (a subsequent volume may be forthcoming) and is more directly concerned with President Wilson's approach to Chinese problems as derived from his general political outlook.

THE THIRD FORCE IN CHINA. By Carsun Chang. New York: Bookman Associates, 1953, 345 p. $4.50.

Mr. Chang, iounder of the Democratic Socialist Party and a drafter of the 1947 Chinese Constitution, sharply criticizes both the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek for their behavior in recent decades. He does not, however, indicate any very real prospects, past or present, for a *tertium quid.*

LA CONQUÊTE DE LA CHINE PAR MAO TSE-TUNG (1945–1949). By General L.-M. Chassin. Paris: Payot, 1952, 244 p. Fr. 700.

A French military historian traces the steps by which the Chinese Communists gained their victory over the Nationalists.

THE LOST CHURCHES OF CHINA. By Leonard M. Outerbridge. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952, 237 p. $3.50.

A former Protestant missionary attempts to discover why the Christian church has recurrently lost ground in China.

BACK DOWN THE RIDGE. By W. L. White. New York: Harcourt, 1953, 182 p. $3.00.

Using the stories of 12 men wounded in action, Mr. White—who wrote "They Were Expendable" in the days of the last war—gives a vivid picture of the evacuation of casualties in the Korean War from the front lines to the mobile hospitals and on to the States.

VERDICT IN KOREA. By Robert T. Oliver. State College (Pa.): Bald Eagle Press, 1952, 207 p. $4.00.

The author, who has served as Counselor to President Syngman Rhee, discusses the Korean conflict. While Dr. Oliver, as he says, does not view the situation with "serene objectivity" he is right in his belief that a view "from the inside" should be presented.

Africa

NAISSANCE DU PROLÉTARIAT MAROCAIN. Paris: Peyronnet, 1952, 291 p. Fr. 1200.

This third volume of the series "Cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asie" is based on field studies undertaken between 1948 and 1950. It is largely devoted to two important topics: the patterns and effects of tribal emigration and the growth of an urban proletariat in the cities of north Morocco.

THE PEOPLES AND POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Leo Marquard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 258 p. $3.50.

A sober and informative discussion, by a South African, of the dangerous multiracial situation in his country.

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JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS. By J. C. Smuts. New York: Morrow, 1952, 496 p. $6.00.

An affectionate, substantial, though not definitive biography of the late statesman, by his son.

Latin America and the West Indies

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO. By Howard F. Cline. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 452 p. $6.00.

Mr. Cline, director of the Hispanic Foundation of the Library of Congress, has made a valuable contribution to the American Foreign Policy Library. Summarizing the variety of factors which have molded the Mexican nation he presents a lucid, and in general optimistic, account of Mexico's twentieth-century political development and its relations with the United States.

THE MEXICAN VENTURE. By Tomme Clark Call. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 273 p. $4.50.

A Texas journalist, who travelled extensively through the Republic, has undertaken to report on Mexico's social, economic and political progress, especially in recent years. The emphasis is on domestic economic problems, but a concluding chapter briefly treats Mexico's foreign relations.

L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE ENTRE EN SCÈNE. By Tibor Mende. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1952, 317 p. Fr. 780.

A journalist who seems to specialize in the problems of underdeveloped areas here surveys the countries of South and Central America.

THE RURAL LAND CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM OF PUERTO RICO. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1952, 261 p. $2.75.

Six essays on rural land classification in various regions of Puerto Rico.

PENSAMIENTO Y ACCION. By Romulo Betancourt. Mexico: Silva, 1951, 387 p.

A collection of articles and speeches by the former President of Venezuela and head of the Partido Acción Democrática.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

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The State of food and agriculture; review and outlook—1952. Rome, FAO, 1952. 126 p. (CL16/2.) $1.00.

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Cartels

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Fine papers; investigation into alleged combines in the manufacture, distribution and sale of fine papers. Ottawa, Cloutier, 1953. 433 p.

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Preliminary report on trade between the ECAFE region and Europe; prepared jointly by the Secretariats of ECAFE, ECE and FAO. New York, 1952. 254 p. (E/CN.11/TP/8.)

Economic Conditions

Economic survey of Europe since the war. New York, 1953. 385 p. (1953.II.E.4.) $3.50.

Economic survey of Asia and the Far East 1952. New York, 1953. 104 p. (E/CN.11/362.) $1.00.

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Zweiter Bericht an den Europarat. Bonn, Bundesministerium für den Marshall-Plan, 1952. 32 p.

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United States income taxation of private United States investment in Latin America. New York, 1953. 80 p. (1953.XVI.1.) 75¢.

Governmental policies concerning unemployment, inflation and balance of payments, 1951–52. New York, 1952. 135 p. (1952.II.A.2.) $1.00.

A Standardised system of national accounts. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1952. 99 p.

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France

Cinq ans d'exécution du plan de modernisation et d'équipement de l'Union Française. (Réalisations 1947–1951 et Programme 1952.) Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1952. 389 p.

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RACE and class in rural Brazil, edited by Charles Wagley. Paris, UNESCO, 1952. 160 p. $1.25.

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